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ABSTRACT

Development, Expertise, and Infrastructure between the Ohio River and Cincinnati Riverfront,
1895-Present
by
Raymond Pettit

Advisor: Jeff Maskovsky

As the first major U.S. urban center located west of the Appalachian Mountains, Cincinnati’s early
growth depended on the Ohio River, a vital route for the westward drive of U.S. settler colonialism in the
first half of the nineteenth century. Over time, with the expansion of railroads and shifting trade routes, the
river became less relevant to the success of the city. In this dissertation study, I pick up the history of
Cincinnati’s relationship with the Ohio River after it had apparently declined in importance. Through a
focus on how Cincinnati elites have advocated for different infrastructural projects along the Ohio River, I
track the ways that they have hoped to again make the river productive for the city. In particular, I focus
on the creation of infrastructure concerning 1) navigation, 2) flooding, and 3) pollution. By developing
infrastructure related to these three areas, local elites hoped to reshape how the Ohio River behaved,
making it more amenable to Cincinnati’s overall needs, as well as to spur development in the region. In
doing so, I connect these proposals designed to transform the entire Ohio River with plans to redevelop
specific stretches of the riverfront around Cincinnati. To explore these two interests simultaneously, I
examine the activities of Cincinnati-based groups that have sought to unite the skills of technical experts
with those of local developers in order to promote infrastructural solutions to the issues of navigation,
flooding, and pollution – groups like the Ohio Valley Improvement Association, the Cincinnati Stream
Pollution Committee, the Cincinnatus Association, the Riverfront Advisory Council, and others. In doing
so, this study uncovers the entanglement of technocratic expertise and development knowledge in
shaping how local elites have maintained their authority in the city and reshaped the urban environment
to suit their needs. Through a century of collaboration on infrastructural projects, technical experts and
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development elites in Cincinnati have been able to transform the riverfront – which had once been a zone
of mobility, racial intermixing, and economic opportunity for the city’s poorer residents – into a tightlycontrolled area that is increasingly inaccessible to Cincinnati’s low-income residents or small businesses.
At the same time, this historical and ethnographic study also places particular emphasis on understanding
the role the Ohio River itself has had in enabling these processes to unfold. Far from being an inert
bystander, the Ohio River has actively shaped these infrastructural projects along the Cincinnati
riverfront, many times being a major contributor to the successful realization of elite objectives around
white supremacy, imperialism, urban growth, and public health, among others.
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Chapter 1.
Introduction

In the early 1990s, traffic engineers from the Cincinnati Department of Public Works were
planning for a massive renovation of Fort Washington Way, the 0.9-mile-long bypass connecting
Interstate 71 and Interstate 75, which also separates the city’s downtown from its waterfront. Engineers
estimated it would cost $20 to $30 million to resurface the entire section of highway. As part of the
process, City Hall wanted public input, so an assistant traffic engineer sent an outline of proposed traffic
adjustments over to Downtown Cincinnati, Inc. (DCI), a redevelopment non-profit focused on reviving the
city center, launched in 1994. While DCI was expected to rubberstamp the plan, the group’s
Transportation Committee pushed back, rejecting the proposal and urging the city to take the opportunity
to rethink Fort Washington Way’s whole layout. John Schneider, a local real estate developer and head of
the DCI Transportation Committee, assembled a group of what he termed “merry rebels” to formulate
alternatives, including Jim Duane, the head of the Ohio-Kentucky-Indiana Regional Council of
Governments (OKI), the group that held final approval over federal transportation funding for the region.
The group presented its own proposal for Fort Washington Way at a press conference on March 2, 1995,
calling to transform the Fort Washington Way bypass into a landscaped boulevard and reroute traffic
through adjacent highway corridors (Curnutte 1995).
DCI and OKI eventually backed off from completing replacing Fort Washington Way, but they
gained support to independently develop a proposal for a much narrower bypass that would also be
submerged below street level, reducing the highway’s disruptive break between downtown and the
riverfront. In parallel, the city also contracted its own planning consultant, Urban Design Associates, to
consider riverfront development options, whose independent review supported the DCI-OKI approach for
Fort Washington Way. Decisively, the City Manager and Mayor, as well as the powerful Cincinnati
Business Committee (CBC), were attracted by the opportunity to free up 14 acres of publicly-owned land
near the riverfront as a result of reducing Fort Washington Way’s footprint. With this increased support
from City Hall and the local business community, OKI contracted Parsons Brinckerhoff, an international
construction engineering firm that had just opened an office in Cincinnati, to design a final proposal.
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The city oversaw Fort Washington Way’s reconstruction between 1998 and 2000 at a cost of
$313.4 million, a total which included a number of connected infrastructure projects: the bypass, a new
riverfront floodwall, improved sewer overflow systems, a transit center, water main replacements, and
buried foundations to facilitate capping the bypass if resources ever became available (Pilcher 2000). The
project designers saw the new Fort Washington Way – by freeing-up public land and better linking
Cincinnati’s downtown with the Ohio River – as a critical first step in finally spurring private redevelopment
in the waterfront area, an issue that had resisted resolution for decades. According to Schneider, city
officials and developers believed the completion of a redesigned Fort Washington Way was a crucial first
step in their plans for the waterfront, which included building two new sports stadiums, a National
Underground Railroad Freedom Center, a public park, and a new mixed-use neighborhood in the area.
As the chair of the DCI Transportation Committee, John Schneider played a key role in changing
the appearance and function of Fort Washington Way, a major piece of transportation infrastructure for
the city. Over the next two decades, Schneider went on to become a prominent participant in public
debates about the location of the baseball stadium and whether or not the city should build a new
streetcar line. However, the Fort Washington Way project remained an eye-opening experience for him:

...yeah it was kind of a glorious ride. It was, for a guy who had never been involved in civic things,
you know to wake up and see your picture on the front page of the Enquirer, it was kinda crazy,
you know? But I think it was really a good example of how citizens with high aspirations for a city
but maybe little practical knowledge can overcome the forces that are resistant to change.

Schneider’s story is strikingly familiar in many ways: an engaged citizen with a good idea – who
happened to be at the right place at the right time – overcoming obstacles in order to contribute to his
community and challenge the status quo. A long-time downtown resident, Schneider dedicated his free
time to improving the city, showing a concern for volunteerism that can be traced back to the era of de
Tocqueville (Bellah et al 1985). This tradition remains strong despite concerns over a decline in civic
engagement (Putnam 2000).
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At the same time, Schneider’s role is a clear example of the activities of an urban growth
machine, a local coalition of elites from the sectors of real estate, government, industry, culture, and
media who pursue development strategies intended to boost their cities and to attract outside capital and
governmental redistribution (Logan and Molotch 1987). After the 1960s, deindustrialization helped tie an
ideology of growth to an increasing belief that different cities were in direct competition with one another,
putting pressure on cities to distinguish themselves or risk the spectacular fall of cities like Detroit or New
York (Harvey 1989). Schneider participated in Cincinnati’s growth machine as a real estate developer
who owned properties downtown. As a civic booster, a volunteer, and a developer in his own right,
Schneider argued that the redevelopment of “drop-dead amenities” like Cincinnati’s riverfront had the
potential to transform perceptions of the city and spur considerable local growth (Curnutte 1995). The
proposal Schneider and his partners put forth – to scale back the highway, improve accessibility, and
beautify the area – drew on waterfront development strategies successfully being utilized by a number of
1

other cities such as Baltimore, San Antonio, and Portland. Ideally, the project would benefit Schneider’s
urban property investments but also the community as a whole.
As familiar as this story seemed, I was drawn to the way Schneider presented himself when
looking back at this formative moment in the early 1990s, stressing particularly his lack of experience and
limited technical knowledge at the time. He had been appointed head of the DCI’s Transportation
Committee only because he happened to take the bus instead of owning a car. To his peers, this qualified
him as an expert on public transportation. According to Schneider, at the time he had an interest in
understanding how transportation worked, but he was far from well-versed on the subject (he has
subsequently become a very immersed in the field). Yet, rather than hindering him, he counted this
inexperience as an advantage:

I think it was really one of those things where, there’s some benefit to not knowing what you’re
doing, in terms of, to put ideas out there that haven’t been through the filter of what the traffic
engineers and the finance people say are possible. To say ‘Let’s do this,’ and capture the public’s

1

The DCI-OKI proposal is also a good example of interurban fast policy transfer, where a policy that is
successfully implemented in one city is adopted by others, as part of this pressure to remain competitive
in a context of zero-sum development (Peck 2011).
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imagination, so that all of a sudden now you have the wind of public opinion at your back, and the
people that would normally be the gatekeepers, they have to find a way to get it done.

The joint DCI and OKI plan outraged the city’s Department of Public Works, as well as the Ohio
Department of Transportation (ODOT), who were far advanced in their own planning processes.
According to Schneider, the same assistant traffic engineer who had originally requested DCI’s approval
on traffic adjustments later sent an eleven-page letter to the City Manager explaining in detail why the
DCI-OKI proposal was impractical and undesirable. The City Manager refused to sign off on the letter.
The city’s urban planning department was also upset that their proposal calling for a massive concrete
platform to transverse Fort Washington Way, reconnecting downtown and the riverfront, had apparently
been forgotten. In our conversation, Schneider presented these engineers and planners as inflexible and
constrained by their professional backgrounds, contrasted against his own capacity to imagine new
possibilities because of his outsider perspective. Schneider is obviously drawing on a historical vision of
technocrats as narrow-minded experts, obsessed with formal, by-the-book solutions (Akin 1977). They
legitimate their prominent administrative role in government through appeals to their specialized
knowledge and professional backgrounds. Despite this, Schneider argues that these experts are little
versed in the requirements of the real world. In this view, these technocrats are more invested in
maintaining their own authority and legitimacy in government rather than being open to new ideas that
could represent positive change (Olsen 2015), like the proposal Schneider had helped shape for Fort
Washington Way.
This idea of governing through expertise emerged in the nineteenth century. Ruling elites in
Europe expected technocrats, drawing on new scientific disciplines like statistics, cartography, and
hydrology, to direct projects concerning transportation, agriculture, economics, and public health, ranging
from small-scale neighborhood interventions to massive reconfigurations of national or international
space, approaches that were deployed both at home and in the colonial context (Joyce 2003, Olsen
2008, Olsen 2015). Historians of governance have described this deployment of expertise as a key
aspect of technocracy, the view that technical solutions, not politics, are needed to resolve problems in
the public sphere (Mitchell 2002, Joyce 2003; see Mukerji 2009 for earlier roots). Proponents of
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technocracy argue that experts’ capacity to make objective and rational decisions based on scientific
knowledge raises them above political calculations and leads to improved results. Expertise thus
functions as an “anti-politics,” disqualifying alternative proposals and debate as misguided or based on
political interests, even, or especially, in cases traditionally understood as very political, such as with
public financing (Brash 2011) or land reallocation (Ferguson 1990). The political effectiveness of these
expert solutions lies “precisely in the way they [are] realised as ‘technical’ and so outside the political”
(Joyce 2003: 7, emphasis in original). In this way, questions of governance and power can be resolved by
apparently neutral experts.
However, technocrats have long aroused suspicion in Western democracies, as evidenced in the
criticisms expressed by Schneider. The public has viewed technocrats as elitists and antithetical to the
rule of democracy, removing the capacity of the people or their representatives to make decisions
affecting the common good (Fischer 1990, Allen 2003). These critics argue that technocratic experts
make decisions based on their professional backgrounds rather than listening to public input. Such
criticisms of remote, unelected government officials doing all the planning for infrastructure, parks, and
redevelopment helped lead to demands that the public have a voice in the decision-making process,
perhaps best known from the case of Robert Moses and Jane Jacobs (Caro 1975). As a result, more
governments have required community input as part of their technical planning processes.
For his part, Schneider pushes back on the neutrality of local government experts, arguing that
they were too invested in the normal state of affairs to be objective, and instead, specifically because of
his inexpertise, he had an unbiased perspective. His status as a civically-engaged volunteer freed him
from this restrictive technocratic viewpoint. In the Fort Washington Way case of infrastructural innovation,
“not knowing what you’re doing” can be a good thing. Yet, despite his claims of inexpertise, Schneider
was not just any outsider. His position as a real estate developer and a member of DCI qualified him to
make claims on behalf of the local growth machine. As a result, local powerbrokers did not reject out of
hand Schneider’s novel suggestions about how to best encourage riverfront redevelopment. Numerous
other citizens, lacking in engineering expertise or elite standing, might have had different proposals for
Fort Washington Way, but were not in positions to make themselves heard. Schneider’s role as a white,
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male developer provided him with a privileged position to push back on expertise and find a public forum
for his alternative vision.
But what is a developer? There are two typical responses to this question, which in many ways
appear contradictory. On the one hand, in the urban growth machine tradition of Logan and Molotch
(1987), the developer is a land speculator who seeks out any available method to profit from their
property holdings. Developers are capitalists united “behind a doctrine of value-free development – the
notion that free markets alone should determine land use” (Logan and Molotch 1987: 32). As such they
embody the ideology of urban growth, working to convince the public of the links between “growth goals
and better lives for the majority” (62). However, according to Neil Smith, while developers are consistent
proponents of growth policies, they are also closely attuned to the “locational seesaw” of profit in the
urban environment: “the successive development, underdevelopment and redevelopment of given areas
as capital jumps from one place to another, then back again, both creating and destroying its own
opportunities for development” (1996: 88). As one urban planner I spoke to in Cincinnati described it,
“there’s a game going on” and developers have to be constantly “buying, controlling, and making these
moves.” Smith (1996) explores in depth how developers assume the role of “mavericks,” seeking to tame
and profit from these wild, risk-filled frontiers of urban growth (14-16). Following this view, developers are
primarily understood as opportunistic individuals, without any particular professional formation, who use
their connections, experiences, and intuition to reshape the urban environment. To Logan and Molotch
(1987), the highly-experienced developer is also skilled in influencing technocrats and structural
conditions to favor their own ends (30), discussions which often take place in backroom settings (64).
On the other hand, the developer has also been represented in ways that overlap closely with
understandings of expertise. Multiple works have all shown how one of the primary objects of
bureaucratic expertise has been economic development (Ferguson 1990, Elyachar 2012, Scott 1998,
Mitchell 2002). In this sense, the developer (or “development practitioner”) relies on their professional
background to oversee massive economic restructuring projects designed to get rid of poverty, improve
health outcomes, and promote educational achievement. Focused on development projects from the
Tennessee Valley Authority to the Thaba-Tseka in Lesotho, these authors have shown how, despite
failures, appeals to development expertise have been incredibly successful in justifying technocratic
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solutions as preferable to political debate (Ferguson 1990). The fields of urban planning, community
health, and transportation design, among others, have extended this development logic to the city
(Fairfield 1994, Joyce 2003, Bocking 2006). Universities and groups like the Urban Land Institute produce
planning professionals who use tools like zoning, population predictions, and sustainability studies to
legitimize technical proposals in the service of development. Despite their diverse professional
backgrounds and claims to neutrality, these experts in the U.S. have consistently favored urban growth as
the most desirable path forward. Describing a context in New York City where planners were promoting a
rubric of urban sustainability, Checker (2011), describes how, while this approach, “appears as politically
neutral planning that is consensual as well as ecologically and socially sensitive,” in reality it consistently
“subordinates equity to profit-minded development” (212).
The speculative and technocratic dimensions of development may seem to contradict one
another, but I would argue that an accurate depiction of the urban developer holds these two views in
2

tension. It is clear in both instances that the developer is understood as an agent of economic growth,
although in one view it is because of their capacity for “maverick” speculation and on the other side it is
through the expert’s predilection for careful calculation. To understand how these starkly different figures
can be seen as connected, it is important to trace back the historical emergence of development as a
doctrine. Drawing on the work of Cowen and Shenton (1996), the origins of development theory derived
from the early stages of capitalist industrialization, in the first half of the nineteenth century. Many French
and English observers recognized the progress brought by industrialization, but also criticized the
destruction and disorder generated by these changes. In response, Comte and other Positivists argued
for a capitalist “development” as distinct from capitalist “progress.” Development represented social order
in tandem with growth, managed through what Cowen and Shenton identify as “trusteeship.” Rejecting
Adam Smith’s contention that “self-interest” ensured that progress would improve quality of life,

2

This uneasy relationship can be far from straightforward yet also incredibly persuasive. For one
example, Elyachar (2012) describes the ways that community-based critiques of development logics in
the 1980s metastasized into rejection of state planning and bureaucratic expertise. This in turn helped
pave the way for neoliberal arguments in support of privatization, promoting the rigors of the market as a
more efficient basis for the provision of public services. Yet, the emergence of these neoliberal shifts were
also typically accompanied by the strengthening of a local economic technocracy (often tracing its lineage
back to the Chicago School), which reinscribed an idea of expertise that neoliberalism had purportedly
sought to undercut (Kiely 2016). In this case, the speculative and technocratic faces of development
reinforced one another even as they competed for legitimacy.
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proponents of “trusteeship” argued that individuals (and nations) with experience accumulating wealth
had the capacity to direct growth in such a way that it would not disrupt social order at the same time.
This is because being a successful capitalist “liberates individuals from material labor and permits the
pursuit of the intellect,” so that they could “act as trustees for the wealth of society” (Cowen and Shenton
1996: 33). This history of “trusteeship” deftly weaves together the depictions of developers as both
speculator and expert. While Comtean Positivists emphasized “scientific” understanding, they also valued
the experiential aspects of becoming a capitalist and accumulating wealth. The “trustee” combined
aspects of expertise (though scientific and professional training) along with their own practical
background (and success) that enabled them to make decisions about how to best manage growth. I
recognize this is a fairly open definition of who “counts” as a developer, making the category inclusive of
almost any wealthy capitalist (industrialist, rentier, speculator, etc.) who uses their position to speak about
economic development, but I still think it is a useful way of distinguishing development from expertise,
even as these categories become intermixed in rather confusing ways. Brash (2011), discussing the local
administration of New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, has shown the continued power of this
techno-managerial combination of business acumen and claims to professional expertise when
attempting to control urban development.
At the same time, it is important to recognize that categories like "developer" and "expert" do not
represent stable groups of individuals over time. The study of elites, which is in many ways at the center
of this research, must examine how distinct class formations have made their claims to being “elite” with
the goal of shaping public institutions and means of governance (Blim 2016). In this sense, it is important
to evaluate here how the definition and accessibility of development knowledge and technical expertise
are constantly being contested among elites as a diverse group of actors in specific places and periods.
Therefore understanding how elites have sought to attain and exercise power in urban environments like
Cincinnati means paying attention to the ways that emerging sources of wealth or influence, as well as
negotiations between existing classes – elite or otherwise – are mapped onto these and other related
concepts (like “whiteness” or “masculinity” among many others).
In this dissertation study, I trace exactly this entanglement of technocratic expertise and
development knowledge in the formation of infrastructural plans across twentieth-century Cincinnati. As I
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will show, infrastructure has repeatedly been the terrain over which developers and experts have come
together over the past century; at times in agreement and other times in conflict. Schneider’s story is just
one instance of the ways infrastructure has appeared at the center of elite discussions around both
expertise and urban growth in Cincinnati. Focusing on the Cincinnati riverfront, I examine how
developers, industrialists, engineers, and public officials have been active in the creation of different
infrastructural systems intended to manage the Ohio River as well as cycles of disinvestment and
redevelopment affecting the city’s waterfront neighborhoods. At different times, groups like local lobbying
organizations, technical associations, governmental advisory boards, and redevelopment corporations –
bringing together representatives of elite interests from across the city, involving experts and non-experts
alike – have each put forward their own infrastructural proposals about how to best manage river issues
like navigation, flooding, or pollution, with the ultimate goal of either directly or indirectly remaking the
Cincinnati riverfront an attractive space for private investment. This focus on infrastructure as a continuing
focus of elite interest is not in any way to claim that infrastructure itself is a “coherent and stable historical
object, that infrastructure is a neutral way of describing certain engineering works, regardless of historical
period” (Rankin 2009: 61). Rather, as we will see in the following chapters, these proposals reflected a
range of goals and ideas of what constituted redevelopment and growth in the city. The name for
infrastructure itself changed during the period I cover here, from being called internal improvements in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, then promoted as public works around mid-century, and mostly
recently referred to as infrastructure. The histories of these different naming conventions reflect in part
how actors conceptualized their projects and the kinds of objectives they laid out for their work, even as
they also pushed back on the limitations of these names and responded to other ideas like modernism or
environmentalism in justifying their work.
In laying out these infrastructural histories, I rely on insights from two popular areas of research in
recent decades. First, there are numerous studies about waterfront redevelopment projects, which have
become so common that they constitute their own subgenre in the urban studies field (Sieber 1991,
Bunce and Desfor 2007). Many urban waterfronts across the world have experienced deindustrialization
as well as restructuring and consolidation due to transformative technologies like containerization,
dramatically changing these districts and exposing them to cycles of disinvestment. In turn, capitalists in
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recent decades have pursued new opportunities to realize value through transforming these locations into
landscapes of consumption (Zukin 1991). Frequently, this involves replacing or rehabilitating factories and
docks with mixed-use communities that combine residential, office, and commercial space, as well as the
displacement of low-income communities that had occupied these areas that were previously viewed as
undesirable, polluted, or marginal locations. As a result, countless waterfronts have been the leading
edge of intense capital investment and public-private partnerships that have reconstructed the urban
landscape to be more amenable to consumption-driven economies (Harvey 2001).
Second, there has been a turn to water in geography, anthropology, and other fields. These
studies concentrate on how efforts to manage water are closely interrelated with social governance.
Studies from a wide range of geographic areas and historical time periods have investigated the diverse
practices and forms of governance that have created systems of water irrigation, sanitation, hydropower,
or flood control. In more recent centuries, technocratic expertise has played a fundamental role in
developing these technologies and creating the organizational structures and bureaucracies intended to
manage massive water infrastructures, with Mukerji (2009) even arguing that projects to manipulate water
were one of the fundamental contributors to linking state power and technical knowledge. Taking the lead
from Swyngedouw (1999, 2004; see also Wittfogel 1957, Worster 1985), this political ecology approach
has also drawn attention to the ways access to water shapes relations of power, as well as how nature
and society have been co-produced through the management of water (Bakker 2003, Kaika 2005).
In Cincinnati, a focus on infrastructure shows the utility of both of these approaches. The
redevelopment literature has shown how urban growth proponents like Schneider see infrastructure as
the “base” needed to enable waterfront redevelopment – both literally and figuratively. Improvements in
transportation, flood protection, or sewage treatment (all of which were neatly encapsulated in the Fort
Washington Way project) are seen to “prime the pump” for further private development, which in turn
leads to resources for even better infrastructure, which entices more investment, and so on in a “virtuous
cycle” (Laidley 2007). By mitigating obstacles like flooding or pollution, which could deter investment or
exchange, these investments ensure that capital is able to circulate uninhibited (Harvey 1982). At the
same time, developers view infrastructure as necessary so that prospective residents or investors will feel
comfortable in spending their money on consumer goods, whether buying designer goods in a high-end
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boutique or purchasing upscale residential properties (Butler 2007). According to one local developer,
when convincing someone to buy a $3 million condominium on the riverfront, there is “a responsibility to
make sure that your community is safe, well-lit, with good signage, all the things that it takes to make
people want to be there.” Thus, areas that have infrastructural investments are overtly contrasted with the
more dangerous and decrepit neighborhoods that lack street lights, parking garages, video surveillance,
or other infrastructures of convenience and security (Low 2001).
Meanwhile, examining the Cincinnati riverfront and Ohio River through the lens of water
management studies provides quite different insights into the role of infrastructure. These studies help us
understand how experts from agencies like the Greater Cincinnati Water Works, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, and Metropolitan Sewer District are trying to control nature for the benefit of society,
attempting to make water and people perform in recognizable and acceptable ways (Linton 2010,
Sneddon 2012). Engineers managing the flow of water in Cincinnati by means of sewers, floodwalls, or
water mains thus intend to shape perceptions of the city – whether it should be understood as clean,
resilient, sustainable, modern, or otherwise (Gandy 2014). Known as technopolitics (Joyce 2003, Mitchell
2002, Von Schnitzler 2016), these efforts to define the conditions of everyday life through expertise
means infrastructure becomes a key site for how individuals and groups build an urban identity as well as
struggle over who is included or excluded from these categories (clean vs. dirty, modern vs. backward,
etc.). These kinds of infrastructural things “shape and delimit the way actions can be done” (Joyce 2003:
41), creating the parameters for both human and non-human actors to perform. Yet, despite technocratic
efforts to manage water and make it useful, political ecology has also shown how water actively shapes
the social in turn, as it subverts, escapes, or corrodes the infrastructural systems designed to contain it.
As a result, the Cincinnati riverfront and Ohio River are best understood as hybrids, waterscapes that are
concurrently social and natural (Swyngedouw 1999). Infrastructure plays a key role in this hybridity, acting
as “material mediators between nature and the city” (Kaika and Swyngedouw, 2000: 120).
In this research project, I bring together insights from these two approaches – that infrastructure
is, on the one hand, understood to facilitate economic growth while, on the other, is viewed as
establishing the framework for everyday life. Both perspectives are critical to understanding Cincinnati
and its relationship to the Ohio River. I utilize these two literatures to examine the activities of a number of
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elite classes originating in Cincinnati that were interested in developing infrastructure for the Ohio River
and the waterfront. The Ohio Valley Improvement Association, the Cincinnati Stream Pollution
Committee, the Cincinnatus Association, the Riverfront Advisory Council, and other local groups brought
together shifting representatives of the urban growth machine and technocratic expertise across multiple
decades, often with overlapping memberships and collaborative projects. Through participating in these
groups, boosters, advertisers, real estate interests were able to join engineers, urban planners, and
government bureaucrats to tackle issues of flooding, navigation, and pollution. My interest in excavating
these histories is to evaluate how these elite groups understood and utilized infrastructure in reshaping
the Ohio River and Cincinnati riverfront over the past century as well as pursuing their own class interests
relative to other groups, using the approaches laid out above, but also seeking to blur the boundaries
between scientific expertise and redevelopment strategies in theorizing the ways elites have configured
the local waterscape.
In doing so, I build on the methodology laid out in actor-network theory (ANT), which has
extensively examined the ways that technologies are coproduced by a range of human and non-human
actors. As an approach, ANT can be used to describe any social process, but its primary application has
been in the field of science, technology, and society (STS) studies. Developed by Latour and others, ANT
is a tool based on the “tracing of associations” (Latour 2005: 5), ones that create and maintain
technologies like infrastructures. While the inclusion of the term “network” is often misinterpreted as
indicating an interest in stable arrangements, in fact ANT calls for the social to be understood as
constantly in process, either involving the formation of new connections or requiring active work to sustain
existing relationships, applying equally for cases of consensus or conflict.
The ANT approach is clearly useful in terms of conceptualizing how infrastructures have been
formulated and utilized along the Cincinnati riverfront, calling for attention to the contributions of experts
and non-experts alike in shaping and maintaining systems for flood control, sewage treatment, and other
forms of water management. Yet, an ANT approach also requires attention to the role of non-human
actors like the Ohio River, which are enlisted to make matter and people perform in specific ways but
which also have their own agency and can behave in ways that are hard to predict (Joyce 2003, Bennett
2005). Thus, both human and non-human actors can be understood as “mediators,” who, through their
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relationships, “transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to
carry” (Latour 2005: 38). In describing these actor-networks, it is crucial to take seriously “the ability of
each actor to make other actors do unexpected things” (129) and thus alter how technologies are
conceived, implemented, and operate. In turn, technologies themselves, such as infrastructures, also act
to to shape the networks that form around them. As a result, ANT grounds social relationships in a lively
materiality, diverging sharply from a view of human agency operating upon an inert, non-social world
(Law 1994).
However, there are specific drawbacks to the way ANT approaches science and scientific inquiry
which are important to lay out since they touch on issues of expertise central to this research project.
First, with its roots in STS, ANT has left scientific expertise in a privileged position at the center of the
complex, shifting networks that surround technologies. Latour insists that science is uniquely responsible
for the “social construction of facts,” meaning that, even though science is inextricable from the practices
surrounding it and is subject to alteration by other actors, it is uniquely the scientist that produces “the
most ascertained, objective, and certified results ever obtained by collective human ingenuity” (2005: 893

90). To Latour, even though scientists fall short of the universal knowledge they claim (1991: 24), they
still retain a distinct position in understanding the how world works and in deciding upon the best ways to
act on this information. In contrast, I argue that it is important to avoid prescribing any special or unique
capacities to scientific experts, since as I plan to show in this study, the process of infrastructural
innovation can originate or depend on the contributions of non-experts and non-human actors as well.
Second, in ANT’s insistence on describing relationships only in the nitty-gritty of praxis, Latour
has adamantly rejected the analytical utility of social concepts like inequality and power if they are not
readily apparent in specific interactions. Latour claims that the reliance on these structural concepts leads
social scientists to hunt for data that conforms to their expectations rather than looking at what is really
going on in a particular time and place. Therefore, to Latour “any consideration of matters like masculine
supremacy or racism or imperialism or class structures are inadmissible because they are the old ‘social’
ghosts that blocked real explanation of science in action” (Haraway 1992: 332). As a result, ANT provides
little encouragement to consider why specific actors are included or excluded from technological
3

Reinforcing this belief in the observational capacity of science, Latour (2005) intentionally positions ANT
as the most unbiased and scientific method available for studying social processes.
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networks, nor how scientific questions are shaped by systems of oppression or exploitation. This
reluctance to consider how social structures – such as the ideology of urban growth or racism – configure
the workings of science can lead to a non-critical reading of the development and utilization of scientific
knowledge, which ultimately runs the risk of reinforcing scientists’ arguments about their own neutrality.
An alternative methodological approach, assemblage theory attempts to remedy many of these
issues. Originally laid out by Deleuze and Guattari (1987), similar to ANT, assemblage theory provides a
framework for understanding fluid and contingent relationships encompassing human and non-human
actors, without privileging human agency. An assemblage perspective also emphasizes the multiplicity of
experiences, in that any given assemblage encompasses interpretations and activities that may not be
consistent. The constitution of an assemblage thus includes many different and cross-cutting registers.
According to Bennett, an assemblage is “a living, throbbing grouping whose coherence coexists with
energies and countercultures that exceed and confound it” (2005: 445). Within assemblage, there is no
perspective that provides the most complete or objective information available, unlike what we find with
Latour’s view on scientific expertise. Instead, all viewpoints, whether that of a scientist, a civic booster, an
infrastructural system, or the Ohio River, are partial, contingent, and limited.
As another important corrective, an assemblage is explicitly a “web with an uneven topography”
(Bennett 2005: 445), meaning it is shaped by the distribution of power through things like imperialism or
sexism, social structures that make some relationships more prominent and others more marginal, and
some individuals more likely to occupy powerful positions and force others into subordinate or absent
roles. This contoured description of assemblage contrasts sharply with Latour’s view of ANT, which rather
than highlighting the unevenness of relationships “has tried to render the social world as flat as possible
in order to ensure that the establishment of any new link is clearly visible” (2005: 16). As a result, ANT
prioritizes commensurability in studying actor relationships while assemblage theory urges research that
emphasizes disparities.
In this, an assemblage approach provides a useful methodology to reevaluate the formation of
infrastructural systems covering the Ohio River and Cincinnati riverfront. Rather than an ANT narrative of
scientific expertise responsible for infrastructural innovations, which are then modified by redevelopment
objectives and the constraints of materiality, we can begin to interrogate how each of these categories
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interrelate as well as how they correspond to the exercise of power in Cincinnati. In the same vein as
Mitchell (2002), my interest is therefore in the “social and political practice that produce simultaneously
the powers of science and the powers of the modern state” (2002: 312 f77). Although Mitchell is focused
on the creation of modern state power, in this context I am more interested in urban governance, which
has similarly sought legitimacy and effectivity through its co-production with scientific knowledge and the
operations of expertise (Isin 2002). The assemblages of infrastructure are therefore always also about
attempts to define, control, and benefit from the characteristics of the urban environment.
Finally, in investigating urban governance, expertise, and development together, I am primarily
interested in proposals for new infrastructural systems rather than the maintenance of existing networks
(though maintenance can also frequently be an innovative process). This is because, in stressing an
assemblage approach, I view these emergent infrastructural systems as attempts to reconfigure the
relationship between urban governance and daily life, and not just as delimited moments of scientific
4

progress or shifts in technological regimes (Berkhout 2002, Bijker 2007, see also Kuhn 1996). While
infrastructure often remains in the background unless something goes wrong and there is a breakdown in
the system (Star 1999), in these moments of planning and implementation, infrastructure is frequently
brought forward into the public eye in order to garner support and educate the population about the
benefits and use of new advances in technology (Kaika 2005).

A. The Ohio River and the Cincinnati Riverfront

It is common to hear in Cincinnati that the city would be nothing without the Ohio River. An
economic lifeline, the city owes its location and early growth to the Ohio River’s funneling of migrants and
commerce to the area. Many residents also recognize that, inversely, Cincinnati has had a profound
impact in shaping the Ohio River. The urban population, today over two million, has heavily polluted the
river, while a system of locks and dams have backed up the Ohio River’s flow, so that the water looks

4

At the same time, I do not want to deny that the process of maintenance is often not also an innovative
process, which requires new approaches and conceptions to respond to changing situations, or that also,
the introduction of new systems do not also double as required maintenance to reinforce or fix existing
infrastructural systems that may serve similar or complementary purposes.
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sluggish and muddy. These observations fit within a surging interest in environmental history in recent
decades, as historians have written a large number of “river biographies,” describing the transformation of
rivers through human intervention as well as the impact these rivers have had in shaping daily life (White
5

1995, Cioc 2002, Biggs 2012, Ball 2017). In parallel, a number of complementary studies, originating in
history, geography, anthropology and other fields, have examined how urban riverfronts are particularly
important sites for understanding the city as well as the relationship between rivers and urban
development, with widely different histories and patterns of usage (Haglund 2003, Kelman 2006, Bunce
and Desfor 2007, Rademacher 2011, Bear 2015). As a guiding approach, I take the formation of both the
Ohio River and Cincinnati as closely connected, trying to always keep their trajectories in tension, so that
I (sometimes awkwardly) zigzag back and forth between the river and the riverbank, investigating how the
Ohio River as a whole has been produced over the last century, while also anchoring these changes in
Cincinnati and its riverfront. Following Swyngedouw (1999), rather than reinforce an arbitrary division of
nature from society by presenting hydrological data and maps that naturalize the Ohio River basin, and
then describing how Cincinnati’s urban history has built on top in this pre-existing context, I prefer to
examine how each has varied and impacted one another over time.
The function of the Ohio River as well as its extent and appearance has changed significantly
over the course of its existence (Banta 1949). Along much of its length, the Ohio River replaced the
ancient Teays River, which flowed towards the northwest – from western North Carolina up to northern
Illinois – instead of the Ohio River’s present southwesterly orientation. Glaciers descending from the north
disrupted the Teays River’s course approximately two million years ago, forming massive lakes where ice
dams interrupted the river. When these lakes overflowed, the flood scoured new channels that makes up
much of the present Ohio River’s passage. As the course of the river has shifted across the landscape, it
has left leaving valleys, meanders, natural levees, and other geomorphic features to mark these
transitions. Today, the 981-mile long river extends from an arbitrary beginning point adjacent to downtown
Pittsburgh, at the junction of the Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers, down to Cairo, Illinois, where it joins
the Mississippi River, covering a fertile area with significant rainfall throughout the year: “The Ohio basin
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For an anthropological approach to the river biography genre see Alley (2002) and Barnes (2014).
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is the third largest by discharge (8733m /s) in the United States, accounting for more than 40% of the
discharge of the Mississippi River but making up only 16% of its drainage area” (White et al 2011: 375).
The symbolic importance of this river has shifted along with its route. Many indigenous groups in
the area considered the Ohio River the primary waterway in the region and used it as a central feature of
the landscape. Indigenous settlement patterns along the Ohio River also experienced significant
population shifts due to factors like climate change, warfare, and increasing pressure from European
colonialism (Drooker 2008). French colonial interests, which claimed the entire Mississippi River basin in
1682, saw the Ohio River as an important route for trade and the supply of their military fortifications,
while, after the Treaty of Paris in 1763, the British used the river as a dividing line between southern
areas slowly opening to white settlement, and an “Indian Reserve” to the north (Ambler 1932). After U.S.
independence, the Ohio River became a vital route for waves of white settlers moving westward, a
powerful early symbol of the country’s Manifest Destiny and drive towards expansion (Gruenwald 2002),
while indigenous groups saw it as the main route of the new country’s genocidal push through the region
(Ostler 2015). Even as the westward migration of white settlers continued, the Ohio River also became an
important border as part of the Mason-Dixon Line, separating slave-owning states in the South from freelabor states in the North. This Ohio River area therefore served as an important borderland to connect the
different formations of white supremacy in the North and the South (Salafia 2013). Meanwhile, AfricanAmerican communities referred to the Ohio River as “River Jordan” in recognition of its emblematic role
on the Underground Railroad and the route to freedom (Trotter Jr. 1998).
As the first major city along the Ohio River, and located at its midpoint, Cincinnati’s history is
deeply rooted in the idea of the Ohio Valley itself. Though the pattern of U.S. settler colonialism is often
portrayed as isolated families of white homesteaders slowly expanding outward into a wild frontier, in fact,
urban settlers often arrived first, attempting to predetermine the routes to be taken by later arrivals as well
as requesting military outposts to subdue indigenous populations (Wade 1959, Mahoney 1990). In the
Cincinnati area, John Cleves Symmes – who owned more than 300,000 acres in present-day southwest
Ohio after purchasing it from the U.S. Congress – offered free property to anyone willing to settle in the
city he planned to establish (WPA Guide 1943). In 1788, three groups founded villages within Symmes’
territory, which covered the area between the Little Miami River to the east and Great Miami River to the
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west. Symmes’ chosen settlement, North Bend, was joined by Columbia and Losantiville. All three were
located on the banks of the Ohio River. In 1789, a U.S. military detachment chose to base a new
garrison, Fort Washington, at Losantiville – whose name meant “town across from the mouth of the
Licking River” in a mixture of French (ville), Greek (anti), and Latin (os), with the “L” standing for the
Licking River, a smaller river that flowed into the Ohio River from Kentucky. The garrison chose to build
Fort Washington (which gave its name to the highway bypass discussed at the beginning of this chapter)
in an elevated location, raising it above the most frequent flooding as well as providing a vantage
overlooking the Licking River in order to better forestall hostile incursions by indigenous groups into the
Kentucky interior, which at that point had been more densely-populated by white settlers (Stradling 2003).
The following year, 1791, the recently appointed Governor of the Northwest Territories, General Arthur St.
Clair, requested that Losantiville be renamed Cincinnati, in honor of the Society of the Cincinnati, a group
of veterans from the U.S. War of Independence, to which he belonged. The group’s name came from
Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, a Roman citizen-soldier who had served as dictator while defending the
ancient Roman Republic from invasion, but quickly relinquished his role once the threat was turned back.
Early U.S. leaders put up Cincinnatus as a patriotic model due to his dedication to democracy
(Waldstreicher 1997).
With the presence of Fort Washington, Cincinnati became an important center for military
campaigns against indigenous groups throughout the Northwest Territories, contributing to the town’s
early growth (Taylor 2004). Even after the garrison at Fort Washington relocated to Kentucky in 1803,
Cincinnati residents played a key role in building the Ohio Valley as a growing domain of white settler
colonialism. Merchants and wholesalers built up the town as a trading post, maintaining commercial
connections along the valley’s waterways. Many migrants descending in skiffs, keelboats, or flatboats on
the Ohio River stopped in Cincinnati to purchase the supplies they need to settle on the land that the U.S.
military was clearing of indigenous inhabitants. The introduction of steamboats in 1811, making upstream
travel widely accessible for the first time, further reinforced the city’s role as the center of the Ohio Valley,
with the busy Public Landing receiving goods and traders from across the region. Soon the Cincinnati
riverfront became known as the region’s “storefront” and the Ohio River as its Main Street (Gruenwald
2002).
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Cincinnati also developed as an early scientific and literary center, producing firsthand
information about the characteristics of the Ohio Valley (Hendrickson 1973). A local doctor, Daniel Drake,
produced some of the earliest geological, meteorological, and epidemiological studies of the region, as
well as founding the Western Museum Society (which briefly employed John James Audubon) and
Western Academy of Natural Sciences to begin to catalogue and display the resources found across the
Ohio Valley. Charles Cist, a local publisher and statistics enthusiastic, began producing some of the
earliest statistical analyses of urban life in the region, documenting Cincinnati’s growth and early history,
including popular settler stories about the white pioneers and their encounters around Cincinnati (Cist
1845). Local elites also founded a number of regional periodicals in Cincinnati, seeking to shape a
distinctive new cultural identity for the rough-and-tumble West (Katz 2002). An idea of expertise guided
these early efforts to explore and describe the Ohio Valley. Binaries of expertise and indigenous
ignorance underpinned settler colonialism in the area and justified the displacement and domination of
indigenous groups (Hobart 1993). Individuals like Daniel Drake argued that Western knowledge was
universal due to its adherence to rational thought, and that indigenous knowledge was unreliable and too
directly tied to nature. In his Discourse on the History, Character, and Prospects of the West (1834),
Drake claimed that:

the civilizing of the Indians is beset with difficulties not easily surmounted; but who can say that
our efforts have been always well directed? or cease to regret, that they have perished by our
presence, as the young corn dwindles and dies beneath the shade of the beautiful sugar-tree,
while both belong to one kingdom of nature? (21)

Drake’s imagery, where Europeans (“the beautiful sugar-tree”) naturally overshadow and choke out
indigenous groups (“the young corn”), was typical of the view at the time that white colonists would
replace local groups because the former were more civilized and better capable of cultivating the land
while the later were incapable of advancing due to their lack of interest in owning property (Gidwani and
Reddy 2011). This belief, reiterated in countless early publications and stories, created an indelible link
between expertise and whiteness in the Ohio Valley.
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At the same time, these explorers and cataloguers documenting their discoveries across the Ohio
Valley were almost all men who believed their gender as well as their race made them capable of the selfcontrol and rational thinking necessary to undertake unbiased observation. White women, on the other
hand, were portrayed as inclined to ignorance due to their limited worldview confined to the domestic
sphere and tendency for emotional responses, making it difficult for them to be objective and impassive
(McNeil 1998). Middle and upper-class white women in Cincinnati were instead expected to contribute by
educating the public about morality, such as with local writer Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin,
and through cultivation of refinement, found in the works of local female artists like Lilly Martin Spencer
(Katz 2002).
The city’s population boomed as local merchants and workshops required significant labor to
meet the demands of the rapidly expanding settler population across the Ohio Valley (Ross 1985). An
intense regional labor shortage helped drive higher wages for Cincinnati workers, which initially attracted
interest among white immigrants from the East Coast in the first decades of the nineteenth century, and
then increasingly from overseas, particularly from Germany and Ireland (Stradling 2003). AfricanAmerican immigrants, mostly from the South, also began to arrive very early in Cincinnati’s history, later
competing with Irish immigrants for the lowest-paid unskilled jobs, including as dock hands and domestic
workers (Taylor 2004). These African-Americans, alongside the indigenous population, occupied the
bottom of the racial hierarchy in Cincinnati, while whites of English or Scottish descent dominated local
positions of power (Ross 1985).
Early in its development, Cincinnati’s residents and businesses concentrated near the two-block
long Public Landing, a city-held commons along the river where anyone could dock or access the water
for their needs. Over time, the city slowly spread out into the wide U-shaped basin behind the riverfront,
as well as expanding east and west along the riverbanks and across the river into Kentucky, primarily into
the towns of Newport and Covington. With many urban residents living close to their place of
employment, African Americans and the Irish increasingly occupied housing in the downtown riverfront,
since men from both communities competed for unskilled jobs on the Cincinnati docks or were employed
on steamboats as cooks, barbers, or stewards, while women used the river for their work as washers, as
well as engaging in sex work in the brothels and bars in the area and occasionally taking jobs in the paper
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mills or other small-scale workshops along the riverfront (Ross 1985, Taylor 2004). Cincinnati residents
began to call sections of the riverfront area “Little Africa” or “Bucktown” because of the presence of
African Americans, even though there was significant intermixing with the Irish in the area as well (Taylor
2004). The competition for jobs between African Americans and Irish created tension between these
groups which contributed to riots on the downtown riverfront in 1829, 1836, and 1841. Cincinnati’s white
residents also believed the local government failed to enforce the Ohio Black Laws, which had been
designed to discourage African Americans from settling in the state and block them from gaining access
to employment that whites believed belonged to them (Trotter Jr. 1998). This further exacerbated
animosity towards Cincinnati’s African-American residents. While the Central Riverfront remained a
vibrant if occasionally disreputable area, other riverfront areas gained more prestige during the
antebellum period, such as the central commercial area located out of the floodplain, or focused on
production, like the Fulton district, named after the steamboat innovator. The Fulton area included many
of Cincinnati’s large boatyards, offering higher-paying employment in specific trades (Lewis 2016).
Throughout these changes, the central riverfront remained the focus of early Cincinnati’s public
life – the place where people went to shop, find work, draw water, and hear the news. Despite being a
vital component of the urban environment, the Ohio River was not always a cooperative partner.
Countless stories described these willful expressions of the Ohio River as “Old Man River,” the spirit of
the river that was closely integrated into everyday life in the Ohio Valley (Grayson 1929). “Old Man River”
was neither malevolent nor kind, but prone to destroy just as easily as to provide. As a commercial
lifeline, the river was at best unreliable. Depending on one’s location in the Ohio Valley, the river system
was only navigable from two to ten months per year. Ship captains had to wait for spring and autumn
freshets to open the river after winter ice and summer low water made the channel unnavigable
(Mahoney 1990). These spring and autumn freshets, when the river rose after snow melt or periods of
extended rain, were crucial to river navigation but also carried the risk of flooding, particularly in spring.
Moreover, snags (sunken trees stuck in the riverbed that could punch holes in boat hulls), sandbars,
boiler explosions, and ice floes all sunk steamboats at alarming rates, causing the loss of life and freight
(Gruenwald 2002). These vagaries were reflected in high insurance costs, which rose considerably as
reports of flooding or low water filtered through a dispersed communication network (Mahoney 1990).
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Farmers, miners, small-scale manufactories, and others reliant on river transport had to accommodate
shipping price uncertainty, limited seasonal availability of cargo space, and constant risk of loss. In
addition, with the city concentrated on the riverbank, any flooding meant annual disruptions to business
and social life as people waited for the waters to go down (Banta 1949). Finally, as a source of drinking
water, the Ohio River posed particular dangers. Residents and business dumped their waste directly into
open sewers running along their streets, which carried their waste down to the river, where ideally it
would be diluted and flushed downstream. In practice, this enabled the spread of disease, in particular
cholera, further abetted by steamboat arrivals from other affected cities. Epidemics hit the city hard in
1832, 1849, and 1866. Although closely studied by Daniel Drake and others, the link between cholera
bacteria, drinking water, and human waste was little understood until the late nineteenth century (Carter
1992).
Over time, the bulk of the city moved back from the immediate waterfront onto slightly higher
ground out of the floodplain, though this did little to mute the impact of the Ohio River’s vagaries. In the
second half of the nineteenth century, Cincinnati’s elites explored a number of ways to respond to these
issues, combining scientific investigations and political maneuvering to adjust the city’s relationship with
the river. Many of these efforts focused on infrastructural proposals like filtration systems for the city water
works, levees, or increased dredging of the Ohio River. Concurrently, after the Civil War, journalists and
city leaders increasingly depicted the city’s central riverfront as an unsavory, dangerous area where racial
intermixing took place and labor unrest often started (Trotter Jr. 1998). As railroads gained prominence,
and the steamboat industry lost its luster, the river became known as the “poor man’s highway” (Ambler
1932). In Cincinnati, this was accompanied by a shift in the riverfront neighborhoods towards
entertainment and illicit activities, which defied the moral conventions of both white and African-American
communities living in other sections of the city (Taylor 2004). Local journalist Lafcadio Hearn, in his book
Children of the Levee (1957), documented the close interconnection between river life and the raciallymixed community on the central riverfront, creating a neighborhood that existed outside of strict
government control (Taylor 2004). Already preoccupied by managing the Ohio River, urban elites also
wanted to find ways to transform the riverfront, disciplining these unruly riverfront populations by
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redeveloping the area. Their infrastructural proposals, planned and modified over decades, therefore
involved both the riverfront and the river, at times conceived together and at times separately.
In doing so, I hope to shift perceptions of what exactly it means for Cincinnati to be discussed as
a river city. Whereas Stradling (2003) argues that Cincinnati gradually ceased to be a river city as
residents turned away from the Ohio River in the nineteenth century, I emphasize in this study that we
also need to focus on the ways that elite groups within the city sought to transform the Ohio River in the
twentieth century as well as to use their proposals to advance the interests of Cincinnati. As I pick up the
history in the following chapters of this dissertation, I show that just as the Ohio River was apparently
declining in importance to the city, different elite groups began to announce own plans for how to best
make the Ohio River and Cincinnati riverfront productive. Within this framework, I argue that it is not fully
accurate to say that Cincinnati stopped being a river city, but rather that we have to expand our focus to
understand how the city and Ohio River have continued to interrelate in crucial ways. In doing so, we will
be able to open new perspectives on how to define river cities.
Throughout this dissertation I track the histories of these elite efforts to tackle three distinct
problems implicating the Ohio River and riverfront: the need to improve navigation, to control flooding,
and to diminish pollution. In doing so, I move between the Ohio River and the Cincinnati riverfront,
following the local, regional, and national assemblages – beginning in the late nineteenth century and
extending to the present – that have contained at times discordant understandings of the best and highest
use for these spaces. Across the Ohio Valley, I focus primarily on the Ohio River as the main stem (and
not its tributaries). In Cincinnati, the emphasis is on the city’s Central Riverfront area – which has retained
a particular symbolic importance as the city’s birthplace – but I also engage with developments along the
length of Cincinnati’s regional riverfront, including crossing into the communities of Northern Kentucky,
which often developed their own approach to these issues.
My research draws predominantly from archives in Cincinnati, including the Inland Rivers Library
at the Public Library of Cincinnati and Hamilton County, the Archives and Rare Books Library at the
University of Cincinnati, and the Cincinnati History Library and Archives at the Cincinnati Museum Center,
looking at the materials produced by the elite groups that formed to address these issues of navigation,
flooding, and pollution. As we will see, rather than one-sided technical reports or public documents, I
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focused on those materials that capture the relationships between scientific experts and representatives
of local development, including convention proceedings, correspondence, debates, and other sources
that provide insight into the conversations taking place between and among these different elite groups.
Throughout these conversations, the contributions of non-elites remain difficult to trace, but I focus on oral
histories and newspaper articles to capture the perspectives that many elites tried to sidestep. I
complement this historical materials with seventeen interviews involving experts and developers who
have helped continue to shape infrastructural projects affecting the Ohio River and riverfront, including
engineers, realtors, conservationists, public relations experts, educators, urban planners, and business
owners, among others, as well as attending public events and meetings concerning plans for the area.
These materials have shaped the structure of this dissertation, beginning with three historical chapters
that each focus in depth on one of the river concerns I identified above – navigation, flooding, and
pollution respectively – and concluding with an ethnographic chapter covering more recent developments.
In the following chapter, I first examine the history of navigation in Cincinnati. With seasonal
fluctuations in river depth a persistent obstacle to providing regular boat service on the Ohio River, a
group of commercial users, industrialists, and civic leaders in Cincinnati formed the Ohio Valley
Improvement Association (OVIA) in 1895 to lobby the federal government to improve navigation by
deepening the river. This group called for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to build a series of
dams on the Ohio River, which would trap the water as it headed downstream, creating a sequence of
pools connected by locks at each dam. The OVIA hoped the new dams would enable year-round
navigation and revitalize river trade, boosting Cincinnati and the region’s economy. In this chapter, I
examine how commercial and industrial interests in Cincinnati worked with the USACE engineers to
justify and advance their project, even though it was strongly opposed by conservationists who advocated
for a more scientific management of Ohio Valley water resources. The OVIA, by appealing to the idea of
the Ohio River as a historic and a national space that they best knew how to make productive, were able
to move forward their project despite these protests. This massive investment in creating fifty-one lock
and dams along the length of the Ohio River, completed over more than five decades from 1875 to 1929,
created a waterway transportation system that remade the river into a depersonalized infrastructural
system, one primarily used to transport freight, and began removing the river as an site of everyday life.
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On the Cincinnati riverfront, OVIA supporters rushed to build modern terminal facilities, hoping to take
advantage of expanding trade opportunities, though with limited success. Even though river transport has
seemed antiquated in comparison to the dominant mobilities of the car and the airplane, as well as to the
water resource management approach that has taken hold in other parts of the country, the commercial
interests that were represented by the OVIA have continued to hold considerable power in determining
how the Ohio River is used.
In the third chapter, I explore how the 1937 Ohio River flood sparked a reevaluation of flood
control at the regional and urban level. Severe flooding in the early twentieth century as well as decades
of lobbying had helped spur federal funding for levees and other flood control measures across the
country as well as making flood control a responsibility of the federal government under the USACE
(O’Neill 2006). However, the administrative arrangements for this federal funding enabled urban
governments to decide whether projects proceeded, and in what form. In Cincinnati after the 1937 flood,
initial belief that the city would build a massive floodwall to protect the city quickly gave way to a heated
debate involving city government officials and local business interests, pitting engineering experts who
argued for comprehensive flood protection infrastructure for the city against a faction of urban planners
who argued for a much-reduced floodwall. Local commercial and real estate interests eventually aligned
with the city urban planning experts to curtail the floodwall plans, arguing that it would restrict the city’s
future development and that the river’s unrestricted flow needed to be respected. They urged the
development of infrastructure in coordination with nature, rather than as a means to control the river.
These urban planners explicitly considered the river an ally, which through its flooding would slowly eat
away at the decrepit buildings left on the central riverfront, enabling the remnants of the low-income
riverfront area to eventually be targeted for destruction as part of urban renewal.
In the fourth chapter, I examine the Cincinnati’s long relationship with pollution. Across the
nineteenth century, even as sewers proliferated, residents and businesses dumped most of their waste
directly into the Ohio River with little treatment. When the Ohio Valley’s industrial base expanded in the
early twentieth century, it proved difficult to resolve the question of how to draw drinking water from the
river while also using it to dump untreated waste. A group called the Cincinnati Stream Pollution
Committee, formed by the local Chamber of Commerce, began to push for a comprehensive approach
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embracing the entire Ohio Valley. The Cincinnati Stream Pollution Committee, including sanitation
engineers, government officials, marketing experts and industrial representatives, was able to lobby eight
states to join an interstate compact in 1948, called the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission
(ORSANCO). Through this process, industry, which had long been resistant to pollution oversight, was
able to maintain an active role in determining what counted as pollution and how it should be treated,
while also preempting national regulations for pollution treatment. This engagement with sanitation
expertise also changed industrial concepts of the importance of clean water in relation to economic
growth and the threat posed by polluted waters. Yet, even though ORSANCO traced its roots back to an
effort to clean up Cincinnati riverfront, it was not until the 1970s that pollution became an important
consideration for the riverfront area with the rise of the environmental movement. Local development
groups began to argue that a series of riverfront parks would clean up the riverfront, protect water
resources, and promote the appreciation of nature. These parks were also designed to lure residents,
tourists, and investors back to the Central Riverfront, seeking to rebuild the neighborhood that had been
destroyed by flooding and urban renewal. Across these diverse histories, sanitation engineers,
industrialists, and marketing experts cooperated to shape public perceptions of specific places as
polluted, as well as the ways that the public understood their role in responding to the threat represented
by waste.
I bring these threads – navigation, flooding, and pollution – together in the fifth chapter to
examine two parallel riverfront redevelopment efforts from recent decades. I carry the narrative into the
present and examine how these infrastructural legacies continue to shape relationships with the Ohio
River and Cincinnati riverfront, examining how two very different visions of the “working river” and the
“luxury river” relate within these histories. My investigation of the “luxury river” focuses on The Banks, a
mixed-use development on the central riverfront. Built between the Ohio River and the Fort Washington
Way bypass, The Banks has been lauded as a sustainable, resilient project that many city officials claim
has finally realized the potential of the riverfront, Cincinnati’s prime asset. While The Banks have received
significant acclaim, I also focus on efforts to redevelop Cincinnati’s ports and promote the “working river.”
The River Advisory Council and later the Central Ohio River Business Association pushed to expand the
federally-defined boundaries of the Ports of Cincinnati & Northern Kentucky, finally succeeding in 2015.
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As a result, Cincinnati is now considered the country’s largest inland river port, a marketing boon for the
city’s maritime industries. Building on this, and in the context of a massive decline in coal shipping, private
maritime operators in the Greater Cincinnati area have also explored ways to attract additional
investment, including through governmental redistribution. While, the leaders behind the The Banks and
the Ports of Cincinnati & Northern Kentucky have competing visions of how the riverfront should be seen,
whether as a “luxury river” or a “working river,” they have also drawn on the same infrastructural histories
embedded in the landscape to legitimize their efforts, including arguments about environmental impact,
flood resiliency, and the importance of navigation. This flexibility of infrastructure in validating two widely
different projects points to its growing recognition as a crucial public good, one that is inherently
beneficial. This is occurring even as infrastructure is used to sustain exclusionary access to the riverfront.
Throughout these chapters, I chart an infrastructural genealogy in Cincinnati that incorporates
both technical expertise and the urban growth machine. In Practicing Community, Rhoda Halperin (1998)
has already laid out a thorough ethnography of the mixed-race low-income communities that have long
occupied the riverfront in Cincinnati, as well as efforts to disinvest in and displace these residents. This
dissertation provides a complement to Halperin’s study, examining from the perspective of city elites their
rationales and goals in seeking to transform the Ohio River and the city’s riverfront. The engagement
between engineers, planners, boosters, and industrialists has been very successful in developing and
implementing new infrastructural systems encompassing navigation, flood control, and pollution in order
to make the Ohio River and the Cincinnati riverfront productive once again.
Through deploying technical expertise, the Cincinnati growth machine has been able to influence
the conditions of development, managing and working with water to facilitate the continued expansion of
the city. At the same time, this cooperation is not just a case of capitalists using scientists to cover their
ulterior motives. These entanglements with engineers and urban planners have fundamentally altered an
idea of how growth should be understood in the city. Over time, their scientifically-framed contributions
have dramatically changed the objectives and metrics whereby growth is measured and understood. In
excavating these elite histories, I hope to outline a technopolitics of redevelopment that moves beyond
just tracking elite “anti-politics” to embrace a more complex and contingent history of urban governance.
Seeing redevelopment as a techno-capitalist assemblage enables this research to expand outwards to
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consider the “unstable cascade [that] spills out from every ‘single’ act” (Bennett 2005: 457) and to reframe
many infrastructural changes as having multiple concurrent and contradictory effects. Finally, throughout
these chapters, my evaluation of the interconnected infrastructural histories of the Ohio River and
Cincinnati riverfront has been guided by a few consistent questions, including: How can we understand
river “problems” like flooding, low water, or pollution as being defined by both technical and economic
factors in tandem? How can we examine incongruences within and between fields of expertise and
development as contributing to common ends within an assemblage of the Ohio River and riverfront? In
what ways is the river as a non-human actor both resistant to and complicit with the projects of elite
governance – like public health or white supremacy – in Cincinnati? And finally, how has infrastructure
been utilized to resolve or enable these multiple overlapping strategies of urban governance?
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Chapter 2.
Ohio Valley Navigation and the City, 1895-1929

On October 17, 1929, a flotilla of twenty-four steamboats gathered in Pittsburgh for a “Celebration
of the Opening of the Ohio River Nine-Foot Stage.” Over the next nine days, the parade traveled
downriver, stopping at cities along the way to commemorate the opening of the last of the Ohio River
6

locks and dams. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers constructed this system of fifty-one dams over the
course of fifty years to make year-round navigation possible on the Ohio River. The Ohio Valley
Improvement Association (OVIA), which had been lobbying for the river improvements since 1895,
organized the festivities. The U.S. Secretaries of Commerce, War, and Labor, alongside the Minister of
Egypt and five railroad directors, took part in the opening ceremonies in Pittsburgh. President Herbert
Hoover, an engineer by training, accompanied the cruise between Cincinnati and Louisville. In total, an
estimated 500,000 people attended riverfront events held from Pittsburgh to Cairo, Illinois (OVIA 1929a).
One observer compared the OVIA’s celebration to the yearly opening of the Great Lakes’
shipping season. After winter ice receded, “it was necessary to get out brass bands and use much
advertising space in the newspapers to get the public into the annual habit of utilizing the boats” (OVIA
1929b: 41). In the case of their celebratory flotilla, the OVIA wanted to reawaken the public to the
potential of the river after decades of decline. To many Ohio Valley residents in the early twentieth
century, river transportation had largely appeared outdated and unnecessary. The speed and reliability of
railroads and later cars made river transport unnecessary. In response, the OVIA’s flotilla of steamboats,
with its dignitaries, pageantry, and speeches, announced a new navigational age, one based on providing
regular, cheap, and efficient maritime transport for freight. While focusing on the “new river,” the parade
also harkened back to the earlier pioneer days of the river, with speeches on George Washington’s early
cartographic forays into the Ohio Valley and the history of Blennerhassett Island, where Aaron Burr
allegedly plotted to create a breakaway republic in Texas.
This chapter considers the significance of this “new river” to the Ohio Valley. Anthropologists
have considered navigation in select cases (Gladwin 1970, Brown 2005, Carse 2012, Bear 2015), but the
6

The last lock and dam in the system was labeled number 53, but two dams had been eliminated when
revising the overall plan, keeping the total at 51 lock and dam facilities.
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contemporary study of water has for the most part focused on water’s role as a natural resource much like
minerals or lumber. In this view, the primary concerns have been to see how water provision takes place
and who benefits from its distribution (Swyngedouw 1999). Navigation offers an alternative starting point
to investigate the trajectory of “modern water,” with “modern water” referring in this case to how the
exercise of expertise has contributed to water’s treatment as an abstraction, an object that can be
separated from its social context (Linton 2010). Despite a conservationist movement that wanted to see
the Ohio River treated as a natural resource above other concerns, I explore here how the OVIA
members were successful in positioning the river foremost as a commercial space, one artificially
maintained by massive locks and dams to enable year-round navigation. In justifying their project, the
OVIA and their partners at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers employed a very different concept of
expertise compared to the conservationists, arguing instead that a combination of technical and practical
knowledge were needed to truly understand how to best manage the Ohio River, not detached scientific
theories about river basins and annual rainfall. However, I also argue that the OVIA and conservationist
groups actually collaborated in the long-run to shape an assemblage of “modern water.” I demonstrate
how both these navigation advocates and water resource proponents oversaw water redevelopment
projects that placed water firmly under elite control and began the process of limiting low-income
communities’ direct access to water. For its part, the Ohio River presented numerous challenges to the
construction of the lock and dam system, silting up the U.S. Corps of Engineers’ construction works,
overflowing cofferdams, and making workers sick, but ultimately the Ohio River largely took to its new
conditions and facilitated elite control of the river, becoming sluggish, dirty, and polluted, all of which
made the river less useful to riverfront residents.
The OVIA held annual conventions across the Ohio Valley, starting in 1895 and culminating in the
celebration of 1929, but then continuing for decades thereafter. Their published convention proceedings
feature a mix of speeches and discussions involving steamboat captains, officers from the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, industrialists, and federal, state, and local public officials. Far from presenting a
unified voice, these conventions were frequently fractious affairs, with speakers presenting a range of
different proposals and viewpoints. Throughout this chapter, I draw from these rich convention
proceedings, supplemented with newspaper articles, government reports, and oral histories collected by
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journalists of the time, to look back at how these conversations (and disagreements) unfolded as the
OVIA and other groups sought to shift public perceptions of what the Ohio River could and should be.

A. Ohio River in Decline

Back when the OVIA was founded in 1895, the organization’s first members were concerned that
the railroads were replacing river navigation as a viable transportation option. Railroads, faster and
available year-round, had begun to overtake river transport as early as the 1850s. Speakers after speaker
in the first ten years of OVIA conventions describe how, across the Ohio Valley, the rapidly-growing
railroad corporations had actively been seeking to undercut their steamboat competitors, running rail lines
parallel to the rivers and offering cut rate pricing along these routes to undermine river transport.
Railroads also bought harbor frontage to reduce available space for ships to land and purchased the
operating rights for cities’ docks or wharf boats in order to drive up landing charges. Leaders in the
maritime industries were unsure of how to respond, with many clinging to any freight shipments or
passengers they could find. According to a steamboat captain at this first OVIA convention, “we have
been standing with folded arms and allowed this great river to be crippled by railroads” (OVIA 1895: 20),
or as another well-known ship operator described it: “When railroads came, we of the river ran away from
the river. The railroads were going to absorb all the trade.” (OVIA 1895: 41).
As a result, shipment by river declined steadily. In 1889, the river had already dropped to only
7

16,041,860 tons of freight moved per year (OVIA 1899: 8). The OVIA’s founders presented the Ohio
River itself as deteriorating, becoming less dependable:

Navigation is actually worse on many of our rivers than it was fifty years ago, because the
improvements by our government have not kept pace with the gradual filling up of the beds of
streams by erosion, denuded forests, and cultivated fields, and, instead of the waters being
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For context, Ohio River transport bottomed out at “about 5,000,000 tons” of freight in 1919 (OVIA 1927:
80), while today, the river regularly moves more than 200 million tons of freight per year, though in 2016
this dipped to 184.2 million tons due to the decline in coal shipments.
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deeper, wider, and better than formerly, they are less capacious in every way (OVIA 1908: 47;
see also OVIA 1895: 40 or OVIA 1900: 30).

In their convention speeches, OVIA members described different reasons for this decline, including a lack
of dredging and removal of snags (trees sticking out of the riverbed) that made the river more difficult to
navigate, continued seasonal fluctuation of water levels that restricted navigations to only part of the year,
as well as increasing settlement along the riverbanks, which they saw as using up water that should end
up in the river and also contributed to riverbank erosion. Rather than any major change in the behavior of
the Ohio River, which as “Old Man River” had long been known as unreliable and dangerous (as well as
generous), almost all these complaints reflected growing concern that river trade could not work unless
the maritime environment underwent major changes to make it more predictable. A U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers officer speaking at the 1895 convention expressed this frustration with the erratic behavior of
the Ohio River, describing how, in terms of “direction the river is quite tortuous, passing from one curve
into another,” while the “water supply is extremely variable, which may be illustrated by the statement that
the oscillation of water surface at Cincinnati from extreme low water to the greatest flood height is about
70 feet” (1895: 10-11). Those concerned about the declining river felt that if the federal government
invested additional resources in river upkeep to tackle these problems, it could help maintain a deeper
and more-easily navigable river, which would aid steamboats to compete with railroads. According to
Cincinnati’s Mayor John Caldwell, welcoming attendees at the first OVIA convention in 1895, the group
had “assembled to consider the needs of the great Ohio River, and to…take such action as will enable
you to convince Congress of the justice and necessity of liberal appropriations for the improvement of the
Ohio” (OVIA 1895: 5).
This perceived decay in the river environment also had important social and economic
dimensions. The historian Reuben Gold Thwaites, a close colleague of Frederick Jackson Turner,
decided to document the passing of the historic Ohio River, much as Turner had done for the Western
frontier. In 1894, a year before the OVIA was founded, Thwaites loaded his family onto Pilgrim – a skiff
built using construction methods from the days before steamboats – and floated down the Ohio River for
six weeks, recording his observations. Intent like Turner on reconstructing pioneer life, in Afloat on the
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Ohio (1897) he describes the disappearing “river people” – fiercely independent, living off the river’s
bounty, and resisting the increasingly omnipresent effects of industrial life. Their simple lifestyle was
increasingly being overtaken by the “noisy, grimy, matter-of-fact manufacturing towns” (6) spreading
along the Ohio River. These new towns were huddled around the numerous new waterfront factories that
depended on the river for their water supply, to dump their waste, and occasionally to receive coal or ship
their goods (depending on local rail prices). Thwaites everywhere noted “the appalling havoc which
these...industries are making with the once beautiful banks of the river” (40).
The increasing popularity of the railroads – “in sight of which we shall almost continually float, all
the way down to Cairo, nearly eleven hundred miles away” (Thwaites 1897: 7) – reduced the number of
people traveling on the Ohio River. By the time the Thwaites family was traveling downriver, the golden
age of passenger steamboats – each a ‘world in miniature’ with musicians, sleeping quarters, bars, and
products for sale – was mostly a thing of the past. Only the Greene Line, between Louisville and
Cincinnati, remained as the last regular packet service, which referred to a cooperative arrangement
among independent ship captains who agreed to keep a schedule and avoid duplicate trips along a
specific route. The other remaining captain-merchants found fewer and fewer small towns that relied on
them for transportation or freight services.
In turn, this affected the number of people living and working on the river, since many, like smallscale fishers or ship peddlers, depended on frequent river traffic to sustain themselves. The number of
shantyboats – floating houses that allowed for a flexible subsistence strategy – decreased as well, with
their tenants viewed as unreliable, filthy, and dangerous due to their nomadic semi-aquatic lifestyles
(Anderson 1957). Thwaites observed that, “Both in town and country, the riffraff of the house boat
element are in disfavor” (54), and that Kentucky had “recently passed, more as a police regulation than as
a means of revenue, an act levying a State tax of twenty-five dollars upon each craft of this character; and
the other commonwealths abutting upon the river are considering the policy of doing likewise” (53).
During the 1910s and 1920s, newspaper references to shantyboats dropped as many municipalities like
Cincinnati, Marietta, and Memphis passed their own ordinances to permanently clear these residents out,
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citing criminal and sanitary concerns. Finally, boat building industries suffered as well. Wood-hulled
boats were increasingly being replaced with steel-bottoms, contributing to a consolidation of the
traditional boat builders under new businesses using industrial approaches and causing a number of dry
docks to shutter throughout the Ohio Valley. All but one of the boat building companies in Cincinnati
closed by 1901, and the last by 1919 (White 1999).

B. Ohio Valley Boosters and Army Engineers

To respond to this perceived decline in the river’s importance, a group of self-described “river
men” founded the Ohio Valley Improvement Association (OVIA) on October 8, 1895. Meeting at the
Grand Hotel in Cincinnati, Ohio, they declared their intention to form:

...a grand co-operative movement, having in view the creation of a healthy public sentiment which
will promote legitimate effort to secure, at the hands of the next Congress, such appropriation as
may be necessary to carry forward, vigorously and practically, the work of improving the Ohio
River. (OVIA 1895: 3)

Drawing attendees from across the Ohio Valley, the early conventions were composed largely of
“steamboat masters, pilots and clerks” (OVIA 1899: 32), as well as the merchants who owned the barges,
packets, wharf boats, warehouses, and boatyards fundamental to river commerce. Men made up the vast
majority of the OVIA’s membership, with only a few women joining them, such as Captain Mary Becker
Greene, the only female captain in Ohio at the time and owner-operator of the Greene Line. From
member speeches, it is clear they were desperately concerned about the decline of Ohio River commerce
and wanted the OVIA to reinvigorate river transportation in order to protect their investments. Although
their wealth paled in comparison to railroad corporations and other industries lining the riverbanks, the
OVIA coalition began to expand shortly after its founding. By 1902, the OVIA’s first President John Vance,
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Shantyboats returned during the Great Depression as a base for a flexible subsistence strategy. In the
1940s, once again shantyboats residents were legislated against or policed until they began to disappear
definitively in the 1940s, to be replaced later by more respectably-named houseboats (Hubbard 1953).
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a former U.S. Representative from the riverfront town of Gallipolis, Ohio, saw businessmen increasingly
joining the steamboat captains and boat builders in the audience (OVIA 1902: 14), and by 1905,
Executive Committee member Edwin Gibbs observed, “...today we have in our ranks the merchant, the
manufacturer, the banker, the lawyer, all to such an extent that...the river is now in the woeful minority”
(OVIA 1905: 39-40). This was in part due to business interests in places like Cincinnati and Louisville that
were increasingly concerned about access to cheap coal year round. The number of coal barges
disembarking from Pittsburgh and West Virginia had begun to drop as local industries consumed more
and more of the supply, and river navigation remained risky, with long delays. As a result, fuel shortages
affected industries across the Ohio Valley. In Cincinnati, the fall in coal shipping also hit the city’s lucrative
coal transshipping trade (OVIA 1925: 24). At the same time, there was growing discontent with railroads,
as both traffic congestion and “rail car famines” had begun to wreak havoc on freight schedules (OVIA
1924: 84). This combination of factors spurred broader interest among elites in the OVIA’s mission,
particularly in Cincinnati, where the new organization based its Executive Committee.
In many ways, Cincinnati merchants and industrialists were the driving force behind the
organization of the OVIA. The Freight Bureau of the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce organized the call
for the first convention, and throughout the construction of the lock and dam system, the majority of
OVIA’s leadership was based in the city. Captain Paris Brown, the Chair of the Joint Organizing
Committee for that first convention, began his invitation calling participants to the meeting in Cincinnati by
stating that, “Acting under authority from the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce and in behalf of the
commercial interests of Cincinnati, whose prosperity is vitally involved in the maintenance of such a stage
of water in the Ohio as will prolong to the utmost limit the season of navigation…” (OVIA 1895: 3).
In the second half of the nineteenth century, Cincinnati’s commercial and demographic growth
had slowed considerably, as other cities like Chicago and St. Louis assumed expansive roles in the
regional economy (Stradling 2003). While many of Cincinnati’s elites had increasingly invested in
industrial production in response to the faltering commercial sector, their declining dominance over
Southern or Western markets as well as the effects of local labor strife had cut into their business profits
and threatened their political and economic dominance in the city (Ross 1985). In response, the Freight
Bureau at the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce, which later launched the OVIA, became preoccupied
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with tapping the Ohio River as an underutilized asset that could provide an advantage to the city. The
Annual Reports produced by the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce from this period leading up to the first
OVIA convention include extended minutiae about the condition of the river and its problems (in
comparison, railroad conditions were typically dispatched in a page or less). These complaints focused
primarily on the effects of low water and its disruptions to trade. For example, the 1895 Annual Report
bemoans the sad state of the river:

As unsatisfactory as was the preceding year in the affairs of River Transportation in which this
city is especially concerned, the year 1895 was even more unfavorable, from the same causes
which prevailed in 1894, the low stages of water. The navigable period was exceptionally short,
representing altogether about five months, for the entire year (Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce
1896: 96).

When the river had been the primary means of transportation, Cincinnati elites had largely tolerated its
irregularities, but as they felt pressure to improve access to nearby markets, they realized that the Ohio
River had to be made more reliable. The 1895 Annual Report continues:

These data afford explanation for the low stages of water in our navigable streams the past two
years, and serve to indicate the need of such effort within the range of practicability as can be
made for modifying the extent of interruption to navigation by low stages of water, by the
introduction of improvements calculated to be effective in securing such results. The importance
of the Ohio River and navigable tributaries in transportation, in the promotion of industrial
enterprise, in the movement and distribution of materials and products of factories and of
agriculture, has been intelligently and effectively laid before Congress, and it is hoped that in due
time such relief may be had as the vast interests affected deserve (Cincinnati Chamber of
Commerce 1896: 97).
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As a result, Cincinnati industrialists and merchants were increasingly anxious to work with the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, who oversaw almost all river improvement projects, and other regional partners to
advance their vision of what the Ohio River could be. A representative from the Cincinnati Chamber of
Commerce declared at the 1900 OVIA Convention that no one was “more fully alive or awake to the vast
importance of this waterway than Cincinnati…who realizes and believes that to a great extent, her future
depends upon it” (OVIA 1900: 26-27).
One of these Cincinnati elites’ key goals for the OVIA was to bring industrialists, merchants, and
engineers together more frequently, in order to improve collaboration and request more federal resources
for the Ohio River. The OVIA had numerous antecedents in the form of one-time conventions (also called
memorials) bringing together interested parties from across the region to demand action on navigational
9

improvements for the Ohio River. The OVIA’s founders intended to supplant these one-time conventions,
creating an organization with a more lasting impact. According to a steamboat captain from Pittsburgh
speaking at the first convention, “In former years we have had meetings and passed resolutions, then
gone home and acted as if everybody else was to do the work” (OVIA 1895: 40). To sustain its pressure,
the OVIA utilized an emerging means of political organization: the permanent interest group. Numerous
trade organizations and social movements were adopting the permanent interest group model, or lobby,
which relied on membership fees to support year-round advocacy. Business interests embraced the lobby
as a way to push for policy change that was not tied directly to party politics, and thus more responsive to
the needs of private groups or associations (Clemens 1995). Ohio Valley maritime industries and
business interests organized the OVIA as their own platform to address the government officials,
engineers, and members of the public that they viewed as crucial to winning support for their project.
The OVIA group sought to develop a close relationship with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE). Started under President Jefferson, the USACE emerged as an elite science-oriented branch of
the military based at the West Point academy, influenced by the scholarly and aristocratic French
engineering tradition rather than a British craftsman tradition that relied on practical experience (Shallat
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Organizing these one-time conventions was a popular political technique for many issues in the
nineteenth century, involving the collection of subscriptions to fund activities and drafting demands to
send to legislators. Convention organizing committees worked closely with regional newspapers to garner
press coverage and promote their causes. They were also a popular forum for politicians to reach new
audiences and connect with powerful constituents (O’Neill 2006).
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1994). USACE leadership used arguments about state-building and national defense to justify their
expanding role as technocratic experts in the U.S. government. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1824, an
annual bill that established appropriations for waterways, established the USACE as the agency
responsible for navigation improvements across the country, overseeing the majority of waterways
projects, including harbor construction, dredging, snag removal, and building dams. By the second half of
the nineteenth century, the USACE had “emerged as the nation’s largest and most powerful water
development agency” (Shallat 1994: 2). Still, the USACE faced deep skepticism, with critics portraying the
Corps as elitist, power-hungry, and anti-democratic (Shallat 1994). General distrust among government
officials about federal spending on “internal improvements” – as infrastructure was referred to at the time
– also constrained the USACE. Opponents viewed internal improvements as, at best, benefitting only
specific localities (whereas federal funds should contribute to the prosperity of the entire nation), and at
worst, corrupt attempts to enrich individual builders and property owners (Larson 2001). Many antebellum
Presidents and members of Congress considered internal improvements unconstitutional. Under U.S.
Presidents Pierce (1853-1857) and Buchanan (1857-1861), even minimal river interventions like dredging
and snag removal essentially ceased (Shallat 1994). States, municipalities, or private enterprise were
thus left to pay for improvements, limiting the size of the projects that could be undertaken.
A more assertive postbellum federal government, enlarged and emboldened after the massive
Civil War effort, invested more into internal improvements but was reluctant to authorize large-scale
projects for river navigation (Larson 2001). Still, the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1869 had appropriated $2
million dollars for improvements, $3.9 million in 1870, and $5.8 million in 1872, compared to a total of only
$3.1 million for river improvements during the entire antebellum period (Lippincott 1914: 648). Yet, most
of these funds went to the ascendant industrial Northeast, deepening harbors in New York, Philadelphia,
and Cleveland, or for works to link the Great Lakes (O’Neill 2006: 54). Rather than large regional projects
focused on economic development, these internal improvements were often focused on specific
Congressional districts, since Representatives and Senators frequently traded floor votes in order to
garner support for projects in their home territories. This “pork barrel” or “logrolling” approach came to
dominate the politics of internal improvements, and as a result the Congressional appropriations to
improve river navigation largely focused on smaller projects for tributary rivers entirely contained within a
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Congressional district or state, such as the Kanawha River in West Virginia (Rivers and Harbors Act of
1872) or the Green River in Kentucky (Rivers and Harbors Act of 1888). Meanwhile, the Ohio River was
mostly forgotten, with only minimal dredging and snag removal (Ambler 1932).
This “pork barrel” environment also made it extremely difficult for the USACE to build the massive
works that its officers, schooled in the French tradition, believed were essential to strengthening the
central state and promoting national wealth (Shallat 1992, Mukerji 2009). With time though, the USACE
adapted to this “pork barrel” reality, “learning to survive in the cracks between jurisdictions” (Shallat 1994:
184) and working closely with Congressional committees and other federal agencies to sustain their work
and preserve a role for the USACE. Given this success in inserting themselves into “pork barrel” politics,
critics increasingly accused the USACE of being nothing but a product of this corrupt system, without its
own vision or principles. By the end of the nineteenth century, the USACE was in the strange position of
being portrayed as both anti-democratic technocrats determined to reshape the country as they saw fit
and also as inefficient servants of “pork barrel” politics that put regional interests above the nation (Shallat
1994).
Initially, the USACE appeared restrained in their support of the OVIA. At the OVIA’s first
convention, Colonel Stickley, in charge of Ohio River improvements at the time, made clear the
organization’s role as a neutral observer, stating that, “It is the policy of the War Department to prohibit its
officers from taking any active part in the matter of influencing legislation or urging appropriations for the
improvement of the rivers and harbors in their charge…” (OVIA 1895: 9-10). However, USACE officials
stationed in the Ohio Valley quickly became crucial OVIA allies, working together with Ohio Valley
maritime and business interest to advocate for river improvements, producing economic studies to justify
their projects, and attending the OVIA’s annual conventions to provide updates on the progress of works
and renew their friendships with OVIA members. With time, it became difficult to distinguish between
speeches by OVIA members and USACE officers, such as when Major E.L. Daley, a USACE division
engineer, felt moved to claim that, “I believe that you have all today seen enough to appreciate how worth
while [sic] it is that we assure for navigators a continuous and dependable operation of this wonderful
system, the Ohio Valley River navigation. (Applause)” (OVIA 1925: 11-12).
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The primary objective for the OVIA and USACE was the creation of a lock and dam system along
the length of the entire Ohio River, from Pittsburgh down to Cairo. Approximately fifty dams would form
slackwater pools, each pool extending miles backward until reaching the next dam farther upriver. This
would remove the seasonal threat of low water and guarantee a navigational depth of six feet (later
adjusted to a goal of nine feet) throughout the year. The deeper water had the added benefit of making it
less likely that ice would form in winter. The dams themselves were to be movable, known as the wicket
or Chanoine design, so that segments of the dam wall could be lowered allowing boats to float over top
during natural periods of high water. This mitigated concerns among ship captains about boats
experiencing delays from traffic backups at the locks. The USACE based the design on dams constructed
in France, brought to the U.S. by Col. William E. Merrill after study engineering advances made on the
Seine River outside Paris (Johnson 1991, OVIA 1925: 88).

10

However, nothing found in France could

equal the scale of creating a movable lock and dam system along the enormous 981-mile long Ohio
River.
In Pittsburgh, the USACE had already built a prototype to test the design. In 1871, the city’s
business interests, after particularly bad summer droughts had brought river trade to a standstill,
requested that the USACE build a navigation dam to create a harbor for the city. Boat operators were
actually opposed to the idea and “demonstrated on Pittsburgh’s streets against locks and dams on the
Ohio River” (Johnson 1991: 193), fearful that a narrow lock would mean they would have to break apart
their tows (a typical Ohio River tow at that time could include ten or more barges tied together) and
reassemble them on the other side, causing considerable delays. In response to these fears, Col. Merrill
proposed the design including the Chanoine movable dam design and a massive locking area to ensure
continuous navigation in the vicinity of the city. The U.S. Congress approved the project, known as the
Davis Lock and Dam, in 1875. The USACE inaugurated the completed lock and dam a decade later in
1885, creating a year-round harbor for Pittsburgh. Once completed, it featured the largest lock in the
world at the time, wide enough to fit a towboat and its barges together. Steamboat captains were almost
instantly won over by the lock size and the movable wicket design (Johnson 1991). Despite the success
10

Though Merrill introduced the idea of the movable dam from France, the proposal to build a series of
locks and dams along the entire Ohio River to improve navigation had been developed by William Milnor
Roberts in 1870 (Johnson 1991), based on well-known precedents, including on the tributary
Monongahela River.
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of the Davis Lock and Dam, no plans were in place to build additional locks and movable dams on the
Ohio River by the time of the first OVIA convention in 1895.
The proposal supported by the OVIA and USACE represented the first request for navigational
improvements embracing the entire Ohio River as an integrated system. While previous requests had
focused on dredging, snag removal, wing dam construction, and other interventions with only localized or
temporary effects, the lock and dam system would rebuild the entire river, positioning it as a reliable,
cheap, and modern shipping alternative for the region and country. According to John Vance, the OVIA
President for its first decades and a former Congressional Representative from the riverfront town
Gallipolis, Ohio:

The Ohio alone, of all navigable rivers in the United States, carries tonnage from its source to its
mouth. It drains the richest valley in the civilized world; and the river might be of the greatest
possible benefit not alone to the commercial, manufacturing, mining and agricultural industries of
the six [adjacent] states, but of the greatest possible value to the trade and commerce of the
United States, and, unquestionably, the greatest of all feeders to the Panama Canal (Vance
1908: 139).

The first priority for the OVIA was to increase the appropriations for the Ohio River itself. From 1824 to
1895, the Ohio River had received $5.5 million for improvements, mostly for snag removal and dredging,
contrasted against the $7.6 million received by the Ohio River’s tributaries over the same period (OVIA
1899: 12). Within this context, the OVIA lobbied to transform how the U.S. Congress redistributed funds
for federal waterways, arguing these piecemeal improvements did little to address the Ohio River’s
fundamental transportation issues: the limited navigation season, large number of accidents, and variable
shipping costs.
The lock and dam system was at the center of these changes, but the OVIA’s plan rested on
reconfiguring the function and the perception of the declining river. On the one hand, the OVIA and local
politicians would lobby for the annual or bi-annual appropriations through the Rivers and Harbors Act in
order to fund the construction of individuals dams, while the USACE was responsible for the technical

41

side. In addition, at the annual OVIA conventions, USACE representatives and elected officials frequently
portrayed the OVIA’s contribution as one of “vision,” the ephemeral work of communicating with the public
what engineering and the central government were accomplishing and building excitement for the
potential of the new river. The organization’s mission laid out in 1900 described: “The CHARACTER OF
WORK engaged in by the Association is educational, in keeping before the people and before Congress
and officers of Government facts bearing upon the commerce of the Ohio Valley...” (OVIA 1900: 6). At
first the OVIA employed traveling agents to undertake these educational efforts, who crisscrossed the
Ohio Valley giving short public talks in order to increase memberships and local subscriptions. Then,
when J.F. Ellison assumed a dual Secretary-Treasurer role in 1904, he organized an OVIA Bureau of
Publicity, expanding the group’s activities to include direct mail solicitations and an emphasis on outreach
to newspapers (OVIA 1904: 134-135). The OVIA worked closely with journalists to place promotional
stories, from convention recaps to in-depth explorations of river trade. Later, radio also increasingly
became a forum for OVIA members to disseminate information. Finally, as described at the beginning of
this chapter, the OVIA organized flotillas as public parades to attract attention to the river, an approach
first suggested by an officer from the USACE. These flotillas were intended to “reawaken” the population
to the river’s potential. Finally, throughout its materials and conventions, the OVIA often encouraged its
members to become agents for the movement however they could, making recruitment for the
association part of their daily habits.

C. Water as a Natural Resource

The Ohio Valley Improvement Association’s plan for the Ohio River coincided with surging
interest in waterways policy across the country. Groups were formed throughout the 1890s to address
various water concerns. Western farmsteaders and engineers met in Salt Lake City in 1891 to form the
National Irrigation Congress (Pisani 1992). Planters from Mississippi and Louisiana formed the
Mississippi River Improvement Levee Association in 1890 to request federal support for flood control
works (O’Neill 2006). In addition, at the very beginning of the twentieth century, the National Rivers and
Harbors Congress (NRHC) launched as a cross-national lobbying effort to increase the size and
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frequency of Rivers and Harbors Act appropriations. Unabashedly a lobbying group, they had no
preferred waterways improvement strategy for the U.S., but supported both large and small projects for
navigation, irrigation, and hydropower development across the country. First launched in Baltimore in
1901, the organization fizzled until reinvigorated by Congressman Joseph Ransdell. The OVIA helped
Senator Ransdell organize a meeting in 1905 to relaunch the group, and also shared some of its
leadership and approaches with the organization. Responding to this lobbying, President Theodore
Roosevelt urged increased waterways spending for a variety of projects, including the Panama Canal. He
also had a keen interest in conservation and multi-purpose water planning for the entire country,
establishing the Inland Waterways Commission to formulate a national water resource plan (Schmidt
2014).
Many of these groups called for water to be studied and managed in a new way: as a natural
resource that was a vital part of the country’s economic productivity. This approach to water, what Linton
(2010) calls “modern water,” centered water as an important object of governmental management,
constantly under threat by issues like scarcity or pollution. Finite water resources had to be vigilantly
administered to ensure proper distribution, use, and disposal. The efforts of these water lobbies helped
create a dense network of agencies, regulations, and new cultural norms to change the way water was
supplied to farms, dams, industry, and households. Many of these water management organizations
traced their lineage back to the conservationist tradition built off the natural philosophy laid out in George
Perkins Marsh’s Man and Nature (1864), which argued that humans could degrade the landscape and
exhaust natural resources, leading to societal collapse.
In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt appointed an Inland Waterways Commission to survey
U.S. water resources and create an integrated multi-purpose water management plan. It was a watershed
moment for the conservation movement (Schmidt 2014). The initial rationale for forming the Commission
had been to consider how to improve inland navigation because of the 1906 railroad transportation crisis,
when rail congestion and car shortages created major delays across the country. The Commission’s
objectives quickly expanded beyond navigation to embrace multi-purpose water planning (Pisani 2006).
Chaired by Progressive reformer Representative Theodore Burton, who also headed the House
Committee on Rivers and Harbors, Roosevelt’s appointees to the Commission also included noted

43

conservation advocates Gifford Pinchot from the U.S. Forest Service, William John McGee from the U.S.
Geological Survey, Frederick H. Newell from the Reclamation Service, and Senator Francis Newlands,
among others. The Inland Waterways Commission worked on a plan to integrate almost all of the major
aspects of water management studied at the time – including hydropower, flood control, navigation,
irrigation, and reforestation – in order to maximize the resources available in different river basins.
The Inland Waterways Commission’s foremost objective was to promote the recognition of water
as a natural resource, equivalent to timber, soil, or mineral resources. The contributions of geologist and
anthropologist William John McGee were particularly important in this respect (Linton 2010, Schmidt
2014). According to McGee:

No more significant advance has been made in our history than that of the last year or two in
which our waters have come to be considered as a resource - one definitely limited in quantity,
yet susceptible of conservation and of increased beneficence through wise utilization. (1909: 38)

McGee, the founding president of the American Anthropological Association, was introduced to the
conservation movement by his mentor John Wesley Powell, a geographer who had advocated for the
importance of watershed management in governing the American West. McGee’s writings on the
relationship between environment and human cultural development quickly made him one of “brains” of
the conservation movement (Pinchot 1947, Hays 1959).
McGee had moved to St. Louis to organize “Anthropology Days” for the 1904 Summer Olympics
and World’s Fair, remaining in the city afterwards to direct the St. Louis Museum. While in St. Louis, he
was recruited by the Lakes-to-the-Gulf Deep Waterway Association to aid in the creation of a navigable
deep-water channel from Chicago to New Orleans. This introduction to waterways policy shaped McGee’s
political and theoretical work for the remainder of his life (Schmidt 2014). Among his many projects,
McGee wanted to introduce comprehensive surveys of water resources and standard units of measure for
the different industries using water (1909). And as with his mentor Powell, McGee believed water
resources should be managed according to river basins, drawing on geographic expertise and the
emerging field of hydrology. These measures would improve control over water resources and avoid
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waste. In the tradition of Marsh’s Man and Nature, McGee viewed the proper management of water
resources as essential to ensuring population growth and national strength (McGee 1909).
This represented a stark departure from the water use policy of the time, which continued to be
dominated by “pork barrel” legislative practices. The Inland Waterways Commission and their allies in the
conservation movement wanted to push back on the piecemeal “pork barrel” approach to waterways
improvements and the USACE was one of their primary targets. Inland Waterways Commission chair
Burton had already been pushing for reforms of the USACE to standardize and provide oversight of their
role in each waterways project. In 1902, Congressman Theodore Burton had led efforts to establish the
Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors that would provide a technical feasibility review and a costbenefit analysis for all USACE divisional projects (Waugh and Hourigan 1980). Burton wanted the Board
to reduce the number of “pork barrel” projects; winnowing out those smaller projects favored by Congress
and instead emphasizing larger navigational improvements that would have a significant impact. This
work naturally fed into the Inland Waterways Commission, which wanted comprehensive planning to
develop the country’s water resources (Hays 1959).
With their “gospel of efficiency,” the conservationist movement also approved the massive
corporations that were proliferating at the start of the twentieth century (Hays 1959). In their eyes, these
enormous industries were the most capable of production at the scale and level of organization necessary
to preserve resources. Conservationists like Pinchot argued that centralized planning of industrial
production “must replace competition so that manufacturers could produce with less waste” (Hays 1959:
126). Even Roosevelt, noted trustbuster, argued that corporations were actually more beneficial with the
proper regulation (Muncy 1997). To these conservationists, because of its ties to “pork barrel,” the
USACE ending up serving unproductive small-scale regional business interests, an inefficient approach
compared to the national reach and impact of the emerging corporate conglomerates (O’Neill 2006).
The OVIA occupied an uneasy position in this emerging discourse of efficient multi-purpose water
management. On the one hand, Burton considered the Ohio River lock and dam project, in its scale and
objectives, as the perfect remedy to the readily-apparent flaws of the “pork barrel” approach:
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The Ohio is a great artery of commerce. Improvements have been made costing tens of millions
of dollars for branch streams like the Big Sandy, the Kentucky, the Green, the Wabash, and even
the Cumberland and the Tennessee. As a result there is a more uniform and at times a greater
depth of water in the Kentucky and Kanawha Rivers than in the Ohio where they empty into
it...There are six feet in the pools in those rivers, and in the Ohio where they flow into it at times
not more than three or four feet (quoted in Crissey 1956: 100-101).

The Board of Engineers that Burton helped set up issued a special report on these Ohio River
improvements arguing that it was, “in the opinion of the Board, the one river of all others most likely to
justify such work” (Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors 1907, quoted in Proceedings of the
Convention, National Rivers and Harbors Congress 1912: 224). Yet, many concerns still existed. First,
many conservationists closely associated the project with the USACE’s leadership, which they saw as
suspiciously pliant to local interests. OVIA members still felt it necessary to dispute claims of “pork barrel”
even when the project was almost completed, with a speaker at the OVIA convention in 1924 describing
how, “hundreds, perhaps thousands of editors across the country...contemptuously cast aside the
opinions of the Army Engineers and yell ‘pork barrel! pork barrel! pork barrel!’ every time a Rivers and
Harbors Hill is under consideration” (OVIA 1924: 87). Moreover, the OVIA membership was drawn largely
from regional businesses, like barge lines and wholesalers, that represented the smaller-scale alternative
to the national railroads lines and other massive corporations. This difference helped conservationist
critics paint them as inefficient in their operations and provincial in their proposals.
But the major concern for the conservationists focused on the fact that the Ohio River lock and
dam system’s exclusive focus on navigation fell well short of the multi-purpose water management goals
of their own movement, leading many critics to point out what the project could have accomplished if it
had only been more ambitious. Burton felt that:

We ought to treat water as an entirety: navigation, water power, purification of water, prevention
of floods and there is nothing better than this House can do than to frame some system under
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which they shall be treated, not merely in reference to navigation, as a separate unit, but to bring
all together as an asset of this people as important as the land (quoted in Crissey 1956: 99).

For their part, OVIA members were equally leery of a multi-purpose water policy approach.
Suggestions to incorporate other water supply considerations were regularly rejected in favor of a focus
on navigation. At the OVIA’s first convention, Cincinnati Health Officer Dr. Prendergast, suggested “that
while the commercial improvement was pushed, the sanitary part should not be overlooked” (OVIA 1895:
22). Captain George Anderson of Pittsburgh replied brusquely that “while he was not a sanitary expert, he
had learned that the river purifies itself every ten or fifteen miles” and moreover, the design of the
movable dams proposed by the OVIA helped aerate water (23). Similar suggestions to consider forest
conservation or flood control were politely heard out, but firmly rebuffed at the OVIA’s annual convention.
Meanwhile, the OVIA-affiliated National Rivers and Harbors Congress joined calls for a national water
resource plan (O’Neill 2006), but its wide-ranging and undiscerning approach also led to criticisms from
multi-purpose advocates and “pork barrel” reformers (Hart 1957, Hays 1959).
OVIA resistance to overtures from the Inland Waterways Commission or the conservation
movement came to a head in 1908. That year, William John McGee attended the OVIA’s Fourteenth
Annual Convention in Louisville. After his initial enthusiasm for the work of the Lakes-to-the-Gulf Deep
Waterway Association, McGee had fallen out with that group when they refused to adopt a multi-purpose
water management approach and instead maintained their focus on navigation. As a result, when he
arrived at the convention representing the Inland Waterways Commission, the OVIA members and
USACE officials were already deeply suspicious about McGee’s claims that navigation groups like the
OVIA and Lakes-to-the-Gulf Deep Waterway Association considered water as “merely a body of liquid as
is a lake or a sea” (McGee, personal correspondence, 1906, quoted in Hays 1957: 104) and that they
ignored the numerous other important uses for water.
Before he could even address the OVIA group at the 1908 Convention, a number of speakers
pointedly attacked McGee’s conservationist platform. Congressman Swagar Sherley, a long-time member
of the OVIA (and also an appointed member of the Inland Waterways Commission), put it bluntly:
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I have the honor to be a member of the Commission appointed by the President for the
conservation of the natural resources of America...I am interested in the other projects that are
being talked of; but I do not want to see those projects tied to the proposition of improving the
Ohio River (applause) (OVIA 1908: 122).

At the same meeting, Major William Sibert of the USACE – who had formerly overseen the government’s
plan for improvements on the Ohio River, but by 1908 had been transferred to working on the Panama
Canal – was more pointed:

It is thought that the people who are advocating a combination of all the above subjects [‘flood
control, forest preservation, prevention of the erosion of the soils, development of water power,
etc.’] as a plan of river improvement are unacquainted with the practical needs of navigation or
the practical ways of providing such needs. (60)

Speaker after speaker drove home the point that the OVIA and USACE were solely interested in
navigation for the Ohio River. McGee got the message, responding:

…the plan of improvement of the Ohio by means of the movable dam system, an admirable plan,
and perhaps not the one that would be adopted today were the question to come up: but, mark
you, the question is not up. A plan has been adopted and is under way, and it is in accordance
with that plan that future development must be carried forward. (Applause.) (129).

After 1908, OVIA convention speakers occasionally presented information on other water-related
topics like hydropower or sanitation, but conservation and the consideration of water as a natural
resource were not seriously debated again by the OVIA until the 1930s. Navigation was the settled
objective of the association, and it would be developed independent of other water management
strategies. Indeed, members of the OVIA were so focused on their objective, they only very rarely even
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appealed to other benefits the would accrue naturally from the lock and dam system beyond navigation,
such as increased water supply for cities along the Ohio River in periods of drought (OVIA 1929b: 51).

D. Assembling “Modern Water”

The multi-purpose water movement and the conservationists lost influence with the end of
Roosevelt’s term in office. Roosevelt’s successor, President William Taft, was a less ardent supporter of
coordinated federal resource management, and allowed the Inland Waterways Commission’s mandate to
lapse. Taft favored limited executive powers, and preferred only to act with Congressional authorization
(Hays 1959). In terms of waterways policies, he viewed navigation as the clearest area where the federal
government had authority to advance work, and moved to curtail other related projects, like hydropower
(Hays 1959). At the OVIA’s convention held in Cincinnati in 1910, Taft – from a prominent Cincinnati
political family himself – spoke strongly in support of the Ohio River lock and dam project, claiming that
after any “calm and impartial consideration of all the project improvements for river transportation, there is
none that offers to great a probability of success and benefit to the entire country as the improvement of
the Ohio River...” (OVIA 1910: 15). Taft’s new policies and approach helped drive noted conservations
like Gifford Pinchot out of the federal government. Moreover, McGee died in 1912, dealing another blow
to the movement (Hays 1959). As a result of these shifts, improvements driven by the USACE, regional
water-users, and sectional alliances in Congress eclipsed multi-purpose water planning in the early
twentieth century (Hays 1959, O’Neill 2006).
Histories of the conservation movement lay the blame for the defeat of the Inland Waterways
Commission at the feet of those organizations that were focused on supporting river navigation, and to a
lesser extent, groups calling for federal management of flood control efforts (Hays 1959, O’Neill 2006).
For those who supported the conservation movement’s aims, this created distrust for lobbies like the
OVIA, Lakes-to-the-Gulf Deep Waterway Association, and Mississippi River Improvement Levee
Association, as well as drawing particular ire for the USACE. In his influential text, Conservation and the
Gospel of Efficiency (1959), prominent conservationist historian Samuel Hays characterized these latter
groups as reactionary and operating mainly from personal or institutional interest. He portrays
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conservationists as a group of well-intentioned technicians, excited to use their emerging expertise to
strengthen the country, while depicting the USACE as an entity that had strayed far from its scientific
roots, more interested in preserving its power than examining the most rational and efficient approach
that could be used to manage water resources. As a result, the USACE resisted the “coordination of
navigation with any other water use [like hydropower, flood control, or irrigation]” solely in order to “protect
its own role in water development” (Hays 1959: 8). Meanwhile Congressional “pork barrel” practices
meant navigation lobbies, which sprung up in great numbers following the OVIA’s success, were able
corrupt the USACE even further and push the development of “many projects at once to satisfy a great
number of localities rather than to construct the most important ones first” (Hays 1959: 274). In Hays’
view, institutional and sectional interest controlled decision-making around waterway improvements to the
detriment of the conservation movement scientists. Numerous subsequent studies have further
developed the history of the USACE and local water development lobbies during this period without
fundamentally disrupting this narrative that these groups acted based on localized and institutional
interests, stifling the promise of the scientific expertise championed by the conservation movement
11

(Dodds 1969, Worster 1985, O’Neill 2006, Pisani 2006).

My challenge here is to understand the OVIA, USACE, and other parties involved in improving
the Ohio River navigation as part of the assemblage emerging around a redefinition of “modern water,”
rather than as an uninteresting reactionary formation. I argue that both conservationists and the OVIA
utilized conceptions of water that made expert management a fundamental part of making water
productive, and that these operations of expertise are best understood as part of an assemblage that
encompasses both viewpoints. While the OVIA and USACE did not align themselves with the
conservation movement, their actions do not need to be interpreted as primarily a result of local or
institutional interests resisting a comprehensive approach to water management. Instead, an assemblage
of “modern water” should embrace both the OVIA and conservationists, despite their conflicts, expanding
our understanding of how water has come to be understood and used in the U.S. and farther afield. At the
same time, it is important to track within these debates the actions of the Ohio River itself, the ways the
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Pisani (2006) goes furthest in suggesting that the USACE was right in making its protests because
many of the Inland Waterways Commission’s conservationist proposals were impractical, but does little to
explore the implications of the navigational projects the USACE was working towards.
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river responded to these projects and shaped the perceptions of “modern water” through its own actions.
Perhaps surprisingly, the Ohio River proved amenable to this new idea of expert management, largely
conforming to expectations and facilitating elite control over this maritime space.
This effort to bring these different threads together – the OVIA, conservationists, and the Ohio
River – implies, first, tracing out the subsequent lineage of “water as a natural resource” in order to
understand the ways that conservationist were ultimately successful in reshaping water management
policy, and how this approach has set the parameters for contemporary water studies. After laying out this
framework, we can return to the efforts of the OVIA and USACE to understand how they viewed
themselves in the early twentieth century (which was, unsurprisingly, not as localized or small-minded),
the precedents they drew on to legitimize the Ohio River lock and dam project, and their continuing place
in U.S. water politics. In closing, I return to the Cincinnati to examine how the Ohio River responded to
these efforts and ultimately reshaped social life along the riverfront. In bringing together these interlinked
histories, I argue we can begin to define the ways that navigation contributes to an idea of “modern
water.”
Proponents of viewing water as a natural resource gained stature throughout the twentieth
century. Although the demise of the Inland Waterways Commission signaled a serious setback for
conservationist, new momentum for multi-purpose water management and river-basin planning arrived
with the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). For decades, government officials and private developers had
expressed interest in two things in the impoverished Tennessee Valley: using the falls along the
Tennessee River for hydropower and developing the region’s extensive nitrate reserves for munitions and
fertilizers (Scott 1998). Despite these desires, which focused on the area near Muscle Shoals, Alabama,
several

public

and

private

development

proposals

had

languished

after

promising

starts.

Conservationists, particularly Senator George Norris, successfully obstructed plans during the 1920s that
did not include a comprehensive resource management plan (Hubbard 1961). With the election of
President Franklin Roosevelt, Norris proposed a government authority to administer an integrated
development plan for the region, considering hydropower, nitrate reserves, flood control, forestry, and
wildlife, as well as many educational programs touching on agriculture, industry, and other fields. The bill
to create this autonomous TVA passed the U.S. Congress in 1933.
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Federal officials viewed the TVA as a near complete success. They believed scientific central
planning and resource management had passed a critical test, and the TVA’s productivity convinced
many in government that the technocratic multi-purpose water management approach could be applied in
a number of contexts (Scott 1998, although Congress also scuppered plans to develop further river-basin
authorities in the U.S., see Leuchtenburg 1952). This marked one of the high points of what Scott (1998)
has called “high modernism,” the conversion of nature as a whole into a resource to be utilized. The TVA
consolidated a river-basin approach to planning, justifying this form of governance through appeals to the
natural divisions created by watersheds and the hydrological cycle (Molle 2009). After WWII, multipurpose planning modeled on the TVA became a central component of the US’s approach to international
development. USAID and other agencies implemented a multi-purpose water management approach in
many of their foreign projects, while U.S. Peace Corps volunteer shared comprehensive water use plans
with rural communities across the globe (Molle 2009). An updated version of this doctrine, Integrated
Water Resource Management (IWRM), became the dominant water policy in the 1990s (Orlove & Caton
2010). IWRM adopted many of the principles embodied by the TVA and later U.S. international
development programs, but also addressed concerns about environmental destruction, social impact, and
the involvement of local actors in planning, instead of relying only on technological solutions crafted in the
U.S. or Europe. Today engineers and hydrologists are expected to work with local communities to craft
the best strategy for managing the local water supply.
From a theoretical perspective, contemporary water studies have grown in large part through a
critique of the conservationist and IWRM models and its use of hydrological cycle as the key framework
for managing available water resources (Orlove & Caton 2010). Geographers building on the extensive
work of Swyngedouw (1999, 2004, 2009) have proposed an alternative approach highlighting a
hydrosocial cycle instead of the largely depersonalized hydrological cycle. Whereas IWRM presents a
vision of a naturalized hydrological cycle (the classic uninhabited landscape of rain clouds, rivers, the
ocean, and evaporation), the hydrosocial cycle insists on also considering the pipes, water sewage
plants, reservoirs, and other forms of human interventions to aid the distribution of water as also part of
the same system (Linton & Budds 2014). Within the hydrosocial cycle, there is no reduction of water to a
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uniform H20 with natural qualities and properties. Rather, water is particularized in its meanings and
consequences, defined through its flow and motion in specific contexts (Banister 2014).
Moreover, and key to this approach, the relationship between society and water, presented as
separate entities in IWRM, is dialectical and immanent within the hydrosocial cycle:

In the hydrosocial cycle, things like water, society, and social power retain their positive identities
but are understood to relate internally, whereby they are neither considered as already-existing
entities, nor ones that can maintain independent identities following interaction with each other
(Linton & Budds 2014: 175, emphasis in original).

This perspective draws attention to the agential aspects of water, whether in the form of the massive
impact caused by something like Ohio River flooding or the cumulative effect of a leaky pipe that causes
structural damages. The materiality of water (thirst, cleanliness, precipitation) is present throughout
everyday life and is as active in shaping society as vice versa. This view also highlights water’s central
role in the relations of power across social settings. The control over water and its flow therefore has
significant consequences in terms of the organization of authority and inequality, a view that can be
traced back to Wittfogel (1957). As a result, drought, pollution, floods, groundwater, desalination, and
many other aspects of the water supply are understood as inflection points for exerting control over social
relations. Anthropologists have further developed this approach, proposing concepts like waterworlds
(Hastrup 2009) or waterscapes (Rodriguez 2006, Strang 2009) that serve as a starting point for
considering the specificity of how water management is “struggled over and fought out in concrete
settings” (Orlove & Caton 2010: 410).
From the Inland Waterways Commission through to the hydrosocial cycle, the emphasis within
this genealogy has been on understanding water as a natural resource. The most up-to-date approaches
in IWRM still rely on hydrological knowledge to best utilize the available water resources to the benefit of
society (whether within a framework of conservation, development aid, or sustainability). In turn,
theoretical perspectives like the hydrosocial cycle or waterscapes have difficulties breaking with this
natural resource perspective. According to Bakker (2002), one of the first proponents of a hydrosocial
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approach: “Whereas H20 circulates through the hydrological cycle, water as a resource circulates through
the hydrosocial cycle…” (774, emphasis in original). Understanding water “as a resource” has been the
ascendant epistemological framework for analyzing water from the early twentieth century to the present,
providing an explanatory capacity for the why and how of water’s role in society.
At the same time, many water users have followed alternative trajectories that leave them outside
this “natural resource” general consensus. In this sense, the contributions of anthropology are critical
since it has maintained a focus on the many other ways that water actively features in creating cultural
meaning: “seeing water not only as a resource, but also as a substance that connects many realms of
social life” (Caton and Orlove 2010: 401). Navigation, whether on rivers or the ocean, fits particularly
poorly within the “water as a natural resource” framework and can benefit from anthropological study. As
we will see below, those groups like the OVIA that use the water for navigation have developed their own
pre-existing legal, social, and technological trajectories that have stood to benefit very little from
incorporation into a water resource management approach, and have maintained water-use plans for
inland waterways that made little reference to the natural resource approach to water. Moreover, within
an overall context where concern over water resources has been the driving force in water management
theory, groups pursuing navigational improvements have typically been ignored or vilified, as with the
conservationist historiography best represented by Samuel Hays’ Conservation and the Gospel of
Efficiency (1959). As a result, water studies have largely neglected to examine how navigation has
developed or to interrogate the objectives of navigation improvement infrastructures like the Ohio River
lock and dam system. For one example of this absence, as of this writing, Water Alternatives, a journal on
“water, politics, and development” features zero articles on navigation, while dozens of articles consider
the issues around irrigation, flood control, or hydropower.

E. Navigation and Nation

Anthropologists have shown the deep importance of navigation to the development of nationalist
projects, particularly in connection with the aims of imperialist expansion (Brown 2005, Carse 2014). In
these contexts, far from being a taken-for-granted reactionary formation, navigation is seen as requiring
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significant investments that are vital to the success of these nationalist ambitions. The creation of new
technologies, regular supply of maritime labor, and a constant search for new markets or ports are all
ongoing requirements to maintain navigational power. Many of these conditions were present in the
OVIA’s efforts to remake the Ohio River into a space of national importance, reframing their work from
being an “internal improvement” to one that benefited the entire country.
Far from seeing themselves as simply maintaining the status quo, the OVIA and USACE viewed
their work as groundbreaking. From their vantage, they had only recently reached a position where they
could develop comprehensive solutions to the problem of navigation, which were markedly different from
the problems of water resource management posed by the conservation movement. In the early years,
OVIA members often portrayed themselves as fighting to overcome long odds to achieve their project. A
Congressional Representative from Indiana spoke at the 1907 convention of his desire to “commemorate
and perpetuate the names of the pioneers of this movement, who for thirteen long years have struggled
through disaster to achieve this present success” (OVIA 1907: 83). In part, this sense of struggle came
from the annual need to secure renewed Congressional appropriations for the Ohio River lock and dam
system in order to continue advancing the project, as distinct Congressional sessions considered each
lock and dam along the length of the river separately, treating them as individual projects. OVIA
leadership felt they had reached a major breakthrough when, in 1910, the U.S. Congress approved a
Rivers and Harbors Act that committed the government to completing the lock and dam project within
twelve years. Unfortunately, they were dismayed to later find out that this resolution in no way established
any requirements for the next session of the U.S. Congress (OVIA 1923: 13). Even the USACE, often
depicted by historians as the entrenched gatekeepers of water policy, had only been authorized by the
U.S. Congress to have continuing jurisdiction to administer the navigable waterways with the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899 (whereas previously they had required official Congressional authorization for each
new project). Both the OVIA and USACE believed drastic changes in how the country used and
administered the Ohio River were necessary to revive the inland maritime trade. To them, the lock and
dams project was in no way an obvious outcome, but rather required reference to extensive navigational
jurisprudence and new engineering technologies to reposition the Ohio River as an object of national
importance rather than an internal improvement, requiring federal investment and care. While the

55

linkages between managing water resources and the exercise of power in society are well understood,
little attention has been paid to how, in instances like the Ohio River, navigation has been developed as a
component of governance and power.

12

In the U.S., river navigation has had enormous legal importance. In 1824, the U.S. Supreme
Court decided the case of Gibbon v. Ogden, denying New York the right to issue a license to Aaron
Ogden (under contract from steamboat innovator Robert Fulton) to operate a monopoly steamboat route
within the state’s borders. The ruling determined that the federal government had the obligation to ensure
free navigation of U.S. rivers based on the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. This case is well
known as the basis for a range of federal interventions in the U.S. economy and social life, with the
Supreme Court subsequently interpreting the Commerce Clause widely to include both trade and more
abstract issues like the exchange of ideas (Johnson 2010). Thus, U.S. rivers have long stood as
metonyms for national commerce and intercourse (Johnson 2010, Gruenwald 2002). Yet, Gibbon v.
Ogden also set the basic parameters for the federal regulation of all water rights across the country,
establishing a legal precedent referred to as “navigable servitude,” meaning that the federal government
has absolute rights over any navigable stream “for purposes related to navigation and commerce,
regardless of ownership and without compensation” (Pisarski 1996: 313). In The Daniel Ball (1870), the
U.S. Supreme Court clarified that: “Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which
are navigable in fact.” (77 U.S. 557). According to this determination, the act of navigation itself made any
waterway fall under federal jurisdiction, verifiable under a “test of navigability,” meaning the actual use of
the stream. Rivers found to be navigable had to be automatically ceded to the state where they were
found, with the land underwater at the normal high water mark required to be held in trust for the public
(Frey 1974). Thus, any navigable rivers in the country constituted a commons, free to be used by U.S.
citizens for commerce (Pisarski 1996). Numerous judicial cases have refined the definition of navigability,
considering what constitutes commerce (whitewater rafting tours? floating logs? Individual recreation?)
and what could be considered physically non-navigable (rapids? a river that dries up during a drought?).
In almost all these cases, U.S. courts have robustly defended a public right to navigability (Pisarski 1996).
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An important exception can be found in studies of the Black Atlantic that consider the ways that the
practice of navigation has helped configure colonial and post-colonial practices of dominance (Brown
2005, Rediker 2007).
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Individuals, private organizations, or local governments cannot obstruct or deviate navigable streams
without receiving a permit from the federal government.

13

In this sense, for most of the nineteenth century, navigability, and not natural resource
management, was the legal and – more importantly – exclusive, basis for federal interventions in
regulating water (O’Neill 2006). As a result, when considering waterways projects, federal officials
restricted themselves to building infrastructure that was intended to improve navigability, arguing that the
U.S. Constitution, through the Commerce Clause, only permitted the federal government to undertake
these projects and not to address other issues like irrigation or flood control (Shallat 1994).

14

This

restriction remained in effect up until the early twentieth century, when the U.S. Congress authorized the
creation of the Bureau of Reclamation (formed in 1902) to aid the development of arid Western lands
through irrigation and then later passed the Flood Control Act of 1917 for the Mississippi River and
Sacramento River, significantly expanding the scope of government intervention in waterways
management (Pisani 1992, O’Neill 2006). Despite this enlargement of the federal government’s water
usage authority, navigation has remained the fundamental legal framework for intervening in water
management, since “federal navigational servitude is paramount to all other interests in navigable waters”
(Pisarski 1996: 316). Speaking at the OVIA’s first convention in 1895, Captain Dravo, a shipbuilder from
Pittsburgh, brought forward this viewpoint as a key component of the nascent organization’s approach,
stating, “I want to see the rivers so controlled that all the people shall have the free, untrammeled and
unrestricted use of the public waters of the nation. These waters belong to the people” (OVIA 1895: 22).
Yet, while Gibbons v. Ogden early on established the importance of navigation on inland
waterways within the country, in practice however, the determination of federal jurisdiction and the
designation of navigable rivers as a public commons did not necessarily lead to funding for navigation
improvement projects. As mentioned earlier, numerous antebellum U.S. Presidents and members of
13

On the other hand, non-navigable waters are open to private ownership and are regulated by state
laws, which can vary. East Coast states typically employ a riparian rights model where all riverbank
property owners have mutual rights, based on English common-law, while Western states use prior
appropriation water rights law, establishing a system of precedent for determining water usage (Johnson
2008).
14
Some projects did incidentally incorporate other water management goals as well. For instance, in the
nineteenth century, the federal government supported the construction of levees on the Mississippi River
because they concentrated and deepened the river’s channel and thus could be argued to improve
navigation. Still, the public recognized – even if not officially acknowledged by the federal government –
that the levees primarily existed for flood control (Shallat 1994).
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Congress opposed improving rivers on the grounds that these efforts would benefit local interests and
were not national in scope. Recognition of federal responsibility to regulate waterways transportation also
developed slowly. As part of a push for increased navigational safety, the U.S. Congress began to
oversee steamboat transportation in 1838, requiring licenses and inspections, even though these
regulations were rarely enforced (Voulgaris 2009).
This lack of interest in improving river navigation in the U.S. waterways during the nineteenth
century contrasted markedly with Europe. Whereas in the U.S., federal support for waterways
improvements was irregular and small-scale, European central governments early on began investing in
massive river works. French river improvements and canals expanded as early as in the seventeenth
century in part to strengthen the ascendant central state (Mukerji 2009). On the Rhine River, both the
Tulla Rectification Project (1817-1876) led by the Grand Duchy of Baden, and the Prussian Navigation
Project (1851-1900) involved large-scale river engineering sustained across decades (Cioc 2006). Similar
channelization projects in the nineteenth century aiming to aid navigation took place on the Danube River
(Haidvogl 2012), Elbe River (Schubert 2017), and Rhône River (Pritchard 2011), among numerous other
European waterways.
In the postbellum U.S., river improvements expanded in number, but were nowhere near the
scale of projects in Europe. Whereas state powers in Germany and France directly rebuilt rivers, most
river infrastructure in the U.S. only temporarily improved the channel (snag removal or dredging) or tried
to concentrate the water’s flow in order to scour a deeper channel (wing dams or levees). During this
period, smaller navigable rivers, such as the Monongahela River or Green River, did see more direct
interventions. These were led by the federal government (due to “log rolling” in the U.S. Congress) or
private companies like the Monongahela Navigation Company, which built a series of locks and dams on
the Monongahela River to facilitate navigation from Appalachian coal mines down to Pittsburgh.
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Meanwhile, the projects on the Rhine River and Danube River straightened river banks, closed off
side channels, cut through oxbow meanders, and created parallel canals where obstructions made
navigation difficult (Cioc 2006, Haidvogl 2012). These interventions indicated a desire to create more
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Private projects like the Monongahela lock and dam system or Soo Locks were later nationalized
because no private entities, by charging lock fees, were supposed to obstruct free navigation of federal
streams (Johnson 1991).
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“rational” rivers that adhered to a nineteenth century efforts to produce logical and reliable spaces of
transportation, just as the USACE leadership had long desired to be able to produce across the U.S.
(Shallat 1994). Larger-scale navigational projects in the U.S., like the Erie Canal (completed in 1825) or
the Soo Locks (opened in 1855), existed but had been led by private capital or state governments and
were typically lead by contracted private engineers. These differences between the U.S. and Europe in
terms of navigational improvements were due to range of factors: a perception of U.S. wilderness as less
tractable (Marx 1964, Blackbourn 2007), the legacy of English cultural traditions in the U.S. favoring
privately-funded infrastructural development like canal-building and a resistance to scientific management
(Shallat 1994), distinct travel cultures (Schivelbusch 1979), and higher labor costs in the U.S., among
other reasons. As a result, at the beginning of the twentieth century, European waterways systems had
received significantly more investment from the central state and scientifically-administered engineering
work than rivers in the U.S.
I focus on these European infrastructural histories because these were a fundamental recurring
concern at the OVIA conventions. Year after year, OVIA members, government officials, and USACE
engineers all expressed the need to redress this international imbalance, soliciting more direct large-scale
interventions in navigable waterways in order to catch up with Europe. Starting with a speech by a
Pittsburgh canal-builder at the first OVIA convention, which compiled extensive statistical information on
navigational improvements in France, Germany, Scotland, and Russia (OVIA 1895: 37), OVIA members
explicitly placed themselves within the pre-existing European legacy of navigational improvements.
Typical of these viewpoints was the statement by Alan Goldsmith from the U.S. Department of
Commerce: “In the United States river and canal transportation has been the red-headed stepchild of
commerce; in Europe it is in many cases more energetically developed and more carefully maintained
than railway transportation” (OVIA 1923: 29). This language extended into their publicity materials, with a
banner at the 1906 convention reading “Belgium, One-Quarter as Large as Ohio, has 1,220 Miles of
Improved Waterways” (OVIA 1906: 7). These references to Europe framed investment in the Ohio River
as important for national commerce and defense. OVIA President John Vance framed the Ohio River lock
and dam project as an issue of “patriotism” (OVIA 1900: 25), stating that “it is not local, it is not national
alone, it is international in its character” (OVIA 1903: 13). Members of the OVIA also linked the Ohio River
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project with the Panama Canal as an complementary investment if the U.S. wanted to achieve its imperial
dreams. At the OVIA convention in 1900, Charles Burdett Hart – a West Virginian and an OVIA member
who was also serving at the time as the U.S. Minister to Colombia and attempting to negotiate a
transcontinental route for the future Panama Canal – declared that the Ohio River improvements were in
the national interest and that “the early completion and control by the United States of an Isthmian Canal
is recognized as logically affiliated with the purposes of this [Ohio Valley Improvement] Association”
(OVIA 1900: 90).
Evan Bone, an engineer for the USACE, similarly portrayed the lock and dam system as a
patriotic project essential to the future of the nation. Recalling work undertaken during World War I, he
described how:

You know speaking of the war we were under pressure to try to get a much better
navigation…one year at the time when there was that big flu epidemic went through the country
and with work like that with exposure and damp, rainy and wet...One after another those fellow
[working on the construction of a lock and dam] would drop off sick and you wouldn't have the
heart to ask or tell someone they had to do that but you would be surprised how they would
volunteer...I often wondered, now there's fellows, they were fighting for their country just as much
as soldiers in the line of battle. Ordinarily they don't get any decorations or anything for it, of
course I don't think they would want it. They just felt like they were doing a job and doing it for the
country…” (Bone 1957: 8-9)

In tandem with this appeal to the national importance of the Ohio River, the USACE and OVIA
members sought to root their argument economic productivity. From the outset, commercial
considerations served as a key justification for the project, with the OVIA’s first meeting organized as an
initiative of the Freight Bureau of the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce. The OVIA’s proposal hinged on
being able to make the river economically viable again, with the new navigation infrastructure improving
the profitability of shipping on the river, making it amenable to transportation needs: faster, more reliable,
and safer. The OVIA membership argued that these improvements would contribute value to the regional
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production process, reducing the time and costs necessary to move goods to market and leading to an
expansion of industry. OVIA members also argued that a river with locks and dams could better operate
as part of an integrated transportation network, even promoting maritime connections to their traditional
nemesis, the railroads, drawing on examples from Europe to show that transshipping opportunities would
increase rail cargos and benefit both groups. Later, the OVIA’s focus expanded to present river navigation
as complementary to the development of automobiles and the nascent trucking industry, and by the late
1920s, even the possibilities presented by air transport. OVIA leadership made an effort to engage with
all these transportation industries, welcoming railroad directors regularly to the OVIA conventions and
hosting motor enthusiasts from the Dixie Highway Association in Cincinnati (OVIA 1925: 140).
USACE engineers were closely involved in this discussion, with Major William Sibert, who had
confronted William John McGee at the 1908 OVIA convention for having unrealistic multi-purpose water
management goals for the Ohio River, also reminding OVIA members that their venture was “founded on
the fundamentals of economics” and warning them away from the “generalities” of the conservation
movement (OVIA 1908: 63). The USACE also used the Ohio River locks and dams project to expand the
legitimacy of their cost-benefit analysis techniques. Colonel C.W. Kutz, while head of the USACE’s
Central District division, presented a talk at the 1925 OVIA convention titled “Some Economic Aspects of
the Ohio River” covering in detail how the U.S. Army Engineers conducted their cost-benefit analysis,
even as he acknowledged that: “Until the project is completed, and the extent of its use is determined by
experience, there will be room for a difference of opinion on [the value of the river improvements]” (OVIA
1925: 69).
The OVIA and USACE brought together these arguments about national interest and economic
impact to depict a very different vision of the river’s role, one that differed from viewing it primarily as a
natural resource. Rather than viewing the Ohio River as an abstract quantity of water that could achieve
various ends, they were interested in remaking the river as a productive space for the national economy.
They saw the Ohio River, rebuilt through federal infrastructural investments, as the basis for a free
competition between business owners, rather than as an object of centralized planning overseen by an
alliance of the federal government and corporations that they argued conservationists favored. They drew
on the river’s symbolic and historical importance as a commons to contrast it with the singular control
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exerted by massive corporations monopolies. As one speaker put it, seizing on anti-corporate sentiment,
there was no way a remade Ohio River, freely accessible to whoever wanted to use it, could be
“Morganized” (OVIA 1905: 5), referencing to financier J. P. Morgan’s role in building multiple monopolies.
The OVIA portrayed the Ohio River as open to everyone, encouraging new businesses to take to the
water and strengthening the country so it could compete with Europe. Through these narrative strategies,
the OVIA wanted to increase recognition of the Ohio River as “a national waterway” not a local river, one
that through its winding course “tells the story of a nation united, of a country that all of us love…” (OVIA
1899: 21).

F. Remaking the River

Through the lock and dam project, the USACE and members of the OVIA sought to make the
Ohio River a productive part of the country’s transportation infrastructure, which was rapidly changing in
the early twentieth century. Railroads (and streetcars at the urban level) had assumed the dominant role
in transportation as of 1900, but the next rise of automobiles and airplanes over the next two decades
saw a drastic reworking of the means and possibilities of mobility. Rather than experts in water
management like McGee, the USACE engineers and OVIA members were eager to make themselves out
as transportation experts – which they argued called for a vastly different skill set and approach to project
management. At the 1908 OVIA convention, Major William Sibert of the USACE, as part of his pointed
rebuke to the anthropologist McGee, claimed that:

This is an age of specialists. It is the business of an ethnologist, for instance, to acquaint himself
with the habits and customs of the various types of the human race, both antediluvian and
modern, but he would hardly be expected to be an authority of equal weight upon the habits and
customs of a stern-wheel steamboat with 20,000 tons of coal in tow in a five-mile current in a
narrow channel of the Ohio River. (OVIA 1908: 60-61)
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In this argument, the vagaries and sudden dangers of navigating the Ohio River made practical
knowledge crucial to making the Ohio River a productive transportation system, knowledge which had to
be gained through years of working the river. McGee’s abstract cross-cultural knowledge could not match
the practical skills that the USACE had developed from their work in the field. These USACE engineers
repeatedly referenced the importance of “trial and error” in discussing their work, and how an engineer
had to rely on “past experience” to “anticipate the trouble you are going to get in” (Anderson 1957: 2).
Sibert argued that the success of the lock and dam project depended on intimately understanding the
river and the particularities of maritime transport on the inland waterways, and he scoffed at McGee’s
belief that a project could seamlessly combine navigation, hydropower, flood control, and other concerns
and still be effective.
In addition to utilizing their own experiences, engineers also relied on steamboat pilots, old
deckhands, and other river inhabitants to help them. A deputy inspector with the USACE, who reviewed
dam and lock works on the Ohio River, recounted his own run-in with one of these individuals:

…this Armstrong when I took over had just been reconditioned and they had not completed all the
insulation on the steampipes and that sort of thing in the engine room and the boiler room. So
one day this shantyboat appeared on the scene and they pulled in and tied up there at
Henderson Island and the old man in the rowboat came out to the boat and was greeted like a
long lost friend and it turned out that he was an expert insulator. Probably the dirtiest human
being I ever saw...But he did a beautiful job, so I inquired about that, and the story was at that
time many of the shantyboat people were marvelous artisans and had definite trades and could
really do a beautiful job of work when they felt like working… (Anderson 1957: 5-6)

While this is a dramatic example, in their work USACE engineers regularly depended on those who had
developed their own particularized skills and knowledge of river life, even if it differed from their formal
training. They needed these individuals to repair their boats, consult on construction techniques, and
evaluate each project location so USACE engineers could tailor lock and dam designs to the specific site
conditions and ultimately protect steamboats from any potential hazards that could arise.
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This last point was important because the Ohio River posed unique challenges at every turn. The
river’s silt load wreaked havoc with lock and dam designs, confounding USACE engineers trying to install
massive movable lock and dam systems, especially since each dam was made up of hundreds of wickets
that the Lock Master would lower or raise depending on water height. Evan Bone, a USACE engineer
who worked on the Ohio River project over multiple decades, described how the “problem with silt was a
problem all the way through, especially as they would get farther and farther down towards the source of
the river” (Bone 1957: 3). The silt gummed up the lock mechanisms, buried lowered wickets, and caused
headaches for the USACE at every turn. The USACE engineers tried various solutions, but “then they
found out, the Old Man [River], the trouble with silt, came along again” (3).
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The USACE also faced

numerous other obstacles posed by “Old Man River,” including sudden flooding that surged over
cofferdams, runaway barges, and unstable sand foundations, all issues that delayed construction
repeatedly over the course of the Ohio River lock and dam project.
Given these issues, the USACE engineers had to develop and test new construction methods
and technical innovations at almost every site, but they also had to be open to implementing informal – or
less “by-the-book” – solutions to these problems. At the first OVIA convention, Captain Dravo, the
prominent shipbuilder from Pittsburgh, asked the USACE engineers to be “big enough and broad enough
to accept suggestions from the practical man on the river, to add to the education of West Point the
education of the Ohio River, as obtained by these men” (OVIA 1895: 22). And, for their part, the USACE
engineers were open to this approach, bringing in ship captains and other “river men” to discuss the
behavior of “Old Man River” at specific locations and learn how to anticipate the river’s moods and
challenges. In his “age of specialists” statement, Major William Sibert contrasts the importance of this
experiential knowledge with the theoretical understandings of conservationist like McGee, who studied
the abstract “habits and customs” of water usage far removed from the tricky realities faced by the
USACE and OVIA members.
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Based on listening to the audio from this interview, I have transcribed Evan Bone’s quote slightly
differently than the original interviewer, John Knoepfle, in the belief that Bone is referring to Old Man
River as the source of recurring silt problems. The original transcription of the full sentence is as follows:
“But then they found out the old man, the trouble with silt came along again, because in the gates when
they rolled out away they had to have a gate recess and that's where the gate would, to get the gate out
to, not obstruct the entrance into the lock, that recess would fill up with silt, the same thing, problem
again” (Bone 1957: 3).
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According to the USACE and OVIA, it was their combination of technical and practical knowledge
that would make the lock and dam successful. This understanding was well captured when, with the
completion of the lock and dam system in 1929, the OVIA held a tongue-in-cheek ceremony celebrating
the marriage of “Old Man River” and “Miss Movable Dam.” Unlike the conservationists, the USACE and
OVIA’s modern Ohio River was to be a careful fusing of scientific engineering and practical knowledge,
bringing together the old and the new. The white OVIA and USACE men used this combination to
reinforce their claims over the river, but the “marriage” of old and new knowledge also represented a
unique formulation in terms of how they justified their actions within the national sphere.
As Brown (2005) shows in her work on the history of Black sailors in Liverpool, the importance of
navigation to nation can be particularly fraught. In Britain, navigational dominance in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries was central to the country’s imperial project. Yet, in Liverpool, this dominance
was increasingly dependent on maritime labor coming from British colonies, particularly from Africa and
the Caribbean. Ship owners encouraged many of these Black sailors to strike up relationships with local
women, establishing roots that would keep them tied to Liverpool and the British maritime complex. Yet,
these same policies created racialized and sexualized anxieties at the core of the British Empire, with fear
of Black sailors cavorting with white English and Irish women. The connections to the colonies, the
reliance on foreign labor, and the idea of Black sailors associating with white women all troubled the idea
of the English nation even as they were vital to the continuation of the British Empire.
In the Ohio Valley, the OVIA leadership carefully avoided similar kinds of preoccupations in their
efforts to remake the river. The Ohio River had long been a place of fears around race and sexuality
similar to those found in Liverpool. An itinerant African-American workforce and numerous disreputable
urban riverfront neighborhoods, like the Central Riverfront in Cincinnati, all contributed to the river being
seen as problematic, especially as it became less profitable. The OVIA was careful to show that their lock
and dam project would make the river a place of respectability, as showed by the marriage between “Old
Man River” and “Miss Movable Dam.” For instance, throughout the conventions, women were consistently
absent from discussions, but also frequently organized nighttime social events for attendees, composed
songs or poems about the river read during proceedings, or attended other related events. At the 1908
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convention in Louisville, OVIA President Vance concluded a session by inviting Louisville residents to a
special talk:

This evening at 8 o'clock we hope the citizens generally will avail themselves of the opportunity to
bring their ladies, for there is a treat for them in the shape of the stereopticon lecture by Captain
J. Frank Tilley, Secretary of the Pittsburg Coal Exchange. His lecture will be illustrated by lantern
slides, and will show the process of the construction of locks and movable dams. He will begin
with the unimproved river and build a dam before your eyes. (OVIA 1908: 50)

Through technological improvements, the modern river became a place that could even be beneficial for
women to learn about (if not directly associate with), compared to the “unimproved” river that had posed
so many problems previously. As I will discuss in the next section, the “modern river” also helped to
radically reduce the dependence on African-American labor by replacing workers with mechanization,
which in turn hamstrung the economies of many riverfront neighborhoods. The OVIA, in remaking the
river, were actually able to reduce the anxieties generated by the Ohio River while they increased its
importance to the nation, a far cry from the context surrounding navigation in Liverpool.
Still, this fusion of scientific expertise and practical knowledge distinguished the river from other
modes of transportation in important ways. Representations of the railroad (Schivelbusch 1979),
automobile (Virilio 1986), and airplane (Adey et al 2007) all placed almost exclusive emphasis on the
technological breakthroughs these systems represented, especially how they would speed up travel times
and enable personal freedom through mobility. A key part of this difference is the fact that the remade
Ohio River focused on freight transportation rather than moving people. Indeed, as Cidell (2012) points
out as maritime transportation has largely moved to concentrating on freight, with its own distinct social
rhythms, it has increasingly fallen outside the discussion of modern mobilities. But, another important
difference is the fact that the USACE and OVIA chose to work through traditional knowledge or practical
knowledge.
Meanwhile, the engineers that designed the railroad, automobile, and airplane explicitly rejected
these forms of knowledge. In their study of Peruvian roads, Harvey and Knox (2012) show how the
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enchantment of speed and personal freedom produced by modern transportation systems are actually
made more effective through their visible rejection and containment of those “unruly landscapes and
citizens” (529) that constantly threaten to upset infrastructural systems of transport. In the Peruvian
Amazon, where the engineers were building their highway, the local populations represented an obstacle
rather than a resource for the success of the project, stealing crucial construction materials and failing to
understand the engineers’ rational planning approach. As Harvey and Knox describe it, a core belief of
modern transportation infrastructure is that the past is something to be overcome. Therefore, the USACE
and OVIA’s vision of working with “Old Man River” thus occupies an apparently odd position within this
trajectory, relying instead on cooperation with premodern landscapes and individuals to remake the Ohio
River as a productive space of transportation, an approach that I call aquamobility.
While Harvey and Knox (2012) attend to the ways premodern individuals and landscapes are
excluded by (but also threaten) modernist projects like highway construction, the OVIA and USACE
celebrated these premodern figures. Even while emphasizing the novelty of their work, the OVIA
embraced the past, consistently linking the work of revitalizing the “new river” with the experiences of the
“old river,” reaching all the way back to the pioneer days. Their publicity materials are filled with scenes of
fearless white male settlers engaging indigenous inhabitants who are alternatingly menacing and curious.
Songs, poems, advertisements, illustrations, and speeches repeatedly incorporated these figures in their
message. Through cooperation with “Old Man River,” the modern river’s phantasms – the traditions and
landscapes displaced by the lock and dam system – were thus reincorporated into the OVIA’s
characterization of the modern river. Always on the edge of vanishing (Ivy 1995), through aquamobility
these iconic river images actually sustain the modern river and make it more alluring. Some individuals
certainly embraced the idea that the lock and dam system represented the passing of the historic Ohio
River – according to President Hoover, an engineer himself, the Ohio River’s “transformation will not
revive the romantic steamboatin’ days of Mark Twain, but it will move more goods” (OVIA 1929b: 136).
Yet, throughout their materials, the OVIA and USACE avoided a simple dichotomy opposing modern
scientific knowledge and traditional knowledge.
The effectiveness of this approach underpinning aquamobility relates to the reassurance that the
river’s navigational space could make even the anachronistic productive: the power of the alliance
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between USACE engineers and OVIA “river men” would be able to redeem even the hopelessly quaint
riverboat. In particular, the OVIA portrayed the masculinity of the “river men” as fundamental to wrestling
this past into the present, using their knowledge of traditional river ways to tame these past hauntings.
Individuals contemplating the improved river were invited to experience a double sensation, a feeling of
nostalgia from witnessing an outdated mode of transportation (the masculine space of “Old Man River”),
while also marveling at the capacity of modernism to make efficient even this seemingly obsolete
17

transportation networks (the more feminine space of technology represented by “Miss Movable Dam”).

This is approach conveyed by a poem from The Town of the Beautiful River, a 1915 book about
Cincinnati’s relationship with the Ohio River. In a piece titled The Great Highway, the poet E. R. Kellogg
writes “Yet, for those wanderers too the great highway / Which still we tread stretched on into the west /
Between the beckoning hills,—then, as today!” (Hurley & Kellogg 1915: 18). This short poem explicitly
links the past and the present of the Ohio River, framing every journey on the present-day river through
experiences of the past.

Figure 2.1 – Detail from the cover of the OVIA’s Official Program and Complete History: Ohio River
Pageant and Dedication (OVIA 1929a: 1) for the inauguration of the lock and dam system in 1929,
juxtaposing the river of pioneer times with the modern river (including an airplane flying overhead).
17

There is a discussion of infrastructure and its role in administering nature that I am sidestepping here,
largely because it was not a central concern of the OVIA. While the conservation movement viewed
nature as something outside of society that needed to be controlled and monitored in order to benefit
civilization, OVIA members made infrequent references the importance of nature. Inconsistent scattered
statements included calls to tame nature by "standard-gauging the river" (OVIA 1925: 23) as well as
admonishments to be a "co-worker with nature” (OVIA 1895: 20). In the following chapter, I examine more
in-depth one way how Cincinnati’s technical and redevelopment partnerships approached the Ohio River
as a natural entity.
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This fusion of old and new was critical to the beguiling success of the lock and dam system. As
Graham and Marvin (1996) have pointed out, a new infrastructural system does not necessarily destroy
or replace the old, but in this way can even extend the useful life of the past. Many infrastructural systems
may appear unsophisticated, such as the postal mail or Ohio River, but still maintain a role in everyday
life through regular reconfigurations of their purpose. In many ways, this aquamobility thus inverts Knox
and Harvey’s emphasis on entangled and contained premodern practices. Symbolic sites such as the
floating palaces, bawdy sailors, and nomadic river people are incorporated into a logic of the renewed
and depopulated commercial river that transported coal, gravel, oil, and other bulk commodities; the river
boat harkens back to the river’s commercial roots while affirming the vitality of the modern lock and dam
river. The power of this enchantment was evident in proliferation of other navigation groups across the
U.S. like the Lakes-to-the-Gulf Deep Waterway Association, Tennessee River Improvement Association,
and Upper Mississippi Valley Improvement Association, who led the rush to develop numerous other lock
and dam systems on the country’s river in the early twentieth century. Many of these projects focused on
rivers such as the Muskingum and Missouri Rivers where they were never commercially viable and have
subsequently been abandoned by the federal government.
What emerges from this history is a widely different role for expertise in managing the Ohio River
compared to what the conservationist or other transportation specialists were proposing at the time.
Rather than a centralized technocratic approach, like with multi-purpose water management, the USACE
and OVIA promoted a hybrid of old and new knowledge, an epistemological foundation that preserved a
strong connection to past ways of knowing the river, embodied by the traditions of the OVIA’s
overwhelmingly white “river men,” a group who represented themselves as self-made entrepreneurs
tracing their origins back to the pioneer freeholder days of the Ohio River. What emerged in remaking the
Ohio River was a closely intertwined operation of scientific expertise and practical knowledge, originating
in the relationship between the USACE and the tradition-laden maritime businesses working the river. In
taking this approach, the OVIA and USACE were able to achieve considerable success in preserving the
importance of navigation within the U.S. and its place within federal water policy, despite the fact that
much of the public had viewed the Ohio River as the “poor man’s highway” and a relic of the past at the
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end of the nineteenth century (Ambler 1932). This power of this combination persists today, as I will
explore in Chapter Five.

G. Navigation and the Cincinnati Riverfront

By the early 1920s, after slowdowns caused by World War I, the completion of the lock and dam system
finally seemed like it would become a reality. Confronted with the realization of their long-term goal, OVIA
members started to grapple with what came next. They recognized that a significant amount of pressure
would fall upon them for the system to be successful. According to Senator Frederic Sackett, from
Kentucky:

Naturally there comes the query if the rivers are improved will the public use them. The future of
the completed Ohio will be looked to for the answer. No other body is so well placed as is the
Ohio Valley Improvement Association to carry forward the work of selling a completed river to the
people—to industry as a transportation system, and to popularize its use (OVIA 1927: 75).

The OVIA ramped up its efforts to promote the modern river, with a series of pamphlets, speaking
engagements, and events like the 1929 celebratory cruise from Pittsburgh to Cairo announcing the
opening of the new river. At the same time, one of their primary focuses shifted to the development of
terminal facilities along the Ohio River. OVIA members saw new terminals as key to delivering on
potential of the lock and dam system, because any increase in shipping would be adversely affected if
there was no cheap way to get freight on and off the boats for local consumption or transshipping.
Senator Sackett, responding to his own challenge, claimed that, “Loading and unloading facilities,
therefore, become of prime importance in popularizing the use of the stream” (OVIA 1927: 75). Another
presenter even suggested that, after the completion of the lock and dam system, OVIA’s new slogan
should be “Modern terminals for every landing” (OVIA 1929b: 175).
Members of the OVIA were active in waterfront redevelopment schemes across the Ohio Valley,
but particularly in Cincinnati. Building on their role in founding the OVIA, Cincinnati merchants, maritime

70

businesses, industrialists, and public officials had all continued to push for the success of the Ohio River
lock and dam project. Over the OVIA’s first three decades of existence, Cincinnati residents provided
close to 50% of all financial support for the organization (OVIA 1924: 11). The city’s elites were eager to
reestablish a river trade that placed Cincinnati at the literal center point of this remade transportation
network. During the 1929 flotilla to inaugurate the completed lock and dam system, OVIA members
erected an obelisk at the Ohio River’s exact midpoint, located on a hill overlooking Cincinnati’s downtown
riverfront. These Cincinnati elites were convinced that the success of both the Ohio River lock and dam
system and their city depended on building modern waterfront terminals, warehouse facilities, and links
with railroads for transshipping. In particular, they were concerned with access to bulk commodities,
primarily coal and steel, which were critical to the rapidly expanding industries and power plant needs in
the city (Ross 1985). The transshipment of coal was also a lucrative business in Cincinnati, and yearround navigation made it easier to receive coal from Pennsylvania and West Virginia. OVIA members and
supporters in Cincinnati thus spearheaded efforts to redevelop the Cincinnati riverfront. Julian Pollack,
from the Cincinnati Rail-Water Transfer Company, gave one of the more extensive OVIA convention
speeches on terminals in 1924, urging other OVIA members to develop their own modern facilities (OVIA
1924: 36). He provided practical recommendations around the importance of rail connections, the need to
tailor terminal design to the specific commodity that the operator planned to receive, and how to evaluate
demand from tributary areas. Throughout his speech, Pollack used examples from his own enterprise,
which was a facility for iron and steel on the Cincinnati riverfront using mechanical cranes, two of which
had been bought from a failed Muscle Shoals development, and integrating connections with rail and
motor truck lines.
At the same time as Cincinnati elites expressed enthusiasm about the possibilities of waterfront
redevelopment, they also saw it as a way to exert more control over the Central Riverfront area. Since the
1870s, the city’s population had become simultaneously more racially diverse and spatially segregated
(Taylor Jr. 1993, Ross 1985). After the Civil War, many wealthy families had moved to the city’s suburbs,
while many poor upland southerners, white and African-American, as well as immigrants from Central and
Eastern Europe, settled in Cincinnati’s older urban core. Many of these new arrivals first settled in the
Central Riverfront, and the area became increasingly known for the presence of racial intermixing and
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illicit entertainment, with sections known as Rat Row (for its African-American residents) and Sausage
Row (for its sex work). For the Cincinnati business elites, still overwhelmingly whites of English and
German descent, their concern with making the Ohio River a productive and reliable economic space
seemed to them inconsistent with what they perceived as the free-wheeling attitudes of these low-income
riverfront residents. A reporter for the Cincinnati Enquirer captured this local elite viewpoint well in a
vignette about the Rat Row section of Front Street before a sudden flood on the Ohio River was expected
to shutter most riverfront businesses. Describing the atmosphere among Rat Row’s blocks of warehouses
and African-American apartments, the reporter writes:

It was in “Rat Row,” the famous residence of numberless colored denizens of the river
front, that the most dramatic scenes were enacted. The water was just lapping the curbstones
when The Enquirer skiff pulled up in front of the “Row.” From every window a head protruded and
feminine voices call to the men on the sidewalks below for news of the prospective flood.
The probability that they would be driven from their homes did not seem to affect them
greatly. A very bad piano in the row was having “Don’t Love Nobody” hammered out of it, and the
saloon near the corner of the row was doing more business than usual. In front of it a group of
roustabouts congregated all afternoon and watched the river “come to git” them.
….
“That ole Mistah Rivah’s mad foh suah,” said one colored woman, with a piece of gaudy
calico over her in lieu of a shawl. “I’m goin’ to make my man get push thing ready ouah things
ready foh rent day.”
And it went on on Rat Row this way all day. In the ground floor of the row are a number of
warehouses and stables, and the owners of these have taken the most of their goods out and are
prepared to move the rest hurriedly.
Along the row stood business men watching with knitted brows the rise of the river. To
them it meant the loss of many dollars; the colored folks to whom it meant the loss of home and
possibly life, watched it with as much laughter as they would a cake walk (Cincinnati Enquirer
Staff 1897a: 10).
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This story underlined a key tension on the riverfront, as these merchants were forced to rely on AfricanAmerican, Irish, and other riverfront residents as a source of cheap labor. Increasingly, Cincinnati elites
looked for the remade Ohio River to also provide an opportunity to reduce the dependence roustabouts
and other undesirable river workers, instead repositioning the river as a source of modern and efficient
employment. Low-income riverfront workers in Cincinnati lacked significant union representation and
were largely unable to resist efforts by employers to reorganize the labor process. Increasing racial
segregation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century also weakened riverfront labor strength,
making African-American and white dock workers less likely to cooperate. Only in a few cities like New
Orleans were waterfront workers actually able to form cross-racial labor movements that could effectively
push back on employer desire to streamline and mechanize the docking process (Arnesen 1994).
Initially OVIA members had argued that the lock and dam system would revitalize riverfronts as
active places of employment and social life, claiming that through the project “the glories of past days will
be revived” (OVIA 1895: 22). A major article in the Cincinnati Enquirer, printed to accompany the 1909
OVIA Convention being hosted in Cincinnati at the time, included a drawing of how the city’s riverfront
would look once the lock and dam system was completed, imagining a bustling hive of activity harkening
back to the river as the city’s “storefront” (Figure 2.2).
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Figure 2.2 – The Cincinnati riverfront as the city’s “storefront,” bustling with social activity (Cincinnati
Enquirer Staff 1909: 47)
But, as more attention focused on the the river as a space for freight transportation and the need to
develop modern terminal facilities to take full advantage of the remade Ohio River, this vision was already
beginning to change among OVIA members. According to Congressman Swagar Sherley, from Louisville:

The condition of the rivers in the past has not justified the expenditure of money sufficient to bring
about modern conditions, but we are rapidly approaching the time when these things must be
taken into consideration; when the old mule with the cart will cease to haul river freight up a high
levee and then deliver it over to a customer or to a railroad train. (OVIA 1908: 125)

Increasingly though, discussions of the modern terminal were concurrently about replacing waterfront
labor in the Ohio Valley. OVIA advertisements for these new river terminals portrayed an efficient
riverfront that was largely devoid of people, contrasted explicitly with older cargo loading and unloading
methods that had featured intensive human and animal labor (Figure 2.3). OVIA members intended for
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this terminal infrastructure to become itself an advertisement for the modern river, a mechanized space of
efficient capitalist transportation flows. Much as Kelman (2003) documents for New Orleans, the creation
of modern marine terminals and improved warehouse facilities across the Ohio Valley were meant to
facilitate more corporate and private control over riverfront space, further severing people from regular
contact with the river. The mechanization of river terminals therefore threw the mostly African-American
and Irish dock hands out of work and targeted riverfront neighborhoods for destruction. In Cincinnati,
these trends were evident with the intended destruction of Rat Row in 1904, due to “the march of
progress of railroads and other big concerns to occupy the bottoms” (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1904a:
5).

18

These changes affected many of the workers who depended on income from riverfront workers. By

the 1880s many of the upscale brothels had already moved out of the riverfront area as the area became
more disreputable (Findsen 1997). This process accelerated in the early twentieth century as more
brothels and bars shut down or moved, with the last central riverfront "watering hole" closing in 1925
(Wilkinson 2008). Men and women active in these industries were forced to look elsewhere in the city for
employment. A proposal endorsed by the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce in 1923 even considered
completely destroying the central riverfront area, commonly known as the Central Bottoms by this time,
and replacing it with an enormous intermodal rail and river terminal (Figure 2.4).
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Rat Row was temporarily spared when the primary interest involved, the Charles H. Moore Oil
Company, selected another site for its facility, although railroad businesses were soon found to be
purchasing individual properties on Rat Row for their own riverfront terminal needs (Cincinnati Enquirer
Staff 1904b).
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Figure 2.3 – The OVIA’s comparison of new and old ways of loading freight (OVIA n.d.) From the
Collection of The Public Library of Cincinnati and Hamilton County.

Figure 2.4 – A proposal to replace Cincinnati’s entire central riverfront with a complex of rail terminals,
barge terminals, and warehouses (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1923: 3).
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Beyond the changes wrought by the shift to “modern terminals,” as lock and dam system
succeeded in changing how the river acted, it also had the added effect of limiting the Ohio River’s utility
to many other urban residents. Members of the OVIA had long envisioned a placid and obliging Ohio
River, that would be welcoming to year-round navigation. The Ohio River made the creation of the lock
and dam system difficult through the threat of flooding at construction sites, the constant unexpected
accumulation of silt, and damp and strenuous working conditions that made workers sick. Yet, as the
project advanced, the river became more and more cooperative after the opening of each new dam by
the USACE. OVIA members and USACE engineers describe the lake-like qualities of the river as each
dam further slowed down and deepened the Ohio River. Sibert, by this point a USACE Major-General,
speaking at the dedication of the last lock and dam in the system, Number 53, during the OVIA’s
celebratory cruise of 1929, asked, “Can you imagine a greater satisfaction to a man than to see, through
his efforts, emerge from the sandy bed of the Ohio, locks and dams creating these placid pools with draft
and width sufficient for the continuous use of men?” (OVIA 1929b: 204). The new river was so amenable,
that even before the completion of the full system in 1929, the USACE could create artificial rises at times
of shallow water by letting water accumulate upriver, and then having each Lock Master lower their dams
in a sequenced order as the high water moved downriver. The effect was to create pockets of high water
that flotillas of coal barges could ride to their destination, even in times of heavy drought (OVIA 1923: 57).
With these changes, the Ohio River grew increasingly calm and predictable, yet they did not
make the river more accessible or useful for the people who had long lived alongside the river. Rather,
with time, it became clear that the remade Ohio River facilitated navigation to the exclusion of other uses.
In Cincinnati, this transition is clear in looking at how the opening of the local lock and dam downriver of
the city, known as the Fernbank Dam, transformed the way many Cincinnati residents interacted directly
with the river. Since Cincinnati’s founding, the riverfront had been an important location to bathe, draw
water, and dispose of waste, making it a key location for socializing. While the growth of plumbing and
private bathrooms limited some of these activities, by the late nineteenth century, the Ohio River still
retained its role as a popular bathing area, with the opening of a number of private resort beaches on the
Kentucky shore (Zimmerman 1972). A bend in the Ohio River just east of downtown Cincinnati helped
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create sandy beaches that were attractive for recreation during summer low water, and entrepreneurs
seized on the growing interest in public bathing to open the Queen City Beach, Primrose Beach and
Canoe Harbor, Tacoma Beach, and a number of other destinations which drew thousands of weekly
visitors throughout the summer months.
The USACE opened the Fernbank Dam in 1911, and many members of the OVIA Executive
Council helped organize massive celebrations across the city, while numerous Cincinnati residents took
steamboat rides downriver to see the new construction and pass the afternoon picnicking or dancing.

19

For their part, beachgoers celebrated the Ohio River’s new behavior, since it meant that there was “hardly
any current in the river, due to the raising of the Fernbank Dam, and the possibility of any danger’s greatly
alleviated” (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1913: 47). Yet, with time, the lock and dam system made the Ohio
River less attractive for those who wanted to use the river. With the opening of the full lock and dam
system in 1929, the permanently higher water levels flooded out many natural beaches along the river
and forced the closure of popular private beach clubs, which had been accessible public spaces for white
men and women to socialize (Zimmerman 1972, Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1958).
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According to Rabbi

Jack Skirball, who had studied at the Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, speaking at the 1929
celebration of the opening of the lock and dam system, “we used to like to swim in the river, and thought
of the picturesque beauty of the Ohio with its few boats. But now commerce has entered into it, and we
think all the more of it for that reason” (OVIA 1929b: 166).
At the same time, with the river’s velocity decreasing, it meant that the sewage dumped into the
river from the city’s homes and factories were also slower to move downstream, and some even
accumulated as sludge sediments in front of the city. Although public officials had expressed
apprehension about this issue before the Fernbank Dam even opened (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1910), it
was only after 1929 that the increasingly polluted river started to cause major health concerns across the
Ohio Valley, as I will explore further in Chapter Four. By 1934 Cincinnati officials posted warnings against
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Kaika (2005) has documented similar dam expeditions in Athens, Greece in the early twentieth century,
as residents took day trips to see the massive dams built near the city that local officials argued would
solve the city’s water supply problems.
20
Fred Matre, the owner of the Primrose Beach and Canoe Harbor, tried to sell his business in 1930, the
year after the lock and dam system opened. The advertisement he placed in the paper describes facilities
for up to 1,000 bathers, but the advertisement spends much more time describing the more attractive and
seemingly profitable canoe livery. Matre was still trying to sell the business in 1931.
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swimming in the Ohio River and one Kentucky city decided to ban public bathing for health reasons
(Cleary 1967). All of these changes removed even more people from the riverfront, decreasing the
presence of the river as an active element in the everyday life of many Ohio River communities. Povinelli
(2016), observing the changes to a popular creek on the rural Australian coast wrought by mining
pollution, notes that as the creek changed, “so do the humans swimming down her – they become rich,
toxic, melancholic, hungry, evil, anxious, powerful” (102). The changing nature of this stream rippled out
to rearrange the lives of the communities that had developed around this waterway. Similarly, the new
Ohio River rearranged relationships both with and between Cincinnati residents, as many were forced to
turn away from the area that had once been a fundamental part of their daily life.
As a result, Cincinnati’s riverfront area slipped from public view in the first decades of the
twentieth century. The waterfront had been one of the major urban public spaces in the early U.S. and
bustling harbors were a key element in a visual language of urbanness throughout the nineteenth century
(Reps 1994). Cincinnati’s busy riverfront has been one of the archetypal urban spaces within the country
– the world’s oldest surviving urban landscape photograph is a panoramic daguerreotype of Cincinnati’s
waterfront from 1848. Taken from the Kentucky shore, the picture captures in stunning and intricate detail
the relationship between the city and the Ohio River. Yet, by the early twentieth century, the decline of
river life had redefined this relationship between the river and the city. No longer was a bustling riverfront
an important part of urban life, as transportation and commerce moved to railroads and the city center
withdrew from decaying waterfronts (Sieber 1991). In Cincinnati, the decline of the riverfront meant it
receded from occupying a central position in the city’s claim to urban importance. In terms of visual
representation, this meant that pictures of skyscrapers, rail terminals, and aerial views replaced images of
the riverfront. In Cincinnati, throughout the early twentieth century, depictions of the city’s riverfront are
largely absent from prominent booster publications of the time. Texts like Charles Frederic Goss’
Cincinnati: The Queen City Vol. 1 (1912), the Official Plan of the City of Cincinnati (1925), and the
Cincinnati Municipal and Industrial Exposition 1788-1935 guide (1935) all forewent classic images of the
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Cincinnati framed by its riverfront, indicating a new way of understanding urban life in the city that had
little reference to the river.
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These multifold social, economic, and visual changes were noted all along the Ohio and
Mississippi Rivers, heralded as the passing of an age. Writers like Ben Lucien Burman, Harlan Hubbard,
and Frederick Way, Jr. produced elegiac laments about the end of river society, the passing of life on
sternwheelers and shantyboats. Cincinnati artists including E. T. Hurley and Herman Wessel produced
paintings and etchings featuring a charming but outdated river life. For many, the inauguration of the lock
and dam system in 1929 was the final act of the old river. The Cincinnati Times-Star took the opportunity
to publish Thrills of the Historic Ohio River, a collection of old news articles and human-interest stories
from a now decidedly bygone era. The preface describes how, in compiling the book, the editor Frank
Grayson had, “caught Old Man River, given him a shave, and turned him over to posterity” (Grayson
1929: xvii). A decade later, a group out of Marietta, Ohio founded the Sons and Daughters of Pioneer
Rivermen in 1939, an organization dedicated to sustaining this rapidly vanishing river life.
The OVIA officers returned to Cincinnati from their celebratory cruise on Monday, October 28,
1929, one day before Black Tuesday and the start of the stock market crisis. Over the coming years the
Great Depression seriously impeded their plans for a revitalized commercial riverfront, putting many plans
for terminal facilities and redevelopment projects on hold. Ultimately though, the OVIA and USACE were
successful in their long term goal to remake the country’s inland waterways, producing a maritime
transportation system sustained by government funding, enabling year-round navigation so that smallerscale maritime industries could flourish. By 1929, the river was moving 21.9 million tons of cargo per year,
81.5 million tons in 1957 (Landon 1961), and 230.8 million tons by 2008 (USACE 2017). The OVIA,
USACE, and Ohio River worked in harmony to remake the river as a space first and foremost responsive
to the needs of navigation. They repositioned the riverfront as a depersonalized system of efficient
transport and industry, with the Ohio River enabling local industries to cheaply receive raw materials,
draw their water supply (after filtration), and occasionally ship their goods. Simultaneously, they
reaffirmed the capacity of white “river men” and engineers to make the river productive. Today, the
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There are certainly counter-examples, including The New Cincinnati: Are You Acquainted with It? a
publication of the Cincinnati Convention Committee in 1932, which includes a photograph of the riverfront
as part of the book’s frontispiece. On the whole though, these waterfront images became much scarcer.
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USACE remains the primary governmental agency overseeing the Ohio River, while many of the old
maritime businesses involved in the OVIA are still active along the river, either in the river trade or in new
industries.

H. Conclusion

Integrating this Ohio River navigation genealogy into contemporary water studies brings attention
to a constellation of civic and state agencies that have been largely ignored but also remained robust
throughout the twentieth century. Unlike other areas where water has “to some extent been freed from the
technical embrace of state agencies and hydrologic engineers who had been entrusted with managing
water supplies on behalf of civil society” (Linton and Budds 2014), navigational projects have consistently
fallen under the control of U.S. federal government since the early twentieth century. The USACE and
organizations like the OVIA (as well as successor groups such as DINAMO and The Waterways Council)
have continued to advocate for navigational improvements with considerable success. The federal
government replaced the entire lock and dam system as part of a modernization project first in the 1950s,
and then again starting in the 1980s. This most recent project will finish with the Olmsted Lock and Dam
construction, near the junction with the Mississippi River, a project that has taken more than three
decades of work and cost more than $3 billion, making it the country’s largest and most expensive civil
infrastructure project ever (Glass 2017). From this perspective, navigational concerns continue to
undergird water management strategies across the U.S., both in a legal and economic sense. Thus, a
focus on the history of navigation on the inland waterways in the Ohio Valley traces an alternative water
management genealogy that is crucial to expanding our understanding of “what is water?” in the U.S.
Still, it is important to evaluate why and how the USACE and OVIA were so successful.
Conservationists have presented it as the victory of selfish institutional and business interests over
impartial scientists who were basing their recommendations on emerging understanding of water
resources and river basins. Yet, the OVIA and USACE succeeded in insisting on the importance of the
lock and dam system even when freight on the Ohio River had almost disappeared, dropping to only 5
million tons in 1919. The USACE and OVIA made a compelling argument to the U.S. Congress and other
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federal officials about the importance of the Ohio River as a fundamental public commons for the nation,
moving the project from being an “internal improvement” to an object of national importance, what were
increasingly called “public works.” As we can see with the Olmsted Lock and Dam project, this justification
has remained potent, continuing to validate massive investments of federal resources as well as
explaining the deference to maritime industries in using the river. The USACE and OVIA used a
combination of practical knowledge and engineering expertise to guide their work on the Ohio River. This
approach drew on the developer experience of “river men” and the scientific expertise of USACE
engineers to make a compelling argument about the best use of the Ohio River. They also built a
productive relationship with the waterway that directly contributed to revitalizing navigation on this inland
waterway. Throughout these OVIA and USACE’s efforts, the Ohio River was surprisingly amenable to
their approach, adjusting to its role in the proposed marriage between “Old Man River” and “Miss Movable
Dam.”
While it is is easily to treat this partnership between the USACE, OVIA, and Ohio River as
unrelated to the history of conservationists, I would argue that these actors were all fundamental to
constituting an assemblage of “modern water.” At their core, the USACE, OVIA, and conservationists had
contradictory understandings on the relationship between development, expertise, and water, but in fact,
these kinds of contradictions are key to the operation of expertise, which far from being a coherent field,
is made up of, and reinforced by, widely divergent claims (Newman and Clarke 2017). Conservations
preferred to discuss river basins, the water table, and scarcity, while the experts of the USACE and OVIA
were more comfortable explaining, for example, “the habits and customs of a stern-wheel steamboat with
20,000 tons of coal in tow in a five-mile current in a narrow channel” (OVIA 1908: 61). But the potency
“modern water” as an assemblage of expertise is precisely in these flexible ways that it can known and
brought under control, even if not every one of these practices fit the model of desocializing abstraction
proposed by Linton (2010). Ultimately, whether looking at the OVIA, USACE, or conservationists, these
were elite groups of almost entirely white men that asserted specific skill sets to validate their control over
the flow and purpose of water. In both instances, unsurprisingly, these knowledge claims usurped rights
to the river held by less powerful riverfront groups. In Cincinnati, as the effects of the Ohio River
transformation wrought by the USACE and OVIA were felt, this led to diminishing access to the Ohio
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River, whether in terms of social activities or maritime employment. Roustabouts, public bathers, workers
in the riverfront entertainment industry and sex trade, shantyboat residents, and other “river folk” were all
lost to sight as the river levels rose.
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Chapter 3.
The Cincinnati Central Bottoms and “Being Flooded,” 1925-1970

The Ohio River flood of January 1937 reached record highs throughout the valley, causing
widespread destruction and loss of life. This “thousand-year” event was the “worst river flood in American
history” (Welky 2011: 6), destroying communities and displacing hundreds of thousands of Ohio Valley
residents. While this flood represented a crucial juncture in the region’s relationship with flooding, many
cities responded differently. Numerous municipalities chose to take advantage of recent Congressional
legislation enabling the federal government to provide financial support for flood control works like levees
and floodwalls. Other cities determined that flood protections were unnecessary. Along the Cincinnati
central riverfront, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, local business groups, politicians, and the City
Planning Commission all put forward their own flood protection plans. In the years following the flood,
these groups engaged in a heated debate over how and to what extent the city should protect its central
riverfront. It was only with the opening of the Ft. Washington Way riverfront bypass in 1961 – which
incorporated a levee structure along its southern face – that the local government finally settled this issue.
In this chapter, I focus on how disagreements over how to best understand and relate to the Ohio
River shaped this discussion over the viability of a floodwall for the Central Bottoms district, as the central
riverfront area in Cincinnati was known in the first half of the twentieth century. I utilize an assemblage
perspective to draw attention to changing conceptions of “being flooded” during this period (Walker et al
2011), with residents of the Central Bottoms, urban planners, business owners, city officials, and
engineers all operating under different assumptions about what the flood of 1937 meant for the city. For
each, the implications of “being flooded” were tied closely to the agency of the Ohio River, but these
groups also had their own perception of the river’s personality. Some wanted to cooperate with the Ohio
River, others considered this idea impossible, and many riverfront residents thought it best to adapt to the
moods of the river. These differences shaped multiple concurrent spatialities within the Central Bottoms,
as actors along the riverfront built their own relationships with the Ohio River. Drawing on the
correspondences of the urban planners and engineers at the center of this debate, as well as their official
reports and news coverage of the issue, I stress here the need to investigate all these different
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discourses of the Ohio River in order to contextualize city officials final decision not to protect the Central
Bottoms by building a floodwall in the area.
Ultimately, all of these different actors sought to integrate the behavior of the Ohio River – a nonhuman actor – into Cincinnati’s urban life, even if their proposals varied greatly. While many studies have
emphasized an increasing belief in the divisions between nature and society (Scott 1998, Kaika 2005),
the viewpoint I present in this chapter opens a new way of thinking about urban nature, one that highlights
more flexibility in cooperating with non-human actors than is generally recognized. At the same time, this
openness to an idea of social nature does not necessarily translate into harmonious coexistence, since it
is critical to look at what these non-human actors, in this case the Ohio River, are doing and how they
respond to the overtures of different actors. In Cincinnati, the Ohio River, after avoiding the constraints a
floodwall would have posed, used this freedom to slowly eat away at the buildings in the Central Bottoms
neighborhood, a historic community that contained small-scale factories as well as low cost housing for its
mixed-race residents. Through recounting this history, I want to expand our understanding of how local
elites relate to nature in the city, and in this case, design policies and infrastructures that amplify the
activities of non-human actors that they feel further their own agenda. Finally, I conclude by reviewing
how urban renewal programs in the 1950s and 1960s formalized new conditions of “being flooded” in
Cincinnati that helped remake the Central Bottoms as a site of disinvestment, and how these experiences
can inform our understanding increased incidents of urban flooding today brought on by climate change.

A. Flood Prevention in the US

By the time the 1937 flood hit the Ohio Valley, flood protection groups across the country had
been lobbying the federal government for funding and technical assistance for decades (O’Neill 2006). In
the nineteenth century, these flood groups received little support from federal politicians and bureaucrats
who opposed flood prevention in the belief that these projects would only have localized effects,
benefitting primarily riparian landowners by opening up new sections of their land for development and by
increasing the value of their floodplain properties. According to the politicians who opposed flood control,
the nation at large stood to gain little from these improvements and thus the federal government should
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not intervene or provide funding. The fact that legal precedent restricted federal jurisdiction over national
waterways to navigation provided another impediment. Mississippi River levees received federal funding
in the latter half of the nineteenth century, but officially this was only because these levees provided
navigational improvements by quickening and deepening the river channel, even if it was an open secret
their primary role was flood prevention (Shallat 1994). In the absence of federal support, many states
along the Mississippi River organized their own levee districts. These levee districts collected taxes from
residents inside their boundaries in order to build and maintain levees for the region. Over time, local
officials expanded these levee districts to include larger backland areas, making levee boards powerful
local political bodies in their own right. And while little direct support from the federal government was
forthcoming, indirectly the U.S. Congress provided aid in the form of land grants under the Swamp Land
Acts, which financed flood works in many states (O’Neill 2006).
Sustained pressure by groups from the South and California led to the first national legislation
authorizing federal responsibility for flood control works for the Mississippi River and Sacramento River in
1917 (O’Neill 2006). Lobbying groups in these areas succeeded in convincing the U.S. Congress that
their rivers were of national importance and required massive flood control infrastructure that outstripped
local capacity. With this authorizing legislation, flood control joined navigation and irrigation as the only
water management projects the federal government authorized itself to oversee. The Flood Control Act of
1936 expanded this federal responsibility for flood protection to encompass all of the country’s navigable
rivers, and designated the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) as the agency responsible for
managing these projects.
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For their part, Cincinnati residents only intermittently called for flood control measures for the city
during the first decades of the twentieth century (Hedeen 1998). In Cincinnati’s early years, the central
riverfront had been the core of the city, a commercial district oriented toward the river, filled with shops,
public offices, and other important social sites. But, due to its proximity to the Ohio River, the area
regularly flooded, sometimes twice a year, contributing to a move away from the riverfront. The city center
shifted uphill and out of the floodplain in the postbellum period, including many of the city’s most
important businesses and wealthiest residents followed. Suburban expansion to the hills surrounding the
22

Later on, the federal government exempted the area under the jurisdiction of the Tennessee Valley
Authority, which established its own separate flood control program in 1933 (O’Neill 2006).
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city aided this momentum. In turn, the central riverfront lost its prestige, gaining a reputation as seedy,
home to numerous illicit activities, racial intermixing, and labor unrest (Ross 1985, Taylor 2004). As
described in the previous chapter, sections of the area like “Rat Row” and “Sausage Row” were
particularly notorious, synonymous with disreputable populations for middle and upper class white
Cincinnatians, including roustabouts, dock workers, and prostitutes, both white and African American.
Elites used the regular flooding of the area to reinforce this view of the central riverfront as unreliable and
dangerous, with repeated references in local papers to how “dirty” or “muddy” water inundated “the
denizens of Rat and Sausage Rows” (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1884: 4). Racist and classist elite
perceptions of riverfront residents are also evident in how, when not emphasizing how “dirty” flood water
left the area, it was also popular to describe the flooding as a “bath” for the area’s poorest tenants. During
periods of high water, Cincinnati Enquirer reporters frequently made observations like, “The second big
rise in the river has given the inhabitants of Rat row another bath" (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1890: 1) or
that "shanty boats that have perched high and dry along the shore for years were treated yesterday to
their first bath since 1892" (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1897b: 10). At the same time, river and rail
companies still sited their terminals in the neighborhood, continuing the area’s commercial focus and
contributing to the presence of wholesalers and warehousing, while small-scale industries also took
advantage of the neighborhood’s cheap rents, plentiful water, and central location.
In this context, flood protection was not a major priority in Cincinnati at the beginning of the
twentieth century. A public clamor for improved protection followed floods in 1907 and 1913, but these
demands subsided not long after the flood waters had gone down. Meanwhile, until 1929, many local
business elites and politicians were deeply involved in the Ohio Valley Improvement Association (OVIA),
and therefore primarily preoccupied by its project to complete the Ohio River lock and dam system,
focused on reviving the city’s role in regional navigation and commerce. Indicative of this atmosphere, in
November 1916, a rumor spread across Cincinnati that the USACE actually opposed the Ohio River lock
and dam improvements, sparking considerable concern in the city:

The rumor that Secretary of War Baker is opposed to the further canalization of the Ohio River, a
report which he denied vigorously yesterday, may have arisen, it was suggested to-day, from
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intimations that have become current concerning the attitude the corps of army engineers will
take toward Federal aid for flood control in the Ohio Valley states...It is understood, and has been
published, that the army engineers cannot see that navigation will be benefited by flood control of
these tributaries...It is thought that the reported attitude of the engineers toward Federal aid on
the Ohio tributaries may have been misconstrued to refer to the [navigation system] improvement
program on the Ohio River itself. (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1916: 16)

When it became clear that the USACE leadership only disapproved of a proposal for flood control
reservoirs, relief among Cincinnati elites was immediate. This was typical of Cincinnati in the first decades
of the twentieth century: navigation as the dominant issue while other river concerns such as flood control
took a back seat.
For its part, the USACE had long been committed to levees as the most efficient flood control
measure available (Shallat 1994). USACE engineers saw it as the ideal solution to both protect backlands
from flooding and to concentrate the stream’s main channel, which deepened the river and aided
navigation. Critics of this approach argued that ever-more extensive levee systems constricted rivers,
increasing the height of flood crests by limiting the floodplain space available to cache excess water and
thus making floods more violent. While the USACE continued to focus on building levees and floodwalls
higher, numerous engineers put forth their own proposals about the best ways to manage flooding
(O’Neill 2006). Discussions began to focus on alternatives like creating emergency drainage basins,
which could be used to relieve pressure from a flooded river system. Another approach, the focus of the
Cincinnati Enquirer rumor above, emphasized the construction of headwater reservoirs, designed to trap
excess water before it reached the main channel and thus reducing flood heights (Welky 2011). In
addition, these reservoir dams could potentially release water during dry periods, aiding agriculture and
navigation. In Dayton, Ohio, the Miami Conservancy District built the first watershed reservoir system in
the aftermath of a devastating flood in 1913, which locals viewed as a major success (Welky 2011). For
their part, conservationists pushed for the preservation of forest land along river banks and throughout
headwater areas, arguing that denuded landscapes increased the amount of rainwater runoff and thus
the intensity of flooding (Dodds 1969).
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In Cincinnati, according to Hedeen (1994), it was only when “another Ohio Valley municipality
guaranteed flood immunity to industries that might relocate to that city, [that] Cincinnati's city planners
were spurred to action” (152). The most prominent flood protection proposal during this period came from
The Official Plan of the City of Cincinnati, adopted May 28, 1925. A comprehensive urban plan drafted
under the supervision of the Cincinnati City Planning Commission (CPC), it proposed a “dyke in front of
the principal business district” (Cincinnati CPC 1925: 152), located in front of the area known as the
Central Bottoms. The 1925 Official Plan recommended a dyke (or levee) that hewed to the river,
approximately 140’ wide and 30’ high with occasional concrete floodwalls if necessary. Large gates would
allow streets and railroads access between the riverfront and city. The more than three mile-long levee
would stretch between two hills bookending the central city, Mt. Adams to the east and Price Hill on the
west, effectively sealing off the entire urban core from flood threats. Pumping stations could move
sewage over the dykes, preventing excessive runoff from building up behind the barrier in emergencies. A
thoroughfare or esplanade could also be placed atop the levee, which the CPC proposed should be
completed by the 1930s or 1940s.
The 1925 Official Plan emerged at the same time that business elites in Cincinnati had become
increasingly supportive of urban planning as way to manage the city. Progressive reformers had been
gaining prominence in the city since the early twentieth century, seeking to tackle housing problems,
government corruption, the effects of industrialization, and a host of other issues (Miller 1980). These elite
reformers eventually united under groups like the Cincinnati Women’s Club, which made it a major focus
of their activities (Kornbluh 1986), the Charter Committee, which successfully fought to reform the city
charter, and the Cincinnatus Association, an “good government” group of elite white businessmen who
investigated issues facing the city, like public education or government structure, made recommendations
about improvements, and then led their own campaigns in support of their platform, publishing their
findings in the local press and pressuring municipal officials to adopt their suggestions (Tucker 1967).
Many of these reformers argued that it was important to recognize the different immigrant, religious, and
racial communities in Cincinnati, and make sure their voices were heard in public debates (Burnham
1992a). At the same time, urban planning emerged as a tool that these elite reformers could use to both
address the “urban problems” that concerned them, while also protecting their own interests in the city
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(Silver 1997). Even as they embraced diversity and a more open political system, these elite Progressive
activists also retained a "perception of political conflict as irrational, a skepticism about the competence of
the average citizen, and a faith in the reforming power of technical expertise and managerial skill"
(Fairfield 1994: 179). The field of urban planning, which its proponents represented as being based on
scientific principles, attracted these reformers, and also provided a means to retain decision-making
power within the city, with elite control over the specialist planning and manager positions in city
government (Fairfield 1994). In Cincinnati, the efforts of the Charter Committee, Women’s Club, and
Cincinnatus Association in the 1920s had led to the city government being restructured to give
significantly more power to technocrats like the City Manager and the City Planning Commission. The
Great Depression further reinforced elites’ faith in the need for urban planning, as mistrust for marketdriven policies grew in tandem with rising calls for solutions administered by government experts (Davis
1991, Welky 2011).
Meanwhile, the city’s intense local focus on navigation had begun to slacken. The OVIA itself,
long dominated by Cincinnati elites, finally achieved its original objective with the completion of the Ohio
River lock and dam system in October 1929. After the completion of the project, and the subsequent
commercial crisis brought on by the Great Depression, the OVIA broadened its objectives, expanding its
membership and considering projects outside the scope of navigation. In 1934, the organization’s
leadership revised its mission to reflect these shifting priorities:

Where formerly the subject of navigation and operations immediately related thereto were
dominant, it was felt that the relevant projects of the land must now be considered. These involve
flood and drought control, domestic water supply, stream pollution, forestation, soil erosion, and
kindred matters… (OVIA 1934: Foreword)

Even before the major flood of 1937, flood control had already therefore emerged as a major new
concern for the OVIA. At the OVIA’s 1934 meeting hosted in Cincinnati, Alan Jordan, Executive Secretary
of the Ohio Valley Conservation and Flood Control Congress (as well as an OVIA Vice-President), argued
that flood control represented "the most important program that should be taken up in the United States
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today.” (OVIA 1934: 28) He encouraged civic leaders from across the Ohio Valley to create conservancy
district laws in their states modeled on the Muskingum Conservancy District in Ohio, which would enable
them to collect property assessments, fund flood control measures, and secure financial support from the
federal government. The OVIA’s changing interests were mirrored in Cincinnati itself. In his speech,
Jordan also claimed that, “The President, as soon as he began to figure on what could be done to restore
prosperity, inquired as to what could be done on the Ohio River to protect Cincinnati" (1934: 28). Earlier,
at the OVIA’s meeting in 1930, the Cincinnati city planning engineer had pushed for a unified flood control
policy, saying flood control and navigation works should be implemented together.
With additional resources, state and federal officials started construction on a combination of
flood prevention measures across the U.S., including levees, flood reservoirs, and emergency drainage
basins (O’Neill 2006). In the Ohio Valley region, the USACE collaborated with the Public Works
Administration and local states in 1934 to start building the Tygart Dam and additional reservoir dams for
the Muskingum Conservancy District (Welky 2011). The Ohio Valley Conservation and Flood Control
Congress, working with OVIA, had been key in lobbying Congress for the construction of these reservoir
dams. While the OVIA and USACE had been at odds with conservationists in the first decades of the
twentieth century over the narrow navigation focus of the Ohio River lock and dam, by the 1930s they
were openly working together. Whereas OVIA meetings typically featured businessmen, USACE officials,
and politicians, the Ohio Valley Conservation and Flood Control Congress based its advocacy efforts on a
network of conservation-oriented scientists – geologists, hydrologists, and agronomists – making multipurpose water management arguments about forests and precipitation runoff, the dropping water table,
and the benefits of reservoirs. Together, after severe flooding on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers in 1936
and 1937, these groups successfully lobbied the U.S. Congress to approve a new Flood Control Act in
1938 for the creation of 78 headwater reservoirs scattered across numerous Ohio River tributaries (Welky
2011).
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B. A Flood Crisis
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The federal government completed the last of these reservoirs in 1990 (though the final 78 reservoirs
constructed were not all exactly in the same locations as those that had been originally proposed).
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Coming in the midst of this increasing interest in flood control both locally and nationally, the Ohio
River’s flood of January and February 1937 brought unprecedented damage. The flood lasted nearly
three weeks, and crested in Cincinnati at 79.99’ on January 26, 1937,

24

almost nine feet above the

previous record of 71.1’ experienced in 1884. The river had seemingly risen up in anger to take away the
livelihoods of Ohio Valley residents, and numerous survivor accounts register the shock as the waters
crept up to places they had never known the river to go before (Welky 2011). Many residents had moved
all their possessions to the second floor of their houses to safeguard them, but were forced to return to
retrieve what they could when the river continued rising. One survivor remembers how his father
borrowed a small barge to return to their home on a salvage mission, floating back above their
submerged street: “My dad had a two-by-four and a hatchet. As we came down the street and wires got in
our way, he’d pop them with the hatchet. We got to the second floor of the house and he took the hatchet
and knocked the window out.” (Insurance Journal Staff 2007). Isolated riverfront neighborhoods in
Cincinnati like the East End also faced food shortages as store owners pulled out and “transportation
[was] virtually nil” (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1937b: 18)
Cincinnati’s infrastructure could not cope with the devastating flood, as the rising waters forced
the suspension of streetcar service. The flood also shut down power stations located near the waterfront,
requiring the city to route in energy from nearby Dayton, Ohio, which was largely shielded from the
flooding by its reservoir system. Still, gas and oil tanks burst along the Ohio River, and downed electrical
wires, many cut by residents attempting to escape in boats, caused massive fires on the water, making
rescue efforts in the freezing winter weather even more chaotic. The Cincinnati Enquirer describes the
fervent night-time battle with one of the city’s largest-ever fires, which “covered an area of three and onehalf square miles due to the scattering of blazing oil on the flood waters of Millcreek," where “firemen
slipped and sloshed through ankle-deep snow, stood up to waists in flood waters, and ventured into the
flame-bound area in boats" (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1937a). Perhaps most urgent, flood waters poured
into the city’s waterworks facilities, making drinking water unavailable for local residents. As a last resort,
local companies began bottling drinking water from their own wells to supply the city. This devastation
across the city’s riverfront area was unprecedented.
24

Reportedly, the crest was declared 79.99’ instead of 80’ so that insurance companies would not be
required to pay out a double indemnity.
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Years later, George Stimson, a journalist for the Cincinnati Times-Star, recounted venturing out in
a canoe, witnessing surreal scenes along the riverfront: “Somewhere in an empty, flooded building, a
lonely telephone was ringing,” while nearby in “the snow on the top of nearly submerged shed roofs were
the footprints of rats” (Stimson 1964: 98). Visiting the Central Bottoms area he found a foreign landscape:

Empty, deserted, a ghost city, was the impression of Cincinnati's frontage on the Ohio. The water
had submerged many waterfront one-story buildings. The old structures, harking back to the
halcyon days when the River was Cincinnati's means of livelihood, felt the lapping waters on their
limestone and sandstone walls well into the second floors. Everywhere the water poked long
fingers into alleys and streets, reaching up toward the higher ground of the business district.
Oddly, the only sign of life was a cluster of houseboats, moored close to a warehouse, swinging
this way and that with the current, fathoms above what had been, a week before, a busy
waterfront thoroughfare. It was a strange sight and one long remembered. (Stimson 1964: 99)

The Ohio River finally left flood stage in Cincinnati on February 5, 1937. Women and men led
efforts to provide relief to those most affected by the catastrophe, organizing a massive response to the
unprecedented damage (Welky 2011). And, almost as soon as the disaster had ended, a flurry of civic
groups and government officials quickly formed committees and took up the question of how to best
protect the city from the next such flood, though these groups were dominated by men. In the immediate
aftermath, the Mayor and City Manager appointed a Citizen’s Rehabilitation Committee to coordinate
recovery efforts. This organization designated a subcommittee, the Flood Control and Future Planning
Committee, on February 11, 1937 to consider longer-term responses available to the city. In parallel to
these efforts, the city government, primarily through the City Manager’s Office, officially began
coordinating with the USACE to design proposals to protect the Cincinnati waterfront. For its part, the
Cincinnati City Planning Commission (CPC), a semi-autonomous municipal agency, also began
developing its own recommendations, with an April 1937 report outlining considerations for any flood
control works (Goodrich 1937). However, the CPC’s chairman, Alfred Bettman, expressed disappointment
in the preliminary and inconclusive nature of this report, drafted by a consultant familiar with Cincinnati.

93

The report was not widely circulated. Outside of city government, the Cincinnatus Association, comprised
of Cincinnati’s business and professional elites, formed its own Flood Protection Committee. The
Cincinnatus Association flood committee produced its first three reports on March 9, 1937, covering soil
conservation, the federal reservoir system, and dyking the city (Tucker 1967). In this chapter, I draw much
of my source material from these diverse groups, which generated voluminous records as they sprung
into action to first investigate and then attempt to guide flood control activities, which led to them
eventually coming into conflict with one another. These debates unfolded very publicly, closely tracked by
local newspapers, making them another important resource in reconstructing this moment.
In its 1936 Flood Control Act, the U.S. Congress had authorized USACE engineers to act as the
primary agency to design and build flood control works (O’Neill 2006). Congress committed to providing
federal funds to cover the cost of construction, while municipalities were responsible for the purchase of
properties in the area, for reconstructing affected utilities, and for maintaining the infrastructure after the
project’s completion. This requirement represented a considerable expense to be born by municipalities,
which they often met by creating special tax assessment districts affecting the neighborhoods that would
benefit most from flood control. After the U.S. Congress designated USACE as the primary agency
responsible for flood control works, there were significant avenues for local interests to influence the
creation of public works affecting the river. Instead of following the directives of centralized watershed
agencies like the Tennessee Valley Authority, municipalities could effectively “opt in” or “opt out” of
USACE flood protection plans by agreeing to provide local matching funds and the necessary land titles,
as well as giving them leverage to suggest modifications to the government proposals (O’Neill 2006). In
this regard, many actors could seek to influence the process, providing input on the scope, timeline, and
goals of a project. This helped produce the post-flood context in Cincinnati, with the rapid proliferation of
different groups providing their own flood control suggestions. Many water lobby group also preferred this
approach since it reserved a space for their input in the creation of new infrastructure. Proposals for an
Ohio Valley version of the Tennessee Valley Authority were opposed by both the OVIA and Ohio Valley
Conservation and Flood Control Congress because it shut them out of decision making (OVIA 1934).
A consensus quickly emerged among Cincinnati’s industrial and government elites that the Mill
Creek Valley, one and a half miles west of the Central Bottoms area, should be protected from the Ohio
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River’s potential backflow. During the flood, the Ohio River had reversed the creek’s current, forcing it
back into a heavily industrialized section of the city that also contained populous residential
neighborhoods, so that the “inundated lower Mill Creek basin appeared to be a lake...which had taken
eight days to fill” (Hedeen 1994: 154-155). As with elsewhere, this backflow flooded areas of the city
previously thought safe, and the heavy concentration of industry in the Mill Creek valley, with numerous
gas and oil storage tanks, created a fire risk, leading to the massive 3.5 square-mile conflagration that
consumed the flooded Mill Creek Valley.
After the flood receded, the city’s elites turned their attention to protecting this important industrial
neighborhood. The editor of the Cincinnati Post pointed out that, “In this valley are situated factories
which represent perhaps 75 percent of the city’s capital investment in industry, and which employ 65
percent of its industrial workers. It is truly the city’s ‘meal ticket.’ (Groat 1940; quoted in Hedeen 1994:
156). Louis Coffin, the Director of Foreign Sales for the U.S. Playing Card Company and a member of the
Cincinnatus Association, rallied corporate and government support to build a barrier dam near the mouth
of the Mill Creek. In normal conditions, a massive gate built into the barrier dam would be open and the
creek would flow naturally. In times of high water on the Ohio River, the gate could be sealed in order to
protect the Mill Creek factories and neighborhoods from backflow. When the barrier dam was closed,
massive pumps would carry the Mill Creek’s water over the barrier to discharge into the Ohio River
(Hedeen 1994). With Coffin acting as a “one-man lobby for his project” (Tucker 1967: 175), and support
from companies with large factories in the Mill Creek valley, such as Procter & Gamble’s famous
Ivorydale facility, the barrier dam plan gained almost immediate support.
Less straightforward was the discussion around what to do with the Central Bottoms. Many
members of the public assumed that the city would pursue the objectives outlined in the 1925 Official
Plan: building a riverfront levee starting at the base of Mt. Adams, just east of downtown, which would
then connect with the flood control works in front of Mill Creek. As late as 1936, the CPC staff engineer
Myron Downs had still promoted the 1925 Official Plan proposal as the flood control program that the city
should implement (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1936). After the 1937 flood, city officials began to prepare for
the large-scale construction this plan implied. When City Manager Clarence Dykstra, who had taken
control of the city during the flooding emergency, left for a post in Wisconsin later on in 1937, the city
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successfully re-enlisted Col. C. O. Sherrill to fill the City Manager position on June 14, 1937. Sherrill had
been Cincinnati’s first City Manager from 1926 to 1930, and it was thought that, as a former USACE
officer who had overseen improvements along the Mississippi River, he would be able to guide the city
through the upcoming public works process. Shortly after being selected, he declared flood control “one
of the city’s foremost problems” (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1937d: 3). Sherrill was also closely connected
with maritime interests in Cincinnati. After leaving the City Manager position for the first time, he had
become an executive at the Kroger Grocery and Baking Co., interacting regularly with riverfront
wholesalers and barge freight companies as part of his work. In 1930, Sherrill had presented before the
OVIA on freight rates in the Ohio River valley (OVIA 1930).
Opposition to dyking the Central Bottoms soon began to mount among the committees that had
sprung up in the aftermath of the flood. From the Cincinnatus Association, Herbert Schroth’s report at the
March 9, 1937 meeting gained attention for arguing that a system of dykes in Cincinnati was an absurdity.
Schroth (1937) argued that the project would create a “Dyked City of the Hills,” since Cincinnati’s hilly
topography meant there was only ever a small proportion of land in the floodplain, and that the system of
dykes offered a “false security” (22) and at best would save structures that were already “dilapidated”
(16). For its part, the Flood Control and Future Planning Committee of the Citizen’s Rehabilitation
Committee recommended a self-liquidating agency to purchase and tear down riverfront property and
then using fill to build up the vacant land out of the floodplain in order to sell the new lots at a profit for
commercial use. Meanwhile, the CPC, in its December 30, 1937 report on The Cincinnati Waterfront: Its
Problems and Recommended Future Utilization, rejected its own recommendations from the 1925 Official
Plan for dykes or floodwalls along the Central Bottoms, worrying that a floodwall would create “protected
slums” (15). These groups were joined in their opposition to the central riverfront floodwall by other
business elites in the community, including those taking part in the OVIA and the Cincinnati Chamber of
Commerce, as well as the Cincinnati Engineers Club.
Despite these complaints, the city and federal government offices moved slowly towards the
construction of a floodwall for the Central Bottoms and a barrier dam for the Mill Creek. Local groups like
the Lower Cincinnati Business Men’s Association, which drew its membership heavily from factory owners
and wholesalers located in the Central Bottoms area, came out in in favor of a floodwall, arguing that it
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would increase the value of their properties and endorsing the USACE flood control plan for Cincinnati.
They believed that it would be best to follow the plan which had already been “in existence for a number
of years” (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1937c: 16). Moreover, after their recent experiences, many city
residents were willing to support flood protection at whatever cost. On November 2, 1937, voters passed
a $5 million bond issue to fund the construction of flood protection works for the city, with 70.5% in favor
(Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1937f).
In addition to their plans for the downtown area around Mill Creek and the Central Bottoms, the
USACE also developed a flood protection plan encompassing Cincinnati’s small neighborhood of
California, about eight miles upstream from downtown. A low-income community lacking many basic
improvements like electricity or paved roads, California did include a waterworks pumping station,
increasing its importance for protection. The USACE District Engineer, Lt. Col. Elliot announced in
February 1938 that the U.S. Congress was making funds available for the works at California. The city
government needed to make a commitment before July 1, 1938 or else the offer would be withdrawn. City
Manager Col. C. O. Sherrill urged the city to authorize its portion of the project, even if the tax
assessments gathered from California were unlikely to approach the costs of municipal contributions
(Sherrill 1938). Since California would be the first section of the riverfront to receive flood protection, it
was an important test for how the city would approach the flood control question, drawing attention from
across the city. According to the CPC’s chair Bettman, in a letter to Col. Sherrill:

California is only one part of our riverfront, and the principles involved in the solution of that part
bear on the problems which will arise in relation to other parts, so that the interested parties are
by no means restricted to those who happen to live in California (Bettman 1938a: 2)

The CPC report on the Cincinnati waterfront from December 1937 argued against any flood
protection works for the “sparsely settled suburb of California,” due to low property values in the affected
areas and continued likelihood of flooding (City Planning Commission 1937: 30). In fact, the CPC
recommended city funds be used to buy out homeowners in California and relocate them, turning the
area into industrial or park land. Sherrill countered by showing that evacuating California would incur even
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higher costs, while also presenting an opinion by the Assistant City Solicitor that the $5 million in flood
protection bond funds could not be applied to relocate citizens away from the floodplain (Sherrill 1938b).
Besides these issues, Sherrill reminded everyone that even if the city did not accept the federal project, it
would still have to protect the Water Works’ pumping station without any outside financial support, since
federal flood protection funds could not be used to protect a single entity, such as a factory or government
waterworks.
On April 18, 1938 the CPC officially declined to endorse the California proposal, which meant City
Council required a two-thirds majority to ignore their recommendation and authorize the project anyway.
The City Council passed the California flood works measure by a margin of 5-4 on April 27, insufficient to
overturn the CPC decision (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1938). Following these votes, members of the
California Improvement Association challenged the CPC’s jurisdiction along the riverfront. The City
Solicitor upheld the CPC’s jurisdiction in his finding , which was eventually confirmed in a case before the
Ohio Supreme Court. Despite an effort by Sherrill and others to revive the California plans in 1939, the
City Council did not provide support to build a floodwall protecting the neighborhood (Cincinnati Enquirer
Staff 1939a).
After this early setback, Sherrill next presented the USACE plans for Cincinnati’s central riverfront
area to City Council on March 8, 1939, again calling for City Council to act urgently, requesting a quick
decision in order to include the project in upcoming Congressional flood appropriations (Sherrill 1939).
City Council was provided with two options. Plan I included both a barrier dam for the Mill Creek and the
floodwall for the Central Bottoms area. A second option, Plan II, featured only the barrier dam without the
Central Bottoms floodwall. Outside of City Hall, the Cincinnatus Association lobbied for Plan II, and on
March 14, 1939 the group “‘unanimously’ repudiated the proposal of a dike along the ‘Bottoms’...” (Tucker
1967: 175). Still, after a recommendation to proceed by the CPC’s board, City Council approved Plan I on
March 20, 1939, seemingly setting in motion the construction of a floodwall in front of the entire downtown
area of Cincinnati.
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Figure 3.1 – Plan I above, and the smaller-scale Plan II below (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1939b: 3).

However, the issue was far from settled. In the months after the March City Council decision, two
Councilmembers, Taft and Craig, both proposed modifications to Plan I. Councilmember Charles Taft II,
son of former U.S. President William Taft, strongly opposed the floodwall measure and had been one of
two votes against the Plan I proposal in March (alongside Councilmember Gradison). He put forward a
plan incorporating a floodwall cut-off that would have enabled the city to first complete the Mill Creek
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Barrier Dam section (along a slightly new route compared to the previous proposal) and then consider the
Central Bottoms floodwall later after more studies had been completed. Meanwhile, Councilmember Wiley
Craig, an outsider politician with a background in engineering and unaffiliated with any of the major
parties in the city, suggested a plan to combine a Sixth Street Viaduct with the Mill Creek Barrier Dam.
The CPC Chairman Alfred Bettman, who had vigorously opposed Plan I, seized the opportunity for the
CPC to review the new modified plans. He believed approval of the new modifications would rescind the
CPC’s approval of Plan I, reopening the possibility to prevent the Central Bottoms floodwall from being
built. Due to health-related absences, the CPC’s vote on June 20, 1939 for a combination of the Craig
and Taft plans ended 3-3, leaving the process in limbo (Bettman 1939b).
Meanwhile, City Council, particularly Councilmember Craig, increasingly saw City Manager Col.
C. O. Sherrill as overstepping his authority in pursuit of federal construction funds. Brought on because of
his engineering experience, critics began to claim that he was “enamoured with the idea of constructing
large-scale public works projects” (Burnham 1992b: 247). For instance, Sherrill delayed signing a city
contract to build flood control works specifically protecting the California Water Works’ pumping station,
holding out hope that a levee would be authorized for the entire neighborhood of California. He also
resisted any suggested changes to the USACE plans, loyal to the agency that he had previously served
with.
For their part, those supporting a floodwall for the Central Bottoms, like Sherrill and the Lower
Cincinnati Business Men’s Association, saw Bettman as their primary antagonist, seeking to evict
residents and businesses from the floodplain at whatever cost. Bettman, besides his role as chair of the
CPC, was a nationally-recognized land use planning attorney. For decades, Bettman had been a key
figure in the field of urban planning, helping to shape the field, and was particularly well-known for arguing
the government’s case in the 1926 hearing of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. before the U.S.
Supreme Court, which had upheld municipal zoning laws for the country. Through Bettman’s efforts, he
had made Cincinnati one of the leading proponents of this new discipline and he had also led efforts to
organize the CPC in 1918 (Burnham 1992b). In his role as Chair of the CPC, he coordinated efforts to
stop the construction of the floodwall in the Central Bottoms area.
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Finally, on September 11, 1939, the CPC considered the Taft plan by itself (without the Craig
proposal, which was deferred) in the presence of all the CPC members.

25

The modification was approved

by a vote of 4-3, recommending the construction of the Mill Creek Barrier Dam and leaving the Central
Bottoms floodwall for later consideration. At this CPC hearing, Sherrill (a member of the CPC due to his
position as City Manager) read a letter from USACE District Engineer Lt. Col. Elliot stating that “…the
later extension of the protection line to Pearl and Martin Streets [if the Taft option was pursued], would
not, in my opinion, be economically feasible. Consequently, I would be unable to recommend it to the
department” (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1939c: 3). The letter effectively signaled that the Central Bottoms
floodwall was unlikely to be built if the city pursued Taft’s plan. Keen to keep alive the possibility of the
Central Bottoms floodwall, Sherrill and his ally Councilmember Albert Cash (also a representative on the
CPC) delayed a final City Council vote on the Taft proposal, arguing that the CPC resolution requested
further study of the suggested Central Bottoms plans (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1939e).
Supporters of the floodwall and its opponents jockeyed for position throughout the fall of 1939,
with a Cincinnati Enquirer editorial comparing it to the “more serious battles in Europe,” just as “fickle” in
its fortunes (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1939d: 6). In November 1939, the CPC published its Preliminary
Report: A Redevelopment Plan for the Central River Front, providing an overview and comparison of the
different possible approaches to the Central Bottoms area, including options with the floodwall, but also
proposing alternatives for the area like a bypass freeway, parks, and a civic stadium. In conclusion,
reviewing the different possibilities, the report recommended that no Central Bottoms floodwall be
constructed and the central riverfront area be dedicated to civic purposes. In December, the USACE, now
under District Engineer Major Bass (after Lt. Col. Elliot had been transferred to a new position), offered a
modification to its proposal more closely following the Taft plan, and asked City Council to determine
shortly what course of action it would choose, whether to request the Central Bottoms floodwall or decline
to support it. City Council turned the issue around by requesting an opinion from the USACE Chief of
Engineers about the advisability of the Central Bottoms floodwall project in late December (Cincinnati
Enquirer Staff 1939f).
25

Craig’s plan was later considered alone by the CPC and City Council. With numerous absences, the
seven member CPC rejected the Craig plan 2-1, and City Council could not meet the required two-thirds
majority to overturn this decision. Craig continued to fight for a study of his proposal, but it was also
rejected by the USACE as impractical.
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Reporting back to City Council in January 1940, the USACE announced a lower cost for the Taft
plan than originally expected. The CPC reaffirmed their support of the Taft plan in a meeting on January
15, 1940. Finally, in an unexpected decision, on January 26, 1940, exactly three years after the crest of
the 1937 flood, City Council voted to reverse its earlier decision and only pursue the Mill Creek Barrier
Dam (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1940). Sherrill and other advocates for the Central Bottoms floodwall had
been defeated.
This decision effectively ended the potential of a floodwall protecting the Central Bottoms area.
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s the issue was revisited numerous times, such as by the municipal
Central Riverfront Advisory Committee in 1951, but there was insufficient interest (or funding) to revive
serious planning for a Central Bottoms floodwall. The Mill Creek Barrier Dam and its associated network
of floodwalls were completed by 1948. Finally, after the passage of the Federal Aid Highway Act in 1956,
the city government used Congressional funds to build a bypass immediately north of the Central Bottoms
area. The bypass, completed in 1961 and known as Fort Washington Way, also incorporated a levee to
protect the Central Business District, while leaving almost all of the Central Bottoms exposed to flooding.

C. Disasters and Assemblage

At first look, the decision not to build a floodwall along the Central Bottoms appears perplexing.
Many of the other cities along the Ohio River took the opportunities presented by the 1936, 1937, and
1938 Flood Control Acts to build floodwalls or levees, including Covington and Newport, the two Northern
Kentucky cities directly across the Ohio River from Cincinnati. Taking advantage of federal funding to
build levees, floodwalls, reservoirs, and a multitude of other flood control public works appeared to be the
obvious choice. Reflecting this ethos, Senator Will Whittington, architect of the massive 1938 Flood
Control Act, declared, “I want to live in a constructive age...I want the age in which I live to build” (1939,
quoted in Welky 2011: 279). As mentioned, in Cincinnati itself prior to the 1937 flood, city elites and public
officials had shown an increasing interest in flood control and had even made plans to build a levee.
Meanwhile, the U.S. in the first half of the twentieth century was seeing a construction boom involving
massive public work projects designed to control or harness the power of water. The U.S. central
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government, especially during the Great Depression as part of work relief efforts, had been providing
considerable funding to build infrastructure for flood control, hydropower, navigation, and irrigation, all of
which had begun transforming the country’s landscape in countless ways. The USACE and other
governmental agencies were building new dams and levees across the country at a dizzying pace,
municipalities were constructing their own waterworks and sewage treatment plants to provide clean
water for their booming urban populations, and irrigation works were transforming the deserts into rich
farmland. Everywhere, public officials in the U.S. were putting water to work.
For many individuals in the first half of the twentieth century, these projects were an obvious
outcome of the ascendancy of science and its mastery over nature. Engineering advances and scientific
planning were creating infrastructure that provide a newfound capacity to make nature manageable and
useful, so that instead “of being fearful and threatening, nature became tame and serviceable” (Kaika
2005: 107; see also Scott 1998, Swyngedouw 2004, Gandy 2014, as well as Welky 2011 for the similar
arguments used to justify Ohio Valley flood control infrastructure). These new infrastructural systems
constrained, purified, and circulated an explicitly nonsocial nature, that is, a nature understood as outside
of everyday life. These changes came in an era of rapidly expanding industrialization, where this
separation of nature from society helped justify capitalist exploitation of nonsocial nature as raw materials,
abstract resources without any history (Smith 2008, Scott 1998). In addition to taming nature,
infrastructure also rendered the effects of nature less prominent in the urban landscape (Graham 2010),
hiding the flows of drinking water and sewage in pipes and tunnels, paving over large sections of the
landscape, or transforming the night with electric lights. In this way, infrastructure helped strengthen the
divide between nature and society, facilitating the belief that each belonged to distinct spheres.
Through its apparent control over nature, Infrastructure also made city dwellers less tolerant of
the vagaries of nature, leading them to expect to exist “outside the reach of nature’s processes” (Kaika
2005: 107). Natural disasters like earthquakes, drought, hurricanes, or flooding were the most notable
threats. Whereas in the past, such disasters had been seen as an inevitable part of life, urban residents
believed infrastructure could minimize the effects of these unpredictable events. In many cases, the
crises brought on by disasters were therefore used to justify new infrastructural projects: after natural
disasters, local and national governments unveiled massive public works projects – like levees – that
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would purportedly prevent future crises (Graham 2010, Kaika 2005). Shortly after the Ohio River flood in
1937, Major H. H. Pohl, Assistant to the Division Engineer of the Ohio River Division of the USACE,
stated, “It may be that the people of the Ohio Valley are now learning what the inhabitants of the
Mississippi Valley learned [after their flood] in 1927, that is, that the best way to secure flood protection is
to have a good flood” (1937: 589). Concurrently, government officials perceived disasters as a threat to
social order, which could “disrupt routine life, destabilize social structures and adaptations, and endanger
worldviews and systems of meaning” (Oliver-Smith 1999: 23).
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This viewpoint among elites increased the

urgency around implementing infrastructural solutions in order to avoid potential social unrest and
dissent.
The changing relationship between urban life and natural disasters seemingly parallels
Cincinnati’s relation to flooding. At the turn of the twentieth century, most Cincinnatians understood
flooding as a normal aspect of seasonal life. Local businesses regularly affected by flooding incorporated
its damages and delays into their accounting. As described in the 1925 Official Plan:

Because the highest floods are rare and because the average floods have become so much a
matter of course to that part of the community involved, the city has adjusted itself as to the real
estate values and rents in the flooded zone and to the slowing down of business during the flood
periods, so that the losses are largely discounted or otherwise provided for. (151)

For many among Cincinnati’s governmental and industrial elite, this was unacceptable, as was its tacit
disapproval of infrastructural solutions. The 1925 Official Plan continues its discussion of flooding on the
riverfront by stating that:

In consequence, many individuals believe that the community is not justified in expending large
sums in flood protection works. Such persons measure only the individual cost and do not
appreciate, or perhaps care, for the cost to the whole community involved in the slowing down of
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While this is a widely accepted view, Oliver-Smith (1999) also points out that it problematically assumes
that there was a “general societal equilibrium prior to disaster onset” (23), whereas in many cases, social
instability and inequality actually helped produce and delimit disaster.
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industry and business. Were these losses capitalized, it would probably be found in Cincinnati, as
it has generally been found elsewhere, that adequate measures are cheapest in the long run.
(151)

By the 1930s, the city’s government was increasingly intolerant of flooding. In February 1936,
CPC staff engineer Myron Downs gave a presentation before the Lower Cincinnati Business Men’s
Association on the “Feasibility of the construction of a dyke, or dykes, along the Cincinnati riverfront to
hold back flood waters, particularly to protect commercial and industrial properties in the lower 'bottoms
district’...” including “illustrating the duration and effect of Cincinnati's five highest floods on commercial
and industrial properties in the downtown area of the city” (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1936). At this
presentation Downs – who following the 1937 flood actually authored the CPC reports against building a
floodwall in the Central Bottoms – urged the Lower Cincinnati Business Men’s Association to support the
levee plan as it was laid out in the 1925 Official Plan. Given this context, one would expect the 1937 flood
to provide the final impetus towards the construction of a Central Bottoms floodwall, and many did expect
that the city would build the dyke and floodwall proposed in the 1925 Official Plan. Initial post-flood events
bore this out, with the city residents voting to authorize the $5 million in flood works bonds, the USACE
presenting its plan to protect the complete downtown riverfront area, and the initial vote by City Council in
1939 authorizing the city’s participation in the full project.
An analysis of the 1937 flood utilizing an assemblage perspective helps explain why the expected
floodwall infrastructure was ultimately not built in the Central Bottoms, even though many factors seemed
to favor its construction. To begin, it is important to move away from a linear flood disaster narrative, one
where a crisis begins and ends, to be followed by a community decision on a course of action as a
response. Instead, it is important to explore how an experience of flooding can vary markedly in terms of
its physical, legal, social, and psychological ramifications (Walker et al 2011). Foregrounding assemblage
attends to these multiple experiences, without prioritizing one as more relevant or revealing. Leading up
to and in the aftermath of the 1937 flood, numerous spatial experiences were at play in the Central
Bottoms. In Cincinnati, residents, workers, local business owners, city planners, and engineers each had
their own perceptions of the Central Bottoms, whether it was home, an inefficient commercial zone, site of
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vice and racial intermixing, or a necessary part of the local economy. These viewpoints were also
influenced considerably by their view on flooding, whether they found flooding intolerable or a part of
everyday life. Following Moore (2005), these different interpretations of space are neither “serial nor
successive, they are copresent, sometimes as hauntings, other times as explicit invocations, shaping a
plural terrain where no single space prevails” (22). Therefore disaster like the 1937 Ohio River flood
cannot be treated as a singular event, but needs to be analyzed as an assemblage, made up of multiple
overlapping experiences of urban space. This spatial copresence means that disasters develop as a
contingent series of interrelated meanings, which need to be pulled apart carefully. Moreover, an analysis
of the response to the 1937 flooding should not hew too closely to a linear narrative of disaster-andresponse, but rather examine “being flooded” as a multicomponent process that simultaneously unfolds at
various levels, understood by actors in ways that can be complementary and oppositional at the same
time.
A core matter in question before and after the 1937 flood was the definition of “being flooded.” As
Walker et al (2011) detail in their study of a June 2007 flood in Hull, England, being flooded versus not
being flooded fails to neatly correspond with the high-water mark from the body of water that overflowed
its normal boundaries. Rather, “being flooded” involves a confluence of numerous actors and interlinked
experiences unfolding over a long period. Moreover, responses can change with time, such as with
individuals that previously accepted flooding as a normal occurrence, who then later change their minds
to instead fear rising water, a transition that could be tied to new building materials and technologies,
understandings of cleanliness, or other factors (Whatmore 2013: 43). In Cincinnati, commercial interests
in the Central Bottoms in the first few decades of the twentieth century were initially opposed to a
redefinition of “being flooded” as an unacceptable state. From their perspective, flooding was a trade-off
that came from their proximity to the water. Businesses benefited from access to rail and marine
transportation routes, the cheap labor that congregated near the riverfront, and the lower property values
they believed that the floods brought. Meanwhile, Central Bottoms residents had long accommodated
themselves to seasonal flooding, with most of their apartments located on the second or third floors of
their buildings in order to escape rising water.
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The release of the 1925 Official Plan marked a shift in this discussion. City officials and business
elites began to argue that “being flooded,” even if only affecting some individuals, was inefficient and
avoidable, leading to unnecessary damages and a loss of profit due to interruption of trade for the city as
a whole, impacting areas beyond just the riverfront. Some of the small industries and warehouse
distributors in the Central Bottoms slowly came over to supporting a levee for the area, such as those
who were active in the Lower Cincinnati Business Men’s Association. Still, others, including many owners
of rail and marine terminals, persisted in their dislike of a levee or floodwall on the central riverfront,
believing it would cut them off from the river and impede their businesses. A marine terminal operator at
the Ohio River Company complained that his business "would be cut off from the use of our property at
the slightest threat of a flood because the steps necessary to close these [floodwall] gateways could not
be left until the last moment" (Marting 1939: 1). A Vice President of the Hatfield Campbell Creek Coal Co.
also argued "that a flood wall...would not permit the city to get more benefit of river transportation that she
is entitled to" (Hatfield Jr. 1939: 1). At the same time, with the Great Depression beginning shortly after
the completion of the Ohio River navigation lock and dam system in 1929, the expected boom in river
trade and construction of modern terminal facilities described in the previous chapter had not occurred as
many Cincinnati elites with maritime interests had expected. While this decline did not totally diminish the
importance of these elites’ complaints – especially those coming from powerful coal and wholesale
merchants – it did mean they were not the overwhelming dominant interest on the riverfront that they had
hoped to be.
For their part, Central Bottoms residents, whose numbers had been declining but still reached
close to 2,900 individuals by the 1940 census, were only fleetingly considered when planning the future of
the neighborhood (Cincinnati CPC 1946). “Bottoms” neighborhoods were found throughout the United
States, most located in the floodplains near rivers and occupied by low-income individuals and families.
Many of these communities, such as those in Frankfort, Detroit, or Kansas City were similar to
Cincinnati’s Central Bottoms. The urban public perceived them as predominantly African-American
neighborhoods even when they were home to a mix of ethnic and racial communities. According to Boyd
(2011), these “Bottoms” neighborhoods were also regularly seen as places of "violence, poverty,
corruption, dirt, saloons, pool halls, whiskey, cockfights, disease, murders, gambling, bootlegging,
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prostitution, slums, and crime” (1). These representations ignored the many other activities that took
place in these areas and ultimately facilitated government planning to displace neighborhood residents
without consulting them (Boyd 2011). The African-American and white residents in Cincinnati’s Central
Bottoms continued working in the area’s warehouses and small factories much as they had before the
1937 flood. Cincinnatians from other neighborhood also frequented the area to work, to purchase produce
(including their Christmas trees), and to fish, among many other activities (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 2008).
Even though the mechanization of terminal facilities threw many roustabout residents out of work, a
considerable number of these riverfront workers, like sixty-one year old Bee Hines and seventy-two year
old Leslie Souther, former roustabouts interviewed by John Knoepfle in 1957, also hung on in the
tenements scattered throughout the Central Bottoms (Souther 1957). These residents were unlikely to
embrace changes likely to raise rents and force their relocation to other areas of the city.
The perception of the 1937 flood as a major natural disaster added a new dimension for this
nascent rejection of “being flooded.” Yet, rather than portray this as a disaster scenario where the
massive scale of the flooding produced a consensual response from Cincinnati residents, such as
prompting specific infrastructural solutions like a floodwall, I want to use an assemblage perspective that
focuses on the multiple new perspectives and interactions surfacing concurrently in relation to this largescale disruptive event. In this I reject an idea of a disaster as something that is defined externally, but
rather I emphasize disaster here as formed precisely within those moments that rearrange social
relations. Much as Whatmore (2013) urges us to see disasters as an “environmental knowledge
controversy,” causing urban residents to re-examine their spatial assumptions, I want to look at disasters
as those moments where the combination of changing environmental and social conditions bring into
contact differing beliefs that may not normally intersect. Whereas Cincinnati’s major floods in 1907 and
1913 (and earlier) had failed to cause serious reevaluations of contemporary conditions and policies
regarding flood control policy, the 1937 flood produced an “environmental knowledge controversy,” not
just because of the unprecedented height of the flood but because of the changing discourse in Cincinnati
over the last decade about the acceptability of flooding.
The fact that Cincinnati experienced an “environmental knowledge controversy” in the aftermath
of the 1937 flood is evident in that residents, civic groups, and government officials began to spend an
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enormous amount of time on fact-finding and investigation, forming numerous temporary committees to
study conditions and activating their networks to find out what other groups were doing. These
committees were focused on examining the existence and behavior of other actors, both human and nonhuman. Each group rapidly collected all the data they could locate on topics like water flow, population
density, damages, property values, and land usages.
The Cincinnatus Association Flood Protection Committee, which eventually focused on
supporting the construction of the Mill Creek Barrier Dam, typified this approach. They set information
gathering as one of their primary objectives after the 1937 flood. Louis Coffin, working with industries in
the valley, collected information on the water table, potential stream deviation options, and other
environmental factors. The Cincinnatus Association group also actively sought to understand how other
groups were framing the problem and pursuing solutions, so that they could best promote their preferred
option. A letter conveying the transcript of a telephone call between Cincinnatus Association member
Ralph A. Kreimer, a local attorney who had long been involved in reform movements in the city, and the
USACE District Engineer Lt. Col. Elliot, provides a clear example of this fact-finding mission. Kreimer is
careful to probe Lt. Col. Elliot for information about how the Cincinnatus Association could provide their
own input to the USACE plans without offending the District Engineer:

(The Colonel was speaking rapidly and at some length. I had the impulse to ask him whether in
stating that the alternate plans, modified plans or new plans would have consideration, he meant
that consideration would end before the plan or plans are submitted. But I did not like to make too
obvious what I was driving at, or to antagonize him by appearing to pin him down when he was in
a cordial mood, so I finally got in this question):

Question. “Well I understand then that about the end of February [1938] your plans will be ready
and that while they will be definite in shape, there will be some flexibility about them.”

Answer. “I suppose so; but the purpose is to push construction as soon as possible.” (Kreimer
1937: 2, emphasis in original)
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Kreimer concluded his letter by asking his Cincinnatus Association colleagues how they should proceed
with their flood control investigation:

Please let me have the reaction of yourself and Messrs. Coffin and Schroth on how we might best
smoke-out where, when, and by whom the “consideration” of alternate or modified plans is to be
given… (Kreimer 1937: 2)

This term “smoke-out” became a catchphrase of the group, with Kreimer even adopting “Yours for a
smoke-out” as his sign-off. Numerous other groups across the city were undertaking their own parallel
investigations, trying to ascertain what response the conditions called for as more information became
available about the key human and non-human actors involved in the decision-making process. One nonhuman actor became the focus of the “environmental knowledge controversy” in the city: the Ohio River.
In particular, efforts to define how the Ohio River behaved and its relationship to urban blight emerged as
the key point of contention in discussions around whether to build the Central Bottoms floodwall.

D. Flooding and Urban Blight

Specialists from the CPC, with the support of business elites in groups like the Cincinnatus
Association, among others, proposed a new understanding the city’s relationship to the river. Built on an
idea of respecting the river rather than trying to control it, this viewpoint had dramatic implications for both
the plans for riverfront infrastructure and the Central Bottoms neighborhood. Revisiting the proposals put
forward by these local elite groups in the aftermath of the flood helps expand a perspective on urban
nature and its role in the city. I argue here that ultimately, through their emphasis of cooperating with the
Ohio River, these elites in Cincinnati were able to enlist the river to support the cause of white supremacy
in the city, which had long seen the mixed-race residents and small-scale businesses in the Central
Bottoms as undesirable and, increasingly, as dangerous urban blight. Through its actions, the Ohio River
facilitated the targeting of the Central Bottoms for urban renewal and thus the area’s eventual destruction.
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In terms of working with the Ohio River, the March 9, 1937 report by Herbert Schroth of the
Cincinnatus Association provided a first indication of a new perspective. Discussing what Cincinnati would
look like with a levee system, he satirized this possible future as the “Dyked City of the Hills,” rejecting
any underlying attempt to control the river through levees or floodwalls. According to the Schroth, rivers
were impressively destructive in their own right, and this could be exacerbated by efforts to manage their
flow. Thus, Schroth claimed, “professional opinion is showing a decided trend toward theory of letting
rivers have their just due, and to quit confining them” (1937: 20). The best response would be to find ways
to remove people from the floodplain, out of harm’s way. Schroth’s viewpoint was particularly surprising
given that he was a civil engineer who worked for the Charles V. Maescher & Co. general contracting
firm, which specialized in concrete construction and could easily have stood to benefit from the building of
a massive concrete floodwall in the Central Bottoms.
Alfred Bettman used his position to push a similar perspective. Arguing that flooding had only
recently emerged as an urban planning problem, Bettman began compiling resources concerning
floodplain zoning (Bettman 1939a), including references to “getting out of the river’s way” so that it could
“have a little more elbow room” (Anonymous 1937). This approach built on ideas put forward by the
planner Lewis Mumford, who argued that instead of seeking to dominate nature, the planning practitioner
should “accommodate the land,” being guided by “its features, not our wishes” (Welky 2011: 43). While
Welky identifies some proponents of this approach as “pessimistic observers,” representing a “spirit of
resignation” in the face of flooding (2011: 229), in Cincinnati, this was clearly a case of local elites seeking
to proactively reconfigure riverfront space for their purposes. Bettman also corresponded extensively
about the issue with his colleague, well-known urban planner Ladislas Segoe (who had worked on the
city’s 1925 Official Plan), discussing the possibilities of using riverfront zoning to force people to leave
zones threatened by flooding.
Bettman saw the 1937 flood as an opportunity to reshape the riverfront, but not from a flood
control perspective. In a memo to Myron Downs, the CPC staff engineer, Bettman discussed how he
wanted to approach the Ohio River not in terms of:
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...the problem of flood prevention or flood problems, but in terms of the problem of the replanning
for a long period of time of the district of the city, with the flood question itself being treated as the
occasion for doing some replanning and as one of the major factors in the process of the
replanning. (Bettman 1937a: 2)

For Bettman, the 1937 flood was the Ohio River acting as it should. The flooding actually pointed
out pre-existing deficiencies in the neighborhood, with its undesirable mix of residences and industries,
general slum conditions, and inefficient commercial arrangements. Bettman wanted to clear out the
Central Bottoms and start anew. The Goodrich report commissioned by the CPC shortly after the flooding
recommended considering the 1937 flood in a similar light to the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and the
1904 Baltimore fire, urging Bettman to take advantage of the opportunity presented by a disaster to do
replanning that these other cities had let slip (Goodrich 1937). To this end, during the public debate about
the Central Bottoms floodwall, Bettman desperately pushed the CPC’s staff engineer, Myron Downs, to
come up with alternative uses for the area that the CPC could publicize, helping to chart a new course for
the neighborhood.
Schroth and Bettman did not see “being flooded” as a fact of life along the riverfront, like many
long-time Central Bottoms residents, but they also resisted efforts to completely control the Ohio River
with a floodwall, as the USACE and many city officials believed was the obvious response to the 1937
flood. Instead they pushed for a position respecting the river’s power to flood and using zoning to guide
the efficient use of the riverbanks area. According to Bettman:

Students of the problems created by floods have pointed out that flood protection works are not
necessarily the only or best solution, but that in many places along rivers it is wiser to convert the
flood areas to uses which would not entail serious damages and impairment from floods.
(Bettman 1938b: 2)

From reviewing Bettman’s personal correspondence, it is clear he favored removing residents
from the floodplain along the Ohio River, even though he was careful to not be seen as wanting to
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“evacuate” people from their homes no matter what, as seen in a letter he penned to the Cincinnati
Enquirer editors on April 9, 1938, calling such claims “a complete fallacy” (Bettman 1938c). Yet, in
communicating with the CPC members and City Council, he recommended zoning plans that would only
permit the construction of new industrial and commercial buildings in the riverfront area that were
elevated out of harm’s way or specially designed to be minimally impacted by flooding, as well as the
eventual exclusion of residential buildings from these areas, arguing that:

...for the development of the city, the general direction of the policy should be toward the
development of the higher levels for residential uses and toward the gradual use of river-edge
areas for purposes which are not so harmed by floods as are residential uses (Bettman 1938d: 3)

Moreover, he called these riverfront areas a "sub-standard environment" for residential occupation
(1938d: 3; see also Bettman 1937b).
At the same time, a corollary debate developed around the Ohio River and its relationship to
urban blight. For both federal and local government officials, property values were closely connected to
their justifications about whether or not to build flood protection projects. First, the USACE’s cost-benefit
analysis was a fundamental step in determining whether a project should even be undertaken. USACE
staff calculated the costs and benefits for each flood protection plan based on the cost of construction
versus the sum of the property values and expected damages to be prevented by proposed a flood
control measure. Ideally, the property values protected and damages prevented should well exceed the
project cost (O’Neill 2006). Meanwhile, property values were also key to a local government’s decision
about whether to support a USACE flood control project, since they typically created tax assessment
districts to cover part of the ongoing maintenance costs required as contributions to the project. If a
district had low tax capacity, especially if city officials perceived it as “blighted,” it made it much more
difficult to gain backing for a project. Support for the floodwall in the neighborhood of California was dealt
a significant blow when it was reported that the tax assessment on the neighborhood would likely cover
only a miniscule portion of the local cost share and 25% of neighborhood households were already tax
delinquent (Cincinnati CPC 1938: 2). Still, even in cases of low property values, most local officials and
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USACE engineers expected that flood protection would improve the property values and tax capacity in
districts protected by flood control projects, meaning that even in troublesome places like the Central
Bottoms there was an expectation that rebounding property values would eventually help cover project
costs.
As the floodwall discussion advanced in Cincinnati, the debate between Sherrill and Bettman
increasingly began to revolve around this relationship between the Ohio River’s flooding and urban blight.
Sherrill and allies assumed that the risk of flooding had caused property values to decline, and flood
protection would reverse this trend, making tax assessment districts more sustainable. In a letter to
Bettman, Henry A. Potthoff, Vice President of the well-known Robert A. Cline real estate firm, argued that,
“If this portion of the city has gradually gone down and land values have been reduced to such an extent
as has been said, the only reason for it is the flood hazard” (Potthoff 1939: 1). Even before 1937, many
riverfront business owners in groups like the Lower Cincinnati Business Men’s Association, traditionally
resigned to the occurrence of flooding, were won over to the necessity of a floodwall because they
believed it would aid their investments, making property in the Central Riverfront more valuable. Glenn
Adams, the President of the Lower Cincinnati Business Men’s Associations argued that, “if given some
protection against floods, this area – by reason of its location – could be enormously valuable as an asset
of the city's business life” (Citizens’ Rehabilitation Committee 1937: 1).
Those arguing against the Central Bottoms floodwall sought to undermine this certainty. Schroth’s
report described the floodwall as a “spectacular experiment in tax valuation enhancement” (1937: 16), or
as Florence Stuart Kreimer, wife of Cincinnatus Association member Ralph A. Kreimer and also an active
participant in local reform movements, put it in a letter to Bettman about the California floodwall:

My family, for one, does not want to pay out any tax money to maintain fictions (I use the word in
what I understand to be its legal sense) – whether they be pleasant fictions about the
undoubtedly splendid Engineer Corps of the Army, or fictions about valuations, or about
assessments... (Kreimer 1939: 4)
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For their part, Bettman and Downs argued that the Ohio River’s flooding was not the primary
cause of property devaluation or blight in the Central Bottoms. They pointed out that waterfront districts in
cities that did not experience flooding, such as Cleveland, were similarly in decline (Cincinnati CPC
1939). They undercut the belief that the construction of a floodwall would benefit property values, casting
it as an uncertain outcome. Instead, they argued that the fall in riverfront property values would not be
remedied by flood prevention measures, but only through the emerging field of urban planning. According
to Ladislas Segoe, the prominent planner who worked closely with Bettman, the issue was not just about
the needs of Central Bottoms residents, but rather:

The planner's job is to answer first the planning questions: What is the best use for this
district?...By best use, I do not mean best for the property holders in the district alone or in the
immediate future only, but, of course, for the long-range development and redevelopment of the
whole community (Segoe 1939: 2)

For Bettman, the current occupants the riverfront did not merit the time and resources required by a
public works project, casting them outside of the “public” represented within his urban planning vision.
Moreover, from the vantage of these urban planning critiques, the floodwall would only serving to limit the
city’s future options for the area and cut Cincinnati off from one of its most distinctive features, the Ohio
River. As a result, City Manager Sherrill clashed with Downs and Bettman frequently over their portrayal
of property in the Central Bottoms area, disagreeing with their total valuations for the area as well as the
assertion that the floodwall would not increase the value of individual properties.
Property holders along the riverfront were shaken to hear that declining land values in the Central
Bottoms were not tied directly to flooding, but to a range of factors obscure to the normal citizen.
According to Hann (1998), property is frequently understood as “the rights that people hold over things
which guarantee them a future ‘income stream’” (4). Thus one of the most serious risks to property is its
potential devaluation (Verdery 2004). Bettman drove home that without proper oversight, the city could
produce spatial arrangements adverse to residents and property owners. The CPC’s 1937 report, The
Cincinnati Waterfront: Its Problems and Recommended Future Utilization, cited the problem of “slow,
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uncontrolled growth since the days of the first settlement of Cincinnati” (2), as a key reason for the
“blighted riverfront” (15) that would only drag down property owners in the area. The message hit home
with many landlords in the area. As one exasperated property owner confirmed at a public hearing on the
Central Bottoms floodwall: “All south of Pearl Street is not worth reclaiming. I own real estate there and it
costs more than it produces” (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1937e: 4).
Through these arguments, Bettman and the CPC staff successfully shifted the discussion from a
focus on the engineering-driven problem of river management in 1937 to an urban planning problem of
urban blight by 1940. Writing on the California issue, Bettman laid this rationale out succinctly:

So far as I have seen or heard, nobody has as yet sought or claimed to support the flood wall
method on the ground of its lower economic costs and greater social benefits. The advocates
point out the wall will keep the water away. Well of course that is so. It is always possible to work
out a structural plan for keeping out any element or matter, air, water or anything else, from a
given area. If the problem were as simple as that, we would not need to trouble ourselves about
planning or about money or costs or about anything except mere structural engineering; and on a
purely structural engineering problem we know we can rely upon the Army and City Engineers
(Bettman 1938b: 2)

He continued by clarifying that, “In the planning problem there is involved not merely the negative
question of what to do about the water, but also the constructive question of what to do with the land and
what to do for the people” (3).
Bettman and the floodwall critics thus replaced engineering proposals as a solution to flooding
with urban planning proposals as a solution to blight. Without oversight from urban planners, Bettman
argued that redevelopment strategies were likely to make the same mistakes of the past, having
unintended consequences in the short and long-term. For instance, Bettman and Downs, along with
Charles Taft, their ally on City Council, argued that even if property values somehow increased in the
Central Bottoms as the result of building a floodwall, it would drive out the current tenants who relied on
the cheap rents to eke out profits from their small factories and warehouse operations. Ultimately, only an
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urban planner could provide the vision necessary to guide redevelopment that unlocked an area’s highest
and best use, integrated into a comprehensive city plan.
The ways that Bettman and others positioned the Ohio River in this debate expands an
understanding of nature in the city. As outlined above, many technical experts saw nature in the first half
of the twentieth century as something that needed to be controlled and was antagonistic to city life (Kaika
2005). Nature was a capricious and uncooperative threat, one external to human society. Ohio Valley
residents during the first decades of the twentieth century had begun to see flooding as “a constant threat
even though (or rather because) damaging events happened irregularly and unpredictably” (Lübken 2012:
131). Surprisingly, after the flood of 1937 in Cincinnati, Bettman, Schroth, and others sought to redefine
this relationship with the Ohio River, claiming that the river had existed long before Cincinnati, and that
any damages from flooding "can all be traced to the location of valuable property or some vital unit or part
of an important public service of facility, within the path of the flood” (Cincinnati CPC 1937). Rather than
viewing flooding as the object of control, they argued that the river needed to be respected and given its
“just due.” In fact, most surprisingly, they treated the river as a useful partner instead of a threat, showing
willingness to collaborate with nature in the development of the urban landscape. For his part, Bettman
approached the 1937 flood as an opportunity to shape redevelopment opportunities in the Central
Bottoms, working in tandem with an independent river that had its own viable role in shaping the
landscape.
The dimensions of this human and non-human partnership become clear in examining its central
objective: erasing urban blight. Bettman wanted to enlist the Ohio River in order to clear out blighted
areas along the riverfront. Chicago School sociologists had introduced “blighting” as a metaphor from
ecology in order to make intelligible the decline of specific urban areas and in order to legitimize their
claims to scientific veracity (Pritchett 2003). Subsequently, urban planners like Bettman had adopted it as
an issue their training had prepared them to handle, using the danger of urban blight to position zoning
regulations and other specialist planning techniques as the kind of expert knowledge required to manage
the urban landscape. In this view, the blighting of the Central Bottoms was well beyond an issue that
could be resolved by flood control measures. This is not to say that Bettman and other opponents of the
Central Bottoms floodwall were against any flood control measures at all. In fact, they were very
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supportive of the Mill Creek Barrier Dam, which protected the western half of the urban core, including the
major factories and more respectable residential neighborhoods that were found there. Rather, they
believed flood control should only be built for areas that were not suffering from “urban blight.” In terms of
the Central Bottoms’ “blight” though, they believed that the neighborhood was irredeemable and their goal
was to have the effects of prolonged exposure to flooding further undermine the area’s viability. As the
flooding Ohio River surged over its banks, it would eat into building foundations, rot their structural wood,
and loosen bricks, contributing to the deterioration of the Central Bottoms’ environment. Paradoxically,
the Ohio River could help solve the blight problem by making it worse.
The results of this technical debate require an expanded perspective on the relationship between
scientific expertise and nature. The formation of scientific expertise had been a critical step in the
historical separation of nature from society, since experts have been primarily responsible for creating a
divide that portrays nature as fundamentally different from society and vice versa (Latour 1993, Mitchell
2002). Mitchell (2002) claims that the authority of expertise is based largely on its efforts to divide the
world into “what seemed nature on one side, and human calculation and expertise on the other” (36).
Experts, through the study of natural forces using scientific methods, could therefore determine the laws
that govern the world, while also providing the means to manipulate these forces for human benefit.
However, Mitchell leaves unexplored how different fields of expertise can portray nature in ways
that are thoroughly incompatible. In the case of the Central Bottoms floodwall, both engineering experts
(represented by the City Manager Sherrill and the USACE) and urban planning experts (represented by
the CPC staff and urban governance groups like the Cincinnatus Association) justified their plans for the
Central Bottoms in terms of a proper understanding of nature. Through deployment of expertise, each
argued their approach was the proper response to flooding on the Ohio River even as they put forward
competing proposals about how to best relate to the Ohio River in the Central Bottoms. A key element in
determining whether the floodwall would be built depended on each group’s capacity to legitimize their
own technical solutions. In the end, Bettman was ultimately able to undercut Sherrill’s view of the Ohio
River as an urgent natural threat that had to be contained by pushing an understanding of blight as the
core issue, one which required more than just engineering expertise to resolve. Instead, Bettman claimed
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that the Ohio River and flooding wanted the same things he wanted and together they could remake the
Central Bottoms as a more productive space of redevelopment.
As utilized by the anti-floodwall critics, this argument opened up a new view on urban nature.
Bettman, Schroth, and others saw nature as an actor that could potentially share the same goals as
capitalist development. This is important because, popular understandings of nature as either passive
and bucolic (Marx 1964, Williams 1973) or wild and uncooperative (Tsing 2005, Braun 2006) ignore these
contexts where nature is an active partner with capitalist development. The problem here is that nature
and the environment, popularly understood as encompassing structural conditions, are often taken as
“passive backgrounds or, at most, states of affairs whose sole power is the negative one of constraint or
resistance” (Bennett 2005: 455). An assemblage perspective requires a view of nature that recognizes its
agency is both multiple and open-ended. In this sense, nature is neither inert nor restricted to being
uncooperative. In fact, in Cincinnati, the river and urban planning experts actively worked together to
redevelop the Central Bottoms and displace its mixed-race residents and small-scale industrial tenants.
Bettman was confident that the Ohio River agreed with him that the Central Bottoms was an undesirable
neighborhood, and that over time, through flooding, the river would help fix the problems he had identified
in the area. Bettman, Schroth, and others embraced and empowered the river’s agency as a tool for
redevelopment, which gained them increasing support among business elites in the city, especially those
active in the Cincinnatus Association.
Tsing describes landscapes like the Central Bottoms as a “gap,” a place where “universals have
not been successful in setting all the terms” (2005: 202), where the division between nature and society
has not quite taken hold. Tsing positions these “gaps” as important spaces to recognize the liveliness of
nature as an alternative to capitalism. For more than a century, residents of the Central Bottoms lived in
close connection with the river, a social nature that was both viewed as an independent actor (“Old Man
River”) and integrated into everyday life. This relationship ran counter to many dominant views about the
scientific management of (nonsocial) nature through infrastructure or urban planning. Yet, in the Central
Bottoms after 1937 one also finds a zone where non-human and human actors collaborated to further the
objectives of capitalist development and white supremacy. This is because, as Povinelli (2016) points out,
in their quest for profits, capitalists actually believe “nothing is inherently inert...and anything can become
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something more with the right innovative angle” (Povinelli 2016: 20). While capitalists might argue for the
division of society and nature, they are also radically open to the behavior of any actor, human or nonhuman, that will facilitate the process of accumulation.
Thus in Cincinnati, city officials used the 1937 flood as an opportunity to recontextualize the
nature-society relationship, based on an argument that urban planners like Bettman were the ones who
were actually working with and respecting nature, in many ways arguing that providing a river its “elbow
room” was more apt for the time than any talk of “Old Man River.” In his work on the reconstruction of
New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Barrios has shown how planners used the
catastrophic impact of the storm to reframe urban space and define specific behaviors and living
arrangements of low-income African-American residents as counterproductive to capitalist development
(Barrios 2011). Similarly in Cincinnati, Bettman was able to use the flood to bring attention to what he
viewed as the backwardness and inefficiencies of the Central Bottoms. He also actually went beyond
what happened in New Orleans by subsequently engaging the Ohio River to help correct the issues that
he and others had identified as problems in the area. Meanwhile, the Ohio River went where the Bettman
and other urban planning elites had asked it to, sending flood waters into poorer neighborhoods to literally
eat away at their foundations, while staying outside the new Mill Creek Barrier Dam and the industrial
district that it protected. Recast in this light, the liveliness of the river then became a justification for and a
participant in disinvestment and displacement.
In the bureaucratic debates around Cincinnati’s floodwall, there is little evidence that any of the
elite governmental, scientific, and business leaders fundamentally doubted a separation of nature and
society. Yet, the understanding of the Ohio River as a cooperative urban non-human actor blurs the way
we understand these categories, opening up new possibilities for how the division of nature and society
can be used to govern the city. Individuals pushing for the redevelopment of the riverfront strategically
utilized the vitality of the Ohio River to undermine assumptions about the necessity of a floodwall and
what riverfront infrastructure could look like. Thus, nature during this era of high modernism was far from
being reduced to only an inert collection of resources, a nonsocial nature, as Scott (1998) would believe
most experts wanted it. Rather, we can see that the constitution of nature in relation to expertise can
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unfold in multiple, overlapping ways, and the predominance of one perspective over another depends on
contingent and site-specific conflicts.

E. The Ohio River and Urban Renewal

Once the Central Bottoms floodwall was finally defeated, it left a massive unresolved question for
city elites: what should be done with the neighborhood? Floodwall critics had urged business leaders, City
Council, and the public to consider what other uses the Central Bottoms could serve, and to see the
floodwall as foreclosing many of those options. Acknowledging that disasters like the 1937 flood provided
bad press, with scenes of misfortune and urban vulnerability, floodwall critics also saw the infrastructure
itself as a negative advertisement. W. W. Marting, from the Ohio River Company, a coal trading firm,
described the flood works in Huntington, WV as a “penitentiary wall” and “hideously ugly” (Marting 1939:
1), while others argued that a floodwall would act as a constant reminder of looming danger. Most
convincingly, they argued constructing a floodwall would cut downtown Cincinnati off from its primary
asset: the river. As Mayor James Stewart put it when reluctantly voting against the floodwall: “the bottoms
floodwall would preclude plans for future development of the river front” (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1940:
9). However, there was little consensus about any aspect other aspect of what to do with this riverfront
asset: whether it should be used for aesthetic, industrial, civic, commercial, or recreational ends, or some
combination thereof.
Bettman, Taft, and others were able to defeat the Central Bottoms floodwall, but they were unable
to move forward with their own vision for the riverfront. The Preliminary Report: A Redevelopment Plan for
the Central River Front, published by the CPC in 1939, included recommendations for civic buildings, a
stadium, parks, parking lots, and a bypass highway. The 1948 Master Plan – the final project Bettman
worked on for Cincinnati, completed under the direction of his son after Bettman’s death in 1945 – further
developed many of these proposals, settling on a recommendation for a futuristic collection of riverfront
buildings built on platforms raised out of the floodplain. The plan also called for a east-west highway to be
built between the Central Bottoms and Central Business District, allowing for easy entry into downtown
and for improved connections between different sections of the city. Through these plans, the CPC
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argued that the Central Bottoms could move on from its lackluster status as “a relic of bygone days” to be
transformed into “an area of great value, utility and inspiration (Cincinnati CPC 1948: 144).
City officials wanted to reconfigure downtown to respond to rapidly changing residential patterns
within the city. Accelerated suburbanization in the postwar years was moving Cincinnatians farther from
the urban core, and as many middle-class families moved out of the city proper, they were replaced by
lower-income African American and white migrants from Appalachia and the upland South (Stradling
2003). This urban exodus was accompanied by a growing belief across the country that the “city” was
dangerous, unhealthy, and obsolete. In this context, urban elites were desperate to preserve the
downtown district as accessible and desirable to suburban commuters for shopping and office space.
They supported urban renewal proposals to destroy “blighted” African-American neighborhoods like the
Central Bottoms or the adjacent West End and replace them with massive highways, so that white office
workers and shoppers could still make their way downtown conveniently and quickly (Davis 1991).
According to a Riverfront Redevelopment report produced by CPC in 1946, the Central Bottoms had "a
depreciating effect on the whole downtown business area, tending to prevent it from attaining its full
stature as a regional trade center" (Cincinnati CPC 1946: 21). To city officials, rebuilding the Central
Bottoms as a modern monumental civic center was therefore crucial, removing an unsightly neighborhood
and pushing back on negative images of the city.
Meanwhile, the fight over the Central Bottoms flood control debate limped on without a clear
redevelopment plan for the neighborhood. Even though Bettman and others had fought so hard to defeat
the Central Bottoms floodwall, there was an effort after the fact to make it seem like the deterioration of
the neighborhood itself was responsible for the final decision not to build a floodwall. The CPC’s report on
the riverfront from 1946 claimed that the decision to abandon the area came after "studies by the U.S.
Engineers concluded that damages to the Downtown Riverfront by recurring floods are not sufficient to
justify Federal participation in the construction of flood control works” (Cincinnati CPC 1946: 46). While
reference is also made to City Council’s original passage of a flood protection plan encompassing both
the Mill Creek Valley and Central Bottoms, there is no mention of the Council’s vote in January 1940
reversing this decision. Instead, emphasis is on the “assessed valuations” (14) produced by the USACE
and City Engineer showing that the property values and potential damages from flooding in the Central
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Bottoms were insufficient to warrant floodwall protection. Still, politicians and civic groups looking to make
a name for themselves continued to raise the issue throughout the 1940s. In 1951, City Council convened
the Central Riverfront Advisory Committee with representatives from ten local organizations to review the
issue once again. City Council had recently requested the USACE to revisit flood protection for the
Central Bottoms once again, and in parallel the Central Riverfront Advisory Committee gathered input
from fifteen expert to consider changes to the 1948 Master Plan. In its final report, the group urged that
the bypass highway be prioritized, but decided to make no recommendations regarding a floodwall or
best land usage for the Central Bottoms (Central Riverfront Advisory Committee 1951).
In the 1950s, newly authorized Federal Aid Highway Act funds enabled Cincinnati municipal
officials to finally build the city’s long-desired bypass highway in front of the Central Business District,
named Fort Washington Way after the military fortifications built on the site shortly after the city was
founded. The city completed Fort Washington Way in 1961, running along Third Street, across the
northern edge of the Central Bottoms. As part of construction, engineers had included a levee into the
Fort Washington Way structure, protecting the Central Business District from high water. However, a final
plan for the Central Bottoms itself remained elusive, with several plans for the area failing to gain traction.
Perhaps best known from this period was the Cincinnatus Association’s competition to create a riverfront
monument in the Central Bottoms called the Symbolon. Meant to rival St. Louis’s Gateway Arch, the
Cincinnatus Association established a panel of experts to determine a winner for the competition. After
receiving sixty-two submissions, the judges declared on October 19, 1962 that none of the proposals
were of sufficient merit and the project would not move forward (Tucker 1967).
Even though those arguing for and against the floodwall had largely agreed that “being flooded”
was unacceptable, it remained a fundamental aspect of Central Bottoms life. The warehouses, small
factories, wholesalers, and the low-income residents in the area continued to experience flooding, with
major floods over 60’ in 1945, 1948, 1955, 1962, and 1964 (flood stage for Cincinnati is 52’). Slightly
downriver, the Mill Creek Barrier Dam began operating in January 1948, and almost immediately
prevented an estimated $2,000,000 in damages from the April 1948 flood (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff
1948b). Still, despite an outward appearance of stagnation in the Central Bottoms, changes were taking
place that would finally enable redevelopment of the area. Several property owners in the Central
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Bottoms had torn down the buildings on their sites and converted the land into parking lots. By the time
engineers were planning the Fort Washington Way bypass, noticeable gaps in the once-congested
neighborhood had appeared. Meanwhile, developers waited to see what plan the city would eventually
support, rather than make any investment in the area. As a result, only seven new structures built in the
Central Bottoms during the 1950s, all of them warehouses (Mitchell 1998: 304). And by 1960, only an
estimated 120 persons were living in the area, a massive decrease from the 2,900 residents in 1940
(Cincinnati CPC 1961: 6).
A core issue was the decay of the Central Bottoms building stock. As a riverfront neighborhood
regularly affected by flooding, renovations had been an central aspect of life in the area. Whenever the
river crept up into the Central Bottoms, it left damaged and dirty buildings in its wake, requiring immediate
attention. Residents and property owners existed in a constant cycle of ruin, repair, and renewal.
However, the decline in property values made securing loans more difficult, and repairs less worth the
investment. In the post-war period, damage from flooding thus went untreated, pushing buildings further
into a “trend of obsolescence” (Cincinnati CPC 1945: 1). CPC staff engineer Myron Downs succinctly
predicted this cycle in a letter to Bettman from 1939, stating that, “Unquestionably, time and depreciation
of buildings will remove many of those now living at flood stage…” (Downs 1939: 1). As hoped, the
unfettered river made living in the Central Bottoms increasingly untenable.
After the 1937 flood, new property logics had been eating away at the Central Bottoms even
when the neighborhood’s physical appearance had appeared largely unchanged. Similar to Alexander’s
findings in post-socialist Kazakhstan, “the properties of the property object...were redefined and
reconstituted while the external form remained constant” (2004: 265). The buildings looked the same as
they had before, and flooding continued to occur much as it had throughout the history of the city, but the
river’s agency was empowered so that damages that would have been a matter of course previously
became more and more problematic. The Ohio River wrought further damage on buildings that had not
been repaired. Without simply replacing existing relations, neighborhood residents had been through a
cycle of floods and repairs for decades were entangled in new property relationships of mortgages and
building inspections that defined “being flooded” as unacceptable. Long-term, these new property
relations increasingly limited the resources that wholesale merchants, factory owners, landlords, and
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residents could access to renew their neighborhood. As Cook (2007) indicates, a similar process was
taking place in the adjacent sections of the West End neighborhood, the city’s largest African-American
community at the time. The part of the West End closest to the riverfront, which featured a mix of factories
and residences similar to the Central Bottoms, had also been left outside of the Mill Creek Barrier by city
officials and the USACE. Abandoned by the flood wall and stripped of the capacity to repair the areas
buildings, the Ohio River took an increasing toll on the area with each new flood season. Fothergill
(2004), in her study of the major 1997 flood in Grand Forks, North Dakota, discusses how residents,
particularly women, experienced the invasion of their home by flood waters as a “violations against their
own bodies” (128). The loss of control over home and environment in the Central Bottoms, while also
being stripped of the capacity to make significant repairs to address any damage, must have similarly
undermined residents’ feeling of well-being and personal security in the area.
Federal urban renewal efforts to demolish what were perceived as blighted and decayed
neighborhoods provided additional energy to this process. To access federal funding, the City of
Cincinnati developed an urban renewal plan for the Central Bottoms in the 1960s, calling for parks,
redesigned light industry, and a more rational streetscape. The Cincinnatus Association, while dismayed
by the failure of the Symbolon, was quick to point out that their competition had driven interest in these
urban renewal efforts. Shortly after the competition in 1962, a $6.6 million bond referendum passed for
the purchase and demolition of riverfront properties. The contrast of the Central Bottoms against
ambitious new urban renewal plans served to further portray the neighborhood as irredeemable.
According to a chronicler of the Cincinnatus Association, plans like the Symbolon only made more
obvious the “accumulated filth of a century of floods” in the Central Bottoms (Tucker 1967: 201).
In preparing the urban renewal application materials, city officials entered Central Bottoms homes
and business places to conduct building assessment surveys, documenting the state of each building and
the type of occupation. It is telling that the justification for the Central Bottoms urban renewal project
focused on the neighborhood’s inadequate construction and physical decay, rather than signs of “blight,”
which the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development operationally defined as behavioral
instead of physical deterioration (although generally the federal government gave local governments wide
leeway in determining what constituted “blight,” Gordon 2004). A February 1965 application for a federal
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loan by Cincinnati’s Department of Urban Development listed 258 Central Bottoms properties to be
purchased as part of the city’s plan. Of these, 186 were listed as having “major defects” including:
“buckling walls, cracks caused by differential settlement, dangerously sagging or eroded joists or other
structural elements, seriously chipped columns, etc.” (Cincinnati Department of Urban Development: 3),
capturing in detail the effect Ohio River flooding was having on the neighborhood. The application only
considered 11 of the 258 buildings to have a “blighting” influence according to Department of Housing
and Urban Development standards, while the rest were considered physically substandard or inadequate
to modern industrial needs. The urban renewal process made the river’s work more legible, charting its
progress in public documents. These reports and proposals helped transfer these depictions of ruin onto
maps, property values, and city plans. The combined effects of the river, declining property values, and
urban renewal documentation created conditions of chronic disinvestment.
For many years, the ultimate fate of the Central Bottoms and downtown redevelopment appeared
to be an intractable problem, a “political football” according to Mayor Ruehlmann (Walker 1988: 43). Yet,
the effects of river flooding, blight, and urban renewal created the conditions for a redevelopment plan to
coalesce rapidly and seemingly from nowhere. In 1966, a whirlwind process led to plans for a riverfront
stadium that would be shared by professional baseball and American football teams (Cowan 2005). A
powerful consensus of political leaders and business interests developed around the new plan for the
stadium to be located in the Central Bottoms. After decades of inaction the riverfront problem seemed to
resolve itself overnight. Unsurprisingly though, the plan had last minute complications involving the river.
The owner of the baseball team, Bill DeWitt, was greatly opposed to a riverfront location because of his
concerns over flooding, even as he was also dissatisfied with the team’s current location in the nearby
“blighted” West End neighborhood. DeWitt’s fear of flooding, even as the first step in riverfront
redevelopment finally loomed, shows the continued power of the idiosyncratic assemblage of spatialities
in the Central Bottoms, with flooding as both ally and adversary. Even as local elites had cooperated with
the Ohio River to destroy the Central Bottoms neighborhood, the recurrence of flooding left many
skeptical of the area. DeWitt finally had to be convinced to sell the team to a specially-formed group of
business elites before a lease could be signed on the new stadium (Walker 1988).
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During 1967 and 1968, the last Central Bottoms residents and factories were removed in
preparation for the stadium. Many residents moved to other riverfront neighborhoods like the East End
(Halperin 1998), while industries like Littleford Bros. fought relocation in a series of delaying actions
before being moved towards the suburban fringe (Wadsworth 1967). Of the former businesses in the
Central Bottoms, only the wholesale companies successfully lobbied to remain in the area, in new
buildings city planners deemed acceptably flood resistant. By 1970, the completed Riverfront Stadium
opened, built on a giant concrete platform raised out of floodplain, and inaugurating a new period for the
riverfront. Other cities in the region like Pittsburgh and St. Louis passed through very similar situations
with their riverfronts during this period, constructing large multi-sport stadiums after clearing out older
mixed-race residential and industrial neighborhoods (Cowan 2005).

F. Conclusion

Recent anthropological research has increasingly shown how “various social actors mobilize a
disaster to air moral grievances, to further their preferred development agendas, or to reassert their
political power” (Barrios 2017: 155). In Cincinnati after the 1937 flood, these included both human and
non-human actors who had widely different perceptions of how the riverfront should be used. Ultimately,
urban planners and corporate elites succeeded in advancing their vision for the Central Bottoms –
overcoming critiques from small-business owners in the area and the engineers who favored massive
construction projects – by arguing that the Ohio River needed to be respected and that their plan would
not limit future use of the central riverfront. The deployment of expertise, focus on development potential,
and partnership with the Ohio River charted a new path forward for dealing with flood disasters after
1937. These changes also signaled the end of the Central Bottoms neighborhood, although the process
took decades to complete.
Much disaster-related research has focused on the social production of vulnerability in urban
settings. The investigation of vulnerability treats disasters as events that are the result of long-term
decision-making processes that expose specific populations, usually lower-income, to more dangerous
contexts, while also pushing back against a view of disasters as unpredictable and with unexpected
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consequences (Oliver-Smith 1999). While wealthy communities can be sited in at-risk locations as well,
they typically have individual and government-provided resources to mitigate their vulnerability.
Meanwhile lower-income communities suffer more sustained consequences (Bolin and Stanford 1999). A
similar process unfolded in the Central Bottoms after the 1937 flood when residents were denied the
resources or the right to restore their neighborhood.
Considering vulnerability as part of an assemblage of “being flooded” means also recognizing that
communities are not thrust into these dangerous contexts unknowingly. Occupants may consider their
home or place of business as safe or understandable, even while recognizing their exposure to things like
flooding. Moreover, the social production of vulnerability is experienced unevenly – one person may
consider themselves vulnerable while another does not. Relations of power shape these discrepancies,
creating uneven spatialities of what vulnerability and “being flooded” mean. Exploiting these uneven
spatialities in Cincinnati, urban planners and developers pointed to flooding and what they perceived as
the spread of urban blight to justify disinvestment, distorting and displacing previous relationships of
nature-society where the Central Bottoms residents had lived collaboratively with the Ohio River.
Many other authors, such as Klein (2007), have demonstrated the ways massive disasters can
create opportunities for profiteering and provide new footholds for the expansion of capitalism. As a
complement to this perspective, I emphasize the role of disaster understood within an urban assemblage,
one that recognizes there are numerous perspectives as to what qualifies as acceptable risk as well as
strategies for mitigating these risks. Vulnerable communities may understand themselves as “at risk” but
also have developed means to navigate and mitigate their environments, such as in the Central Bottoms.
Efforts to prevent communities from experiencing vulnerability, even if well intended, are closely tied to
debates around whose definition of risk will guide governmental and economic responses. In the Central
Bottoms, Bettman and many others argued that residents were unacceptably vulnerable to flooding, even
if these same residents did not think so. As Bettman’s definition of vulnerability gained acceptance, it
helped legitimize the slow destruction of the neighborhood. Thus, rather than focus on the immediate
effect of one traumatic moment (the “shock” that Klein discusses), it is important to analyze how
numerous actors, both human and non-human, create overlapping spatialities of vulnerability, a process
that unfolds through contingent and unstable assemblages of expertise and nature.
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In many ways, these experiences in Cincinnati, and in similar river cities like Pittsburgh and St.
Louis, presaged situations faced along many urban waterfronts today. With climate change leading to
rising sea-levels and more powerful storm surges, numerous urban waterfronts are increasingly subject to
flooding. Scientists and other specialists are designing new infrastructures to protect these communities
from the threat of flooding. In tandem, as numerous people are moving back to the city, urban developers
are eager to redevelop waterfront low-income residential or deindustrializing neighborhoods. As a result,
numerous cities are already seeing developers taking advantage of climate change and new regulatory
environments to transform their waterfronts into upper-class enclaves, with fantastically expensive condos
or houses that incorporate the latest flood-resilient technologies (Gandy 2014, Robbins 2016). These
developers, and the government officials and environmental experts that support them, are arguing that
they are working with the changing conditions of nature, rather than opposing climate change, in order to
reduce vulnerability. From this analysis emerges a racial and class geography of flood protection and
flood exposure, which explains why increasingly the wealthy are the only ones who can afford to occupy
areas that are vulnerable to flooding, ensconced in costly buildings designed to adapt to flooding.
While some see waterfront retreat as at times a necessary step in the face of increased chances
for disaster (Koslov 2016), the experience from the Central Bottoms shows that the dynamics of flooding
need to be analyzed carefully in terms of how vulnerability is being defined and for whom. It is important
to challenge ideas of climate change and vulnerability that, in the name of scientific expertise, ignore
existing communities understandings of nature and means of navigating risk. This is critically important in
the U.S. where many of the communities that experts and developers are determining to be unacceptably
exposed to flooding are also communities of color or low-income communities. As Vaughn writes, we
need to reject approaches that draw on “technoscientific culture and popular culture...to hierarchize some
citizens as possessing more expertise about floods than others because of their race” (2012: 361). I
would also add rejecting those notions of expertise that draw on class standing. Moreover, this history
from the Central Bottoms shows that bodies of water like the Ohio River will gladly take part in the efforts
of white supremacy to tear down waterfront communities that elites have targeted for redevelopment.
From this perspective, it is clear that we must support alternate understandings of vulnerability and “being
flooded” on urban waterfronts, even while entrenched policies like flood insurance and federal grant
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requirements can make this particularly difficult. Therefore, preserving equitable access to urban
waterfronts will require a fine-tuned and committed advocacy based on understanding these spaces as
assemblages constituted by multiple understandings and experiences of “being flooded.”
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Chapter 4.
Stream Pollution and Riverfront Recreation, 1934-1988

In 1977, workers uncovered “the ruins of a large stone structure and a series of many deep
tunnels” (Ahlering 1983: 46) during the clearing of a steel scrapyard on the Cincinnati central riverfront.
The large structure puzzled the project planners, who were working on Sawyer Point, the city’s newest
park. Learning of the find, the Miami Purchase Association (precursor to the Cincinnati Preservation
Association) stepped in to investigate. Their research determined that the building and tunnels were part
of the Front Street pumping station, the city’s first water works (Ahlering 1983). The city had closed the
facility in 1907 due to concerns about pollution affecting the city’s drinking water, building a new water
works further upstream in the neighborhood of California. Seven decades later, by the time the city
purchased the site from American Compressed Steel and was clearing it of decades of scrap waste, the
Front Street water works had been long forgotten. The Sawyer Point Park project team, collaborating with
their partners at the Cincinnatus Association and Riverfront Advisory Council, chose to incorporate these
rediscovered ruins as the backdrop to an outdoor amphitheater for the new park. This symbolic
reclamation of the Cincinnati’s first water works reinforced the project’s development goals. Through deft
public relations work, the project planners seized the opportunity to show that they were cleaning up the
landscape, connecting the new park to the healthier water environment of the past in order to encourage
people and capital to return to the riverfront.
In this chapter, I explore how sanitary engineers and business elites worked together to reshape
public perceptions of pollution on the Ohio River and Cincinnati waterfront. Through two organizations –
the Cincinnati Committee on Stream Pollution (CSP) and the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation
Commission (ORSANCO) – a mid-century anti-pollution movement in Cincinnati transformed water
pollution from being seen as a necessary outcome of industrial expansion to instead as a dangerous
inhibitor of growth, impacting both the economy and public health. With the construction of the Ohio River
lock and dam system for navigation, the river began to increasingly threaten water supplies across the
region, posing unexpected dangers to residents and businesses. These new anti-pollution activists,
moving beyond the confines of urban pollution, built an awareness of industrial and municipal waste as
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circulating throughout the Ohio River watershed, linking the region’s residents through its shared impacts.
By using a sophisticated publicity strategy, they cultivated a vision of a polluted public stretching across
the Ohio Valley, one defined by the limits of the river basin and connected by the movement of waste.
The success of this regional public relations campaign spurred the construction of municipal sewage
treatment plants across the Ohio Valley and altered local understandings of water pollution.
The active participation of business leaders in the process also preserved a role for industry to
shape pollution regulations that limited the impact of new regulations, favoring their needs. Yet, despite
the continued power of industrial polluters on the Ohio River, the activities of stream pollution advocates
in Cincinnati and elsewhere helped establish a new assemblage around the claim that clean water was a
critical precursor to fostering development and growth. Industry, which had previously shown little
concern about the availability of clean water, now expressed a desire for consistent access to an
unpolluted water supply, a significant change in the Ohio Valley’s business mindset. For its part, the Ohio
River largely cooperated with these expectations, reaching a standard of cleanliness that removed it as a
threat to economic growth in the region, while also still receiving the discharge of chemicals and other
pollutants that enabled businesses to cheaply get rid of their waste.
To trace this early environmental history, I draw on the publicity documents produced by the
Cincinnati CSP and ORSANCO from the 1930s through the 1950s, newspaper articles from the period,
and convention proceedings as sanitation officials, industrialists, and politicians negotiated the regional
compact that became ORSANCO. Another key resource has been the The ORSANCO Story: Water
Quality Management in the Ohio Valley under an Interstate Compact, a book produced by Edward Cleary,
the first ORSANCO Director, which traces the history of the movement and enters into great detail
regarding the debates over the group’s technical and public relations approach. Even though the antipollution movement’s biggest successes came later, it is important to go back to these earlier
antecedents and understand how they shaped later understandings of pollution and its impact on social
understandings of cleanliness and growth.
Despite the efforts by the Cincinnati CSP and ORSANCO to clean up the Ohio River, they did
little to change expectations for the Cincinnati riverfront. Not only was the area considered disreputable
because of racial intermixing and illicit entertainment activities, but the public also viewed the area as
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dirty, sullied by repeated flooding, with old worn-down buildings and industrial tenants that used the area
as a dumping ground. As a way to clean up the area and make it more appealing to the public, city elites
had sought to build parks in the area for decades, but with little success. The environmental movement in
the 1970s brought fresh momentum to this effort on the riverfront area. City elites utilized environmental
language to argue that the riverfront represented an important area in the fight against pollution, and that
parks would help prevent storm water run-off – contaminated by pesticides and other chemicals – from
flowing directly into the river. To understand this period, I use personal correspondence, meeting minutes,
and reports produced by Cincinnatus Association members, city government committees, and others as
they pushed for parks to be built on the riverfront.
At the same time, they also argued that building parks in the area would spur private investment
and economic growth on the riverfront. A number of urban redevelopment studies (Thompson 1979,
Bauman 2003, Jackson Jr. 2010) have drawn on the work of Douglas (1966) to explain this emphasis on
cleaning up urban spaces in order to prepare them for new development. Relying on her observation that
dirt is “matter out of place” (35) and as such, elicits purification and sanitizing to return it to a proper state,
these authors claim that developers and urban elites go to great lengths to portray low-income
communities as “dirty” and polluted, tapping into a powerful need to “clean up” contaminated areas in
order to justify displacing residents and receiving massive public subsidies for their projects. While this is
a crucial insight, I also argue here that we need to examine how the process of “cleaning up” is
constructed in given contexts like the Cincinnati riverfront.
In this regard it is important to look back at how ORSANCO’s work to link clean water and
economic growth framed the transformation of Cincinnati’s riverfront into a showcase space of parks and
recreation, rather than assume that the process of “cleaning up” urban areas involves self-evident
components like access to clean water or green spaces. In the case of Cincinnati, while the
environmental movement was crucial in identifying the riverfront as “polluted,” we need to go back to
ORSANCO’s mid-century anti-pollution efforts to understand the ways elites viewed “cleaning up” water
pollution as preceding economic development across the Ohio Valley, creating a indelible connection
between sanitary knowledge and urban expansion in the region. The public relations experts, civic
boosters, and industrialists involved in ORSANCO, as well as the Ohio River itself, were all active in
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disseminating new forms of sanitary understandings that positioned clean water as a prerequisite to
urban development.
I emphasize here an assemblage perspective in order to move away from a linear analysis that
charts a simple move from “being polluted” to “being clean.” I recognize how important it is to track the
processes whereby people are able to “discern, conceptualize, and confront the toxins that pervade their
bodies and environments” (Cepek 2012: 401) – particularly in the context of persistent environmental
racism in the U.S. and the disproportionate health outcomes it inflicts on low-income communities, many
of which are also communities of color (Pulido 2000, Checker 2005). Yet, in this chapter, my focus is to
see how an assemblage of technical and economic interests in the Ohio Valley shaped new perceptions
of pollution, cleanliness, and profitability for the region in ways that did not always track neatly with actual
impacts on community health.

A. Cincinnati and the Sanitary City

I begin this discussion by going back first to the concept of the sanitary city, which is a key
reference point for understanding the innovations proposed by Cincinnati’s mid-century anti-pollution
experts. The conceptual framework of the sanitary city connects emergent epistemologies of health and
disease in the nineteenth century with changes in urban governance across the U.S. and Europe (Joyce
2003, Melosi 2008). In the nineteenth century, bacteriologists, building on discoveries by Pasteur and
Koch, began identifying germs as the cause of disease, replacing a belief that miasmas – noxious fumes
or “bad air” created by decaying organic waste – caused illness (Melosi 2008). This new germ theory of
disease focused on organic waste and highlighted the role of water as crucial in transmitting bacteria and
spreading contagions, which in turn led to calls for the constant supply of fresh water and the carrying
away of dirty water (Gandy 2014). At the time, most of the U.S. population understood “pollution” through
moral connotations, tied to individual decline and impurity – the pollution of a sinner’s soul for example,
but a concern with the degradation of water supplies, reinforced by experiences in England and Scotland,
led to the association of pollution with physical phenomenon, primarily with water (Rome 1996). As a
result of these new scientific understandings of disease and growing public concern with pollution, cities
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across the U.S. and Europe focused on building infrastructure for the provision and removal of water,
expanding their water works and sewer systems. In addition, through the creation of public health
departments, municipal governments sought to educate urban residents about how to practice
cleanliness and avoid epidemics like cholera or typhoid (Foucault 2003). This combination of factors,
referred to as the sanitary city, made the urban environment a crucial site to prevent disease and manage
rapidly growing urban populations (Joyce 2003).
In Cincinnati, these changes during the second half of the nineteenth century coincided with the
arrival of the new waves of immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as whites and AfricanAmericans from the upland South. These recent arrivals settled in older housing in the urban core, as
many wealthier whites moved to the rapidly expanding suburbs located in the hills around the central
basin area of the old city. These shifting residential patterns contributed to growing segregation in
Cincinnati by the end of the nineteenth century (Fairbanks 1988). Concurrent with this suburban exodus,
many urban elites in the city grew alarmed about living conditions throughout the urban core, as these
new immigrants moved into rapidly decaying tenements. Feeling these neighborhoods were “unhealthy
and unwholesome” many elites advocated for housing and sanitation reforms to clean the area up
(Fairbanks 1988: 13). The proximity of many of these tenements to “foul-smelling, polluted” bodies of
water like the Mill Creek, as well as Duck Creek, the Miami and Erie Canal, and increasingly the Ohio
River, only strengthened elite concerns about the area (Fairbanks 1988: 15).
In this context, in Cincinnati and elsewhere, health experts pushed fresh water as a fundamental
precursor to public health, a “universal cleaning agent” (Barles 2012: 96) that could help prevent disease
and improve sanitation. Given these changes, water pollution gained new importance as a potential threat
to clean water supplies. While some cities like New York drew drinking water from pristine natural
environments far away from the city, most places dumped their sewage directly into the body of water that
they used for their water supply, leading to concerns about water quality. This was the case in Cincinnati,
which drew its water from the Ohio River and also dumped its waste there (Giglierano 1977). While
sanitary engineers recognized that this waste could cause disease, they also believed in water’s natural
dilution capacity to facilitate a process of purification as well as in new filtration and chlorination water
works technologies to protect the population from any remaining germs. As a result, the Ohio River
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served as Cincinnati’s ultimate sewer, utilized to carry waste downstream and away from the city. In 1863
– based in part on the opinion of Cincinnati’s chief civil engineer that “when fecal matter is mixed with
water, it is no longer harmful due to chemical change,” (Gilbert 1862: 30, quoted in Giglierano 1977) – the
city finally adopted a new regulation allowing urban residents to connect to the sewer system, so that
more and more waste could be funneled to the Ohio River, where it would be diluted.
The focus here was almost exclusively on organic waste such as fecal matter or food wastes.
Sanitation engineers used new metrics like bacteria counts and dissolved oxygen levels to quantify the
success of diluting this organic waste in the river (Melosi 2008). High level bacteria counts indicated a
polluted stream that would help breed germs such as typhoid, whereas waterways with high levels of
dissolved oxygen would be able to sustain those microorganisms that break down organic matter,
reducing the number of bacteria in the water and thus helping streams naturally purify themselves. While
urban sanitary engineers were deeply concerned about the bacteriological threat posed by organic
wastes, they were much less interested in the study of inorganic wastes from industries, with some even
arguing that chemical discharges helped neutralize harmful bacteria (Tarr 1985, Colton and Skinner
2010). The incredible expansion of industrial production across the U.S., and its central role in driving the
economy in the Midwest, also contributed to lack of desire to recognize industrial pollution (Stradling and
Stradling 2008). When critics did attack industrial waste for their harmful effects, they typically saw this
damage impacting a natural landscape located far outside the city, which was responsible for causing
wildlife and foliage to die (Marx 1964). That said, sanitary engineers were still concerned with regulating
those industries that produced organic wastes, like meat-packing plants (Joyce 2003, Rosen 2007).
By the early twentieth century, Cincinnati’s local government initiated a major sewer expansion in
the city (Giglierano 1977). Local citizens welcomed these upgrades and additional services as residences
struggled to deal with their liquid wastes, particularly as more residences incorporated private bathrooms
rather than shared cesspools. As with many other growing cities, the expansion of the sewer system
improved sanitary conditions in the home and the workplace, but at the cost of further degrading urban
waterways (Giglierano 1977). New concerns arose in Cincinnati about the quality of drinking water
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available to the city, as the quantity of sewage poured directly into the river increased.

27

With the

proliferation of sewage discharged from public sewers near downtown, the city’s water works department
closed its Front Street pumping station in 1907 as mentioned in at the beginning of this chapter, opening
a new facility farther upstream in the neighborhood of California. Cincinnati sanitary engineers also
successfully lobbied the U.S. Public Health Service to locate its first Field Investigation Station in
Cincinnati in order to conduct research on stream pollution. This pollution laboratory opened in 1913 and
began studies to monitor seasonal bacteria fluctuations in the Ohio River. Despite these first steps, the
general public still had limited interest in Ohio River stream pollution, which was largely seen as minimal
or intractable (Giglierano 1977).
Elsewhere, other municipal governments were experimenting with ways to minimize organic
waste instead of dumping it directly into local waterways. Many European cities sought to use human
waste as a fertilizer, piping it to special farms on the outskirts of the city, though this technique was not
widely adopted in other contexts (Barles 2012). Other cities altered their waterways in order to increase
the volume of water in a stream, increasing its dilution capacity, such as with the Chicago Drainage
Canal, which the Chicago municipal government built in order to channel water from Lake Michigan into
the Illinois River, increasing the latter’s volume and flushing pollution away from the city. Cities also
covered over their polluted urban waterways, so that these streams essentially became an extension of
the sewer system (Deligne 2012). Finally, sanitary engineers also introduced interceptor sewers as a
means of concentrating the discharge of waste from multiple points and ideally to bring the sewage to
treatment facilities, where it could be rendered less dangerous to public health (Melosi 2008). Research
on different waste treatment options, such as the activated sludge process, advanced throughout the
early twentieth century. Still, overall, there was little commitment to sewage treatment. The bacteriological
or germ theory of disease was “insufficient, in and of itself, to produce a major commitment to treatment,”
(Melosi 2008: 106), especially when reinforced by advocates for diluting sewage in waterways and the
parallel breakthroughs in water works filtration science,.
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These problems were often self-justifying outcomes of a sanitary approach to governance, in that each
new outbreak of disease became evidence of the need for ever-increasing sewage expansion (Joyce
2003).
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Overall, the sanitary city represented a cityscape primarily preoccupied by internal dynamics, with
little interest in the effects of pollution on other urban centers or a natural environment located outside the
city. Instead, in the sanitary city, engineers and the public largely understood the pollution produced by
urban residents as having localized impacts (Melosi 2008). Pollution created in Cincinnati could have
negative impacts within Cincinnati itself, but was unlikely affect other areas. Rivers occupied a unique
position within this viewpoint, given their ability to cross regions and create upstream-downstream
relationships between communities (Harper 2005, Scherer 1990). However, even in terms of stream
pollution, sanitary engineers in the U.S. still largely believed that the water’s capacity to clean itself limited
the impact of pollution to its source city. In a well-known case, the state of Missouri brought a case
against Illinois and the Sanitary District of Chicago, charging that the opening of the Chicago Drainage
Canal in 1900 would bring fecal pollution to the Mississippi River and impact local drinking water. After
years of competing sanitary tests overseen by the litigants, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the case in
1906 because of a lack of evidence, instead citing anecdotes that the water actually appeared to be
cleaner than before due to increased water volume (Paavola 2006). And when cities did end up
constructing sewage treatment plants they were largely intended to have a local effect, since “engineers
understood that segments of many streams could be overloaded with waste material, they did not know
how much waste was necessary to produce such a result, nor did they know how far downstream the
untoward consequences would extend” (Andreen 2003: 167). Later, when it became clearer that sewage
could have negative effects on nearby downstream communities, there was resistance to build treatment
facilities if other upstream cities and towns were not also required to do so, as well as a belief that
downstream communities could resolve the issue by just building their own water filtration systems
(Andreen 2003).

B. Beyond the Sanitary City

The insular nature of the sanitary city proved untenable in the long run, as a number of health
crises related to the water supply forced Ohio Valley residents to grapple with implications of regional
stream pollution, even as they had been told that advances in sanitation engineering had eliminated
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potential threats. Stolz (2014), writing on stream pollution in late nineteenth-century Japan, similarly
shows how the effects of increasing levels of water contamination in the countryside – as seen in mass
fish die-offs, crop failures, and individuals getting sick from chemical poisoning – all contributed to a
growing recognition that waste discharges in “distant mountains and rivers” (7) could have a direct impact
on health outcomes in other areas. Similarly, in Cincinnati, residents encountered the limits to the sanitary
city in the first decades of the twentieth century, as increasing industrial pollution and changing
hydrodynamics in the Ohio River produced a series of new threats to public health, caused by activities in
faraway locations. The technologies and policies of the sanitary city in the US, which relied extensively on
localized water filtration and state health boards, were ill-equipped to deal with these issues. These new
crises forced sanitation engineers in the Ohio Valley to look outside their own cities for alternative
approaches.
As early as 1908, a group of sanitary engineers, politicians, and business leaders from across the
Ohio Valley began to discuss the need for a regional approach to pollution problems, rather than just a
city or state-based one. At their first meeting in Wheeling, WV in May 1909, the group firmly rejected the
reliance on water filtration systems, arguing that, “that the interests of the public health may not be
sufficiently safeguarded by the installation and operation of water purification plants when the source of
supply is a highly sewage polluted water (quoted in OVIA 1935: 25). The group later issued a resolution
stating that:

...we condemn the use of the Ohio River in its present unhealthful condition as a source of public
water supply, and that we recommend to the various municipalities along the Ohio River using the
river as a source of water supply to take immediate measures to discontinue the discharge of
unpurified sewage into the stream… (quoted in OVIA 1935: 25).

Despite two further meetings, one later in 1909 and another in 1911, little resulted from this regional
initiative.
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Recounting this early history of regional sanitation cooperation in 1935, F. H. Waring, the Chief
Engineer of the Ohio State Department of Health, summed up his feelings by stating that it was “Rather
strange, that in 1909 we recognized that we were riding to a fall” (Cincinnati CSP 1935: 8).

139

The issues this group had identified came to head in 1923, when increasing levels of phenolic
acid originating from the production of steel and coke fuel in the Pittsburgh area began to affect drinking
water across the Ohio Valley. Whereas much focus up to that point had been on organic waste, phenolic
acid represented a chemical pollutant that the water works filtration systems in use at the time had no
way of eliminating or reducing. Phenolic acid did not pose an apparent public health concern, but did
cause an unpleasant odor and taste in drinking water that the filtration systems could not mask. A group
of sanitary engineers, most working in their state public health departments, created the Ohio River
Interstate Stream Conservancy Agreement in 1924, an informal arrangement enlisting the U.S. Public
Health Service in seeking a solution to the issue. Through coordinated outreach to industries across the
region, the Ohio River Interstate Stream Conservancy Agreement succeeded in reducing phenolic acid
pollution. State sanitary engineers cooperated with industries to find a profitable reuse for phenol byproducts and reduce the presence of phenol in the Ohio River. After their phenolic acid campaign, the
group continued to meet to exchange information, but took no action on other regional pollutants (Cleary
1967: 23).
In addition to the threat of inorganic industrial pollutants that could travel long distances, the
public perception of pollution in Cincinnati began to change with the completion of the lock-and-dam
system on the Ohio River in 1929. The canalization of the river had important hydrological consequences:
instead of being widely variable and dynamic over the course of the year, the river’s flow became much
slower and deeper, interrupted at numerous points by the navigational dams. Whereas previously regular
spring and autumn flooding had scoured the riverbed, now thick deposits of silt and human waste, called
sludge, accumulated at low velocity sections of the river, particularly near the navigation dams. According
to F. Clark Dugan, Chief Engineer of the Kentucky State Department of Health, speaking to a group of
stream pollution activists in Cincinnati in 1935:

The installation of navigation dams has caused many of the rivers to become a series of pools or
impounded lakes which results in the more rapid settling out of suspended matter with an
increasing growth of microscopic organisms or algae which, in their turn, produce objectionable
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tastes and odors, and in many instances these tastes and odors are beyond the power of the
water filtration plant to eliminate (Cincinnati CSP 1935: 5).

In order to study the effect of the recently completed navigational dam system on the Ohio River,
the U.S. Public Health Service pollution field station in Cincinnati launched a project to monitor the river
during 1929 and 1930. Their results found much higher levels of organic waste compared to the last study
they had done on the river, conducted from 1914 to 1916. As a result of the higher concentration of
sewage, in times of low water, the Ohio River became a place of “unpleasant odors, [with] bubbling gases
of decomposition” (Cincinnati CSP Communication No. 37: 2, Alfred Bettman Papers, Box 14, Folder 25).
Severe droughts in 1930 and 1934 led to gastroenteritis outbreaks affecting thousands of individuals
across the Ohio Valley, causing concern over the quality of drinking water even for communities with
modern water works equipped with the latest filtration technologies. On the other hand, major floods, such
as the flood in 1937, tore up long-accumulating sludge banks, rapidly releasing a heavy waste load.
These spikes in the levels of organic pollution exacerbated numerous flooding crisis, mixing the flood
waters with freshly released contaminants. The Ohio River’s torpid response to the navigational dams in
tandem with increasing levels of waste discharge across the valley were therefore key factors in the
emerging pollution issues during the 1920s and 1930s, a growing concern to many sanitation engineers,
politicians, and business owners in Cincinnati.
Recognizing the regional scale of these issues, new groups formed in Cincinnati to investigate
solutions to stream pollution that would embrace the entire Ohio Valley. To this new wave of waterways
activists, the self-contained sanitary city no longer served as the appropriate frame of reference.
According to Kentucky Chief Engineer F. Clark Dugan, speaking at an early convening of anti-pollution
advocates in Cincinnati, the solution to this new problem could not be achieved “by one city, or one state,
but all the cities and all the states, working together must solve it…” (Cincinnati CSP 1935: 7). In
response, the Cincinnatus Association, the group bringing together one hundred of the most powerful
business leaders in the city to study local issues, established a stream pollution committee that published
six reports during 1935, covering the local and regional pollution impact, public health considerations, and
relevant state regulations. In particular, two reports by Herbert Schroth (who also featured prominently in
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the floodwall debates after the 1937 flood), were widely circulated to cities throughout the Ohio Valley.
Prompted by these reports, the Cincinnati Enquirer ran dozens of editorials about water pollution,
including front-page stories eight days in a row, meant to overlap with the 1935 American Water Works
Association convention being hosted by Cincinnati (Tucker 1967).
The Cincinnati Enquirer’s General Manager, William Wiley, had a particular interest in the issue
and frequently promoted the publication of news articles on the topic. Since Wiley was also President of
the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce (which had also helped found the Ohio Valley Improvement
Association OVIA in 1895), Wiley used that group to organize and host a Cincinnati Committee on Stream
Pollution (CSP) in 1935, bringing together representatives from groups focused on water quality,
recreation, real estate, fishing, industry, urban planning, and numerous other fields. The group elected
Hudson Biery as its first chair, and attempted to frame its work in the context of community clean-ups
often led by women, which sought to improve local morality by first beautifying the physical environment
(Spencer-Wood 2003). According to the organization’s own historical account of its origins, had become
involved in anti-pollution efforts after taking part in a 1934 “Clean-up and Beautify Week” effort organized
by the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce (Cleary 1967). At the committee’s last meeting, the project
coordinator posed a general query about whether anything else needed cleaning up in the city, and Biery
passionately urged the group to tackle the dirty and disgusting Ohio River, setting off hours of debate and
excitement among the group. In this account, Biery’s spontaneous proposal generated so much public
enthusiasm that it sparked the formation of the Cincinnati CSP and led to his role as chairman. Biery
himself presents a more methodical and calculated history of the group’s origin, describing the Cincinnati
CSP as:

a group of interested citizens: it started in the Health Department of the Chamber of Commerce,
rather with the Health Committee of that organization. Two years ago [in 1933] we had brought to
our attention the question of stream pollution. We began to do a little under-cover work, to see
how much public support could be brought together on the solution of the problem. It soon
became apparent that there was great public interest in the subject. We set up a more definite
organization about six months ago…The committee consists of about forty members, including
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sanitary engineers, industrial leaders, railroad men, representatives of large civic associations,
with membership as high as 50,000, Department of Health Officials, recreation officials, an array
of distinguished counsel giving their attention unselfishly, construction engineers, bank officials,
the President of the Real Estate Boards, Life Insurance executives, etc. (National Resources
Committee 1935: 15-16, Bettman Papers, Box 14, Folder 22)

In addition, the Cincinnatus Association and Cincinnati CSP convinced the OVIA to make stream pollution
a special focus for their 1935 convention, bringing further interest to the topic across the region.
The group defined its objectives as seeking to:

A. Promote legislation to control pollution of streams of the Ohio Valley.
B. Encourage the construction of disposal plants.
C. Conduct a general program of education.
D. Coordinate, as far as possible, all local efforts to accomplish these ends.
(Cincinnati CSP 1935: 17)

The Cincinnati CSP under Biery focused on finding local, regional, and national solutions to Ohio River
pollution problems. Their first actions involved correspondence with a number of agencies, sanitation
engineers, and other civic groups across the country to investigate the approaches being taken in other
cities and states. After these preliminary consultations, the group settled on a dual approach, pursuing an
interstate compact incorporating many or all of the states in the Ohio Valley, while also lobbying for
federal legislation to encourage research and financial support for state initiatives (OVIA 1935: 39). The
interstate compact would bind members to standardized pollution controls and enable a coordinated
response regarding interstate streams. It would also preserve state control over pollution enforcement,
rather than shifting responsibility to federal agencies. Since these types of interstate compacts required
approval by the U.S. Congress before they could be negotiated by the states, the Cincinnati CSP pushed
for Congressional authorization to move forward this effort, which they succeeded in getting in June 1936
(Cleary 1967). Despite this progress, the compact itself still had to be negotiated and required enabling
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legislation to be approved by each participating state’s legislature, a daunting task. The Cincinnati CSP
solicited delegates from each of the Ohio Valley states to negotiate the actual treaty, hosting the first
treaty convention in November 1936. Unlike the OVIA conventions, which were more informal multi-day
gatherings featuring parallel social and educational events that women were welcome to take part in,
these treaty conventions were even more male-dominated spaces, largely consisting of practical and
humorless sessions considering the legal and technical aspects of the negotiations. The delegates using
a draft agreement provided by the Cincinnati CSP as a base to start their work. The flood of 1937
temporarily diverted attention from water pollution, but delegate meetings resumed throughout 1938 until
the treaty’s form was finalized by October 1938.
In tandem, the Cincinnati CSP and their allies decided to push for federal legislation that would
support these regional and state-level efforts. According to Biery, members of the presidential
administration told him that, “’At Washington we are a little discouraged about present efforts on
legislation to further these things and if your local committee out in the country can formulate some
definite suggestions that originate in the field, they may have a good chance to go through in
Washington’" (OVIA 1935: 39-40). Working closely with Senator Barkley and Representatives Vinson and
Spence, all from Kentucky, the Cincinnati CSP advanced proposals in the Senate and House that called
for federal stream pollution research and grants to support the construction of treatment facilities (Cleary
1967). This approach would increase federal involvement in pollution control efforts, but in no way
increased federal responsibility or policing powers to regulate stream pollution in any area.
In their efforts to promote an Ohio Valley interstate compact and federal grants for treatment
facilities and pollution research, the Cincinnati CSP came into direct opposition to the Izaak Walton
League, a group of recreational enthusiasts and conservationists who were some of the era’s strongest
critics of stream pollution (Paavola 2006). In 1922, fishermen and other outdoors enthusiasts formed the
Izaak Walton League in Chicago to represent the interests of anglers, including the preservation of wild
land and an end to waterways pollution. Ohioans a established a state office for the organization in 1924,
though the Cincinnati chapter only formed in 1944. Their objectives included:
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...to promote by precept and example the highest standards of sportsmanship in angling; to
increase good fellowship among anglers; to advocate and encourage the use of appropriately
light tackle; to guide and direct the efforts of its members in the endeavor to create public
sentiment for the propagation of game fish in waters appropriate for them, and the proper
conservation of such fish. (Izaak Walton League Constitution, reproduced in Chicago Tribune
Staff 1922: 15)

Izaak Walton activists sought to draw attention to the massive die-offs of fish and other wildlife
affected by pollution, primarily from industrial contamination (Scarpino 1985). From their viewpoint, more
leisure time had the public seeking out new recreational opportunities, but pollution was forcing these
tourists into more and more remote locations to find pristine streams or unspoiled woods. By curbing
pollution, the government would satisfy public demand for healthy recreation, while also providing
financial opportunities in the growing tourism industry.

29

The Izaak Walton League represented a new

wave of more combative recreation advocates compared to the older, more elitist conservation movement
comprised of groups like the National Park Service or National Association of Audubon Societies (Gottlieb
1993).
The Izaak Walton League had first focused its efforts on localized campaigns – with several
notable victories including the creation of the Upper Mississippi River National Wildlife and Fish Refuge –
but a lack of overall progress had them shift to more national efforts, especially under Kenneth Reid, a
Pennsylvania Fish Commissioner who was elected the Izaak Walton League’s national director in 1936
(Casner 1999a). After taking over his family business that produced mining equipment, while also
beginning to take part in anti-stream pollution efforts through the Izaak Walton League, Reid had
increasingly shifted his energies to the latter, leading successful campaigns in West Virginia and
Pennsylvania while moving up in the organization’s management. Under Reid, the Izaak Walton League
staked out an anti-pollution position that differed sharply from the Cincinnati CSP. While the latter pushed
for federal legislation that preserved the police power of individual states to regulate pollution, the Izaak
Walton League wanted complete federal control over water pollution and the power to regulate all waste
29

Studies in Wisconsin and Minnesota, where the Izaak Walton League had a strong base, were among
the first to attempt to calculate the economic impact of pollution on recreationist tourism (NRB 1935).
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discharges (Casner 1999a). Working closely with Senator Augustine Lonergan from Connecticut and later
Representative Karl Mundt from South Dakota, the Izaak Walton League argued that the states had
already had the opportunity to regulate pollution for a long time and had produced inadequate results.
And while the Cincinnati CSP pursued water quality standards that still permitted some waste discharges
into waterways – maintaining a much diminished role for the natural dilution of pollutants – the Izaak
Walton League wanted complete sewage treatment throughout the country, with no pollution discharges
of any kind permitted without treatment (Paavola 2006).
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s these two groups promoted their competing proposals for
federal legislation, each pushing their vision in Congress and in newspapers across the country. At the
crux of their disagreement was the role of industrial polluters and the capacity of state and interstate
groups to control pollution. Both sides agreed that industry had long sought to prevent any kind of
effective regulation of pollution, expertly operating in the interstices between state and federal
government to preserve weak oversight. An Izaak Walton League officer in Pennsylvania described the
situation from his experience:

During the 1935 session of our [Pennsylvania] legislature, a manufacturer’s representative
appeared at a committee hearing and said in effect: “We are in sympathy with the lofty purpose of
this bill, but its adoption would place Pennsylvania industry at an unfair competitive disadvantage.
If drastic pollution legislation is to be fair, it must be national in scope to provide for uniformity.”
This argument helped defeat pending legislation of that time, but there was an interesting sequel.
This same individual checked his bags and appeared at a later hearing before the Commerce
Committee of the United State Senate and said, in effect: ‘\”We are in sympathy with the lofty
purpose of this proposed legislation, but it is just none of the business of the federal government
how Pennsylvania conducts its pollution problem.” (Platt 1936, quoted in Cleary 1967)

As a result, stream pollution critics portrayed state laws as a mishmash of regulatory exemptions and
loopholes. In the case of Cincinnati, the Ohio Legislature had passed the Bense Act in 1908, regulating
sewage discharge in the state and requiring most cities to begin planning for sewage treatment plants.
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Yet, the legislators exempted communities whose sewers emptied into interstate streams, such as
Cincinnati along the Ohio River. This exception was intended to prevent more relaxed regulations in a
neighboring state, like Kentucky, from creating a competitive disadvantage for communities in Ohio.
Legislators also emphasized the fact that if cities located upstream, like Pittsburgh, did not treat their
sewage, then Ohio had little incentive to institute changes that benefited downstream communities
(Cleary 1967). While Dayton, Columbus, and other interior cities began to consider treatment facilities,
Cincinnati did nothing to limit the amount of sewage dumped into the Ohio River. According to the Izaak
Walton League, these kinds of exemptions were proof that states were too invested in their own industrial
growth to effectively regulate pollution, and only the federal government would be able to undertake the
disinterested enforcement necessary (Paavola 2006). From Reid’s perspective:

...regulations had met with subterfuge from industrial interests, creating an endless round of
debate and pointless investigations. Recognizing the economic interests of individual states and
the competition between the states for industry as the fundamental roadblock to local pollution
reform, [Reid] argued for federal jurisdiction on the grounds ‘it eliminates this competitive
disadvantage’ (Casner 1999a: 542).

The Cincinnati CSP countered that their proposal for an interstate compact remedied these issues,
without the necessity of adding another layer of federal bureaucracy. According to Biery:

Most people believe federal control in this country has gone far enough and that some powers
should be retained by the states. More can be accomplished through cooperation that through
coercion...Some people want the federal government to do everything for them and we have had
a rapid extension of federal control in the past few years. We do not want the federal government
to change our linen and clean our back yards. (Biery 1940: 8).

After ratification by each of the state legislatures involved, the interstate compact would
standardize regulations across the region, as well as providing interstate police power to take action
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against polluters who failed to meet enforcement standards. In this way, the compact would finally resolve
the issue of interstate pollution. Previously, if a factory in Cincinnati discharged phenolic by-products into
the Ohio River, the Ohio health board would not be able to regulate this waste, since it was being sent
into Kentucky territory, which contains all of the Ohio River to its low-water mark, while the Kentucky
health board had no jurisdiction to bring action against an industry located in Ohio (Cincinnati CSP 1935:
10).

30

In addition, differing regulations across state lines discouraged the enforcement of any sewage

treatment requirements, either officially, as with the Bense Act in Ohio, or through a lack of effective
policing, despite legal requirements. Even the Ohio River Interstate Stream Conservancy Agreement,
which state sanitation boards had formed to reduce phenol pollution back in 1924, still had to rely on the
goodwill of industry and local governments for interstate issues, since it was only an informal
arrangement to coordinate efforts at the state level rather than a binding agreement (OVIA 1935: 27). The
Cincinnati CSP argued that a formal interstate compact be more effective by operating through existing
bodies that understood the context better and could work with local actors to improve sewage treatment
standards (Cleary 1967). Under the interstate compact, the Ohio River and other streams that acted as
state borders, like the Wabash River, as well as streams that began in one state but passed through at
least one other, such as the Monongahela River (running from West Virginia into Pennsylvania) would all
be under common jurisdiction.
From the Izaak Walton League’s perspective, Reid argued that interstate compacts would “suffer
from the same economic pressures to prevent enforcement” (Casner 1999a: 544) that already plagued
pollution control by the states. To him, the Ohio Valley interstate compact was just a more formalized
version of the informal agreements across the region that saw state health boards, industry, and
municipal officials across the region prioritize economic growth while only slowly working to mitigate
pollution levels. Labeled by Kehoe (1997) as “cooperative pragmatism” this approach focused on doing
30

The issue of how much of the Ohio River pertains to Kentucky is an interesting example of the shifting
legal, geophysical, and social dynamics that depend on the interrelated behavior of the Ohio River,
technology, and human actors in the area. The cartographic creation of Kentucky utilized the Ohio River
as the area’s northern boundary, later determined to be at the river’s northern low-water mark by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1820. Yet, with the creation of the lock and dam system for navigation on the Ohio
River, this fundamentally altered the river’s low-water mark. A subsequent court decision required the use
of the 1792 low-water mark (when Kentucky achieved statehood), which was estimated by the U.S.
Geological Survey using historical information. So as a result, the present northern Kentucky border is
now measured at a historical low-water mark that has little connection to the Ohio River’s actual low-water
mark as of today (Staff of the Indiana Magazine of History 2011).
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just enough to keep major pollution crises from occurring, while still enabling industry to focus most of
their energies on profitability. According to Reid, “In theory compacts sound fine; in practice they just don't
materialize, but as a legal means of putting off the day of reckoning in pollution control, the interstate
compact probably has no equal...” (Reid 1945: 1, quoted in Paavola 2006). In particular, the Izaak Walton
League decried the Cincinnati CSP’s proposal to form industrial committees for each sector. Comprised
of industrial actors, these committees would help establish regulations for the discharge of the inorganic
pollutants that characterized each of their own sectors, a clear conflict of interest to those calling for
technical standards determined by unbiased scientists employed by federal agencies (Paavola 2006).
Reid argued that by the time any positive effects would come from the interstate compact approach, “you
and I may have long white whiskers and be drinking water imported water from Canada’” (Reid 1945,
quoted in Casner 1999a: 544).
After the Cincinnati CSP successfully lobbied the U.S. Congress for permission to establish an
interstate compact for the region in 1936 and treaty delegates from each of the states negotiated a final
draft in 1938, state legislatures in the Ohio Valley region then began considering adoption of the treaty
over the following years, although WWII pushed water pollution concerns into the background, since most
government officials viewed water pollution control measures as irrelevant constraints in the face of the
country’s military-industrial needs. Despite this setback, the Cincinnati CSP kept pushing the issue in the
background and states slowing began adopting the enabling legislation for the interstate compact treaty.
By December 1944, the delegates reconvened to consider the results of an exhaustive study on Ohio
Valley pollution conducted over 1941 and 1942 by the U.S. Public Health Service and U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, as well as to pressure the remaining non-signatories, Pennsylvania and Virginia, to join the
compact. The convention, hosted in Pittsburgh, succeeded in getting Pennsylvania to take up and pass
enabling legislation in April 1945 (ORSANCO 1949b). The last hold-out was Virginia, which West Virginia
had stipulated must join before it would make its own participation final. Virginia’s legislature eventually
indicated it was willing to join the compact, but still needed to organize a pollution-control board before
ratification, since the compact listed this as a prerequisite to joining, delaying the process further (Dixon &
Thompson 1955).
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In parallel, the Cincinnati CSP and their allies advanced their pollution bill in the U.S. Congress,
which restricted the federal government’s role in pollution control to research and providing grants or
loans, reserving enforcement powers for the states. President Roosevelt proved ambiguous about the
measure, though his capacity to shape domestic water policy was already waning by the late 1930s as
fewer New Deal Democrats were re-elected (Shanley 1988). Yet, the Cincinnati CSP-backed bill
introduced by Senator Barkley had a list of powerful supporters from both technical and industrial
backgrounds, including “state Departments of Public Health, the American Public Health Association, the
Surgeon General, the Head of the U.S. Public Health Service, and the Water Planning Committee of the
National Resources Committee...the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce (and a number of local and state affiliates), the American Coal Association, the American
Mining Congress, the Association of Independent Petroleum Producers, and representatives of the pulp
and paper industries” (Shanley 1988: 324-325). The Cincinnati CSP proposal was also supported by
influential water experts like Abel Wolman, a well-known scientist and sanitary engineer from Maryland
who was increasingly criticized among conservationists as an apologist for industrial polluters (Ross and
Amter 2010: 101). The U.S. Congress eventually approved the Cincinnati CSP’s federal pollution bill in
1938, but President Roosevelt then vetoed it based on a budgetary concern (Cincinnati CSP
Communication No. 37: 4, Alfred Bettman Papers, Box 14, Folder 25) and because it failed to support his
recently created National Resources Committee (Welky 2011: 278). Much like negotiations for the Ohio
Valley compact, federal water pollution legislation would not gain traction again until after the war.
As war production slowed down, Biery and Reid continued to push their respective positions with
the U.S. Congress. In 1947, Reid reported to his conservation and wildlife peers that, for “10 years, that
cat-and-dog fight has gone on,” but that he and Biery were finally working on a compromise bill (North
American Wildlife Conference 1947: 149-150). However, even though the Izaak Walton League had
continued to grow in popularity after the war as more recreational opportunities became available for
citizens, pro-business forces gaining ascendency in the U.S. capitol building doomed these compromise
efforts, insisting on economic growth as the number one priority of the country after years of recession
and war (Ross and Amter 2010). On June 30, 1948, the U.S. Congress passed its first Federal Water
Pollution Control Act. “Mirroring the Barkley bill of 1936, it explicitly reaffirmed state primacy in water
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pollution control and created no real federal enforcement authority” (Ross and Amter 2010: 106). The bill
was introduced by Senators Barkley and Taft (one of the earliest members of the Cincinnati CSP) and
Representatives Elston and Spence, all from Ohio or Kentucky. In recognition of his key role in the
process, President Truman gave the pen used to sign the legislation into law to Biery (Cincinnati Enquirer
Staff 1948c). On that same day, the Governors of Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia all met in Cincinnati to sign the Ohio Valley interstate compact
treaty, forming the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission (ORSANCO).
A number of studies have portrayed these efforts as a pollution control dead-end, with interstate
compacts like ORSANCO and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act effectively forestalling any real
progress until the environmental movement achieved actual breakthroughs in the 1970s (Colten and
Skinner 1995, Ross and Amter 2010, Paavola 2006, Kehoe 1997, see also Brooks 2009 who returns to
this mid-century period for the roots of the later environmental movement). Largely glossing over the role
of the Cincinnati CSP and other organizations that brought together sanitation engineers and water users,
in their discussions they treat interstate compacts and the federal legislation these groups supported as
primarily an alliance of industrial polluters trying to prevent effective regulation with state sanitation
agencies eager to avoid further extension of federal jurisdiction. In many ways, these analyses are
accurate, capturing the economic and political arguments that were used to justify these projects. Yet, in
taking a non-linear view of pollution control, one that does not privilege an overarching narrative of a
move from polluted to healthy, but rather focuses on how understandings of pollution and cleanliness
changed over time, it is equally important to evaluate the goals of the nascent ORSANCO organization
and the ways that its activities reconfigured the perceived impacts of pollution, both in terms of municipal
and industrial waste. Under ORSANCO, the percentage of households receiving sewage treatment went
from 1% to 97% between 1948 and 1963 in Ohio Valley (Paavola 2006), impacting millions of residents’
sanitation concepts (as well as their utility bills). In terms of industrial pollution, the way the business
community perceived the impact of pollution also shifted dramatically through an engagement with the
Cincinnati CSP and ORSANCO. Overall, it is clear that the Cincinnati CSP and ORSANCO did have a
major effect in terms of changing perceptions throughout the Ohio Valley about the need for clean water.
In the following sections, I examine the strategies the Cincinnati CSP and ORSANCO used to be
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successful, the impacts their activities had on local understandings of pollution, and how these changes
shaped the context of the subsequently emerging environmental movement as well as efforts to
redevelop the Cincinnati riverfront.

C. Pollution Publicity in the Ohio Valley

Situated in the relatively understudied period between bacteriological reform and the rise of the
environmental movement (Melosi 2008), both the Izaak Walton League and Cincinnati CSP emerged in a
period where the inadequacies of the sanitary city began to be exposed. In response, both of these
groups called for increased recognition that water pollution problems impacted areas far larger than just
the city where they originated. In the Ohio Valley, the phenolic crisis of 1924, the drought-related
gastroenteritis outbreaks of 1930 and 1934, and growing awareness of the impact of acid mine drainage
had underlined the importance of this perspective. But the transition from the sanitary city to a regional
understanding of pollution was not a straightforward process, since acid mine drainage or drought
conditions did not automatically produce new understandings of how pollution worked in the cities
affected. Rather, these stream activists had to search for new ways to identify and convey to the public
the effects of pollution. They also had to expand the spatial boundaries of what pollution control looked
like. Much as Stolz (2014) documents in late nineteenth-century Japan, this transition is not just about the
fact that levels of stream pollution were rising, but also about having to reorient public understanding of
how pollution functions and where it could come from. To get their messages across, both the Izaak
Walton League and Cincinnati CSP realized that public relations would be a core component of their
work, and they developed novel publicity strategies that enabled them motivate large populations to
change their perspectives on pollution.
The leaders of the Izaak Walton League placed advertising expertise at the center of its mission
from the beginning. From the group’s inaugural fifty-four members in 1922, “twelve worked in advertising
or sales, the largest single Occupational group represented” (Scarpino 1985: 119). Moreover, Will Dilg,
the founder and first director of the organization, utilized his background as an advertising executive to
develop an ambitious plan to rapidly grow the organization and mobilize a massive national membership
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base. Dilg oversaw a messaging campaign that drove home a crisis of nature confronting the U.S.,
delivered in a blitz of public events and through the launch of the group’s attractive member magazine
Outdoor America. Roving Izaak Walton League organizers spread this message, targeting both men and
women, to establish new chapters in cities across the country (Scarpino 1985). By 1927, the group had
already grown enormously to 200,000 members, with 2,900 chapters, becoming the country’s first mass
membership conservation group (Paavola 2006). While Dilg and later directors like Kenneth Reid were
strident in their attacks on polluters, they also had to be mindful, since “many members worked for
industrial interests, this meant avoiding positions that seemed too economically threatening” (Casner
1999a: 540). Many Cincinnati CSP and ORSANCO members saw these recreation-driven anti-pollution
advocates as still calling for unrealistic and radical levels of sewage treatment – though Biery and others
admired the effectiveness of the Izaak Walton League’s publicity campaigns (Conference of Delegates
Appointed by Governors of Ohio Valley States 1944: 8).
The Izaak Walton League has received significant attention for its innovative use of modern
advertising techniques to achieve phenomenal growth in its first five years, but little critical attention has
focused on the strategies developed by the Cincinnati CSP and ORSANCO for the Ohio Valley. The first
chairman of both the Cincinnati CSP and ORSANCO, Hudson Biery, was central in helping to shift
perceptions of public responsibility for pollution, popularizing new understandings of pollution’s role and
its impact in the Ohio Valley. By the time he became involved in stream pollution issues, Biery had
already built a successful career as the public relations director for the Cincinnati Street Railway
Company, and his writings on advertising techniques were published extensively in the trade literature.
His articles focused on topics like the effectiveness of visual language, which should ideally communicate
with the “flash, the strength, and the simplicity of the sunflower” (Biery 1930: 69), and on the fact that
messaging was often more important than the facts, arguing that “many of the most widely used products
on the market are sold, not on their intrinsic merits, but by dint of persistent and well phrased advertising”
(Biery 1932: 1108). Responsible for both paid advertisements and public service announcements on the
Cincinnati Street Railway cars, he also recognized that the most important goal of publicity efforts was
“the binding of public good will” (Biery 1930: 69). From the beginning, he drew on this advertising
background to guide the Cincinnati CSP’s work.
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While public relations had already been an important consideration in the creation of sewage
infrastructure by the time Biery became involved with the Cincinnati CSP, it had primarily focused on
projecting the modernity and cleanliness of treatment facilities and water works, in order to overcome
community concerns around odors or other effects (Murphy 1932, Radebaugh 1933). Instead, Biery set
out to reshape public understandings of pollution hazards using his advertising expertise. In doing so, he
brought his own shock tactics to the effort, outstripping even the Izaak Walton League’s dire language
with his choice of words. Utilizing graphic bacteriological examples, he aggressively sought to change the
narrative on dilution as an acceptable means of managing sewage, while also showing that pollution had
wider impacts than previously thought. One of his favorite slogans – “Let’s take the dead horses out of the
river!” – brought these points home concisely. Drawing on Public Health Service data, he would follow up
this rallying cry by explaining that approximately 450 tons of human excrement were dumped into the
Cincinnati section of the river every day, or the equivalent to “dropping a dead horse into the Ohio River
every two minutes, night and day, year in and year out” (Cincinnati CSP Communication No. 37: 3, Alfred
Bettman Papers, Box 14, Folder 25). His tactics were designed to shock and horrify audiences who
lacked a clear picture of how the water supply system worked, peppering his speeches with comments
like: “It is barbaric to drink our own bodily wastes even if we do salve our self respect with scientific
filtration and chlorination” (5). After an interview for local AM radio station WLW in 1938, a high-wattage
signal reaching audiences across much of the eastern U.S., the censors felt forced to edit the broadcast
considerably, fearing “a wave of public hysteria if all the harrowing details were known” (Biery 1940: 11).
Once launched in 1948, ORSANCO served as a platform to further spread this message among
communities in the Ohio Valley. Fine-tuned by Biery’s public relations background, ORSANCO developed
a state-of-the-art strategy for motivating cities and towns in Ohio Valley to construct their own sewage
treatment facilities. While Biery continued as ORSANCO’s first chairman, Edward Cleary, the first
ORSANCO Director, sought to perfect the organization as a vehicle for “the art of communication,”
making a case for improvements built on “emotional appeal” (Cleary 1967: 95). According to an early
ORSANCO annual report, the organization had adopted “the philosophy that persuasion with facts rather
than compulsion by law was a speedier way to gain its objectives” (ORSANCO 1951: 3). In one key
event, ORSANCO treated the October 1953 opening of Cincinnati’s Little Miami River sewage treatment
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plant as a major promotional opportunity, with the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce subsidizing
attendance by mayors from close to 100 towns from across the Ohio Valley. At this “Clean Water Rally”
accompanying the opening of the Cincinnati plant, each mayor was given a gold-plated shovel to break
ground on facilities in their own communities (Cleary 1967).
In addition, ORSANCO developed two distinct types of publicity campaign to encourage support
for sewage treatment: first, what they termed a “buck-shot” campaign targeting the general public across
the Ohio Valley, and second, a “rifle-shot” campaign intended to encourage a specific municipality to pass
bond measures that would enable the construction of sewage treatment facilities (Cleary 1967). The
former included publications, films, interviews, speeches, and exhibits developed for a regional audience.
ORSANCO intended to saturate the entire Ohio Valley with information to increase public awareness of
pollution issues, tackling “the problem of education – the development of understanding and a sense of
common responsibility for the preservation of water resources” (ORSANCO 1950: 6). The “rifle-shot”
campaigns involved ORSANCO’s support for the passage of specific sewage treatment plant bond issues
in municipalities around the Ohio Valley. ORSANCO worked with local organizations like women’s garden
clubs, fishing and hunting conservation societies, and civic service groups to develop and implement a
campaign strategy, as well as sending staff representatives and all the collateral materials needed to
support passage of their bond issue, including “fact sheets, speech outlines, suggested proclamations
and resolutions, news releases, program outlines for radio and television presentations, slogan cards and
other aids” (ORSANCO 1951: 17). Overall, ORSANCO was ready to provide any interested group a
complete ready-made campaign kit to support the construction of sewage treatment plants in their
hometown.
Throughout these advertising efforts, ORSANCO sought to constitute the entire Ohio River basin
as a regional community brought together by experiences of pollution. Biery focused on common waste
practices across the region, expressing disgust that, “All the cities along the river empty their sewers into
the stream without any treatment. Cincinnati is just as guilty of this filthy practice as Pittsburgh or
Wheeling or Louisville and the rest of the cities” (Biery 1940: 11). Under ORSANCO, the focus was on the
unique scale of pollution in the heavily populated area, “Nowhere has community growth and industrial
expansion brought a greater foulness to streams than in the Ohio Valley” (ORSANCO 1950: 5). Studies
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going back to Durkheim (1995 [1912]) and Mary Douglas’ Purity and Danger (1966) have emphasized
pollution’s central role in creating and sustaining community. The defining of people, things, or groups as
polluted has been fundamental to “placing boundaries” (Douglas 1966: 68) in order to delimit the inside
and outside of a community. The Cincinnati CSP and ORSANCO under Biery continued to emphasize
pollution’s role in defining community, but proposed that, rather than the limits of the sanitary city, the
natural divisions of the Ohio River river basin were the actual boundaries that mattered. This is clear in
the organization of ORSANCO to embrace the entire Ohio River Valley. Earlier interstate compacts had
focused on smaller areas, such as with the NY-CT-NJ interstate pollution compact, which was authorized
by the U.S. Congress in 1935 to address ocean pollution, particularly to protect water quality for area
beach goers. Whereas the NY-CT-NJ compact was still essentially a city-specific accord embracing a tristate metropolitan region, ORSANCO made the whole river basin fundamental to its work.
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Across the U.S. and Europe in the first decades of the twentieth century, the river basin had
gained popularity as a scientifically-defined region for the technocratic administration of different aspects
of water, including flooding, irrigation, or hydropower (Molle 2009, Cioc 2002). Despite this, pollution
control remained stubbornly resistant to appeals for watershed-based governance. In part this was due to
the resistance from industrialists, who saw advantages in maintaining patchwork regulations across
municipalities and states (Molle 2009, Cleary 1967). In addition, many scientists, bureaucrats, and
members of the general public continued to believe in the first decades of the twentieth century that
pollution’s effects were localized, restricted to the local city or town. The strength of this resistance to
adapting a river-basin approach to the problems in the U.S. is clearly seen from the example of the
Tennessee Valley Authority. It represented the most-advanced and comprehensive vision of technocratic
river-basin administration current in the U.S. at the beginning of 1930s (Scott 1998), but did not include
pollution control among its objectives when the federal government constituted its mandate (Molle 2009).
Rather than making a purely scientific argument for the their plan though, the Cincinnati CSP
overcame doubts among industry and the general public about a river-basin administrative structure by
arguing that the Ohio River basin should be regarded as a community constituted by pollution, what I term
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The efforts by the Cincinnati CSP and ORSANCO to create a polluted community based on the river
basin had important parallels to the Izaak Walton League’s activities, in that they both wanted to expand
understandings of pollution out from the city to embrace larger areas.
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here a polluted public. The shared act of discharging waste into the Ohio River and its tributaries defined
the boundaries of this group. At the first meeting of the delegates to negotiate the ORSANCO treaty in
November 1936, the group elected William Wiley, the President of the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce
as chair of the convening. In his opening remarks he described how:

There are living in this basin approximately 20,000,000 people. If you stop to think of the about
the amount of human excrement that goes into our streams in the form of sewage and waste from
about 8,000,000 of the people, it is shuddering to contemplate...The problem is so great that no
city, no state alone can undertake it (Conference of Delegates Appointed by Governors of Ohio
Valley States 1936: 4).

This argument for the importance of a river-basin approach to pollution control fit naturally within a
growing focus in 1930s planning circles on “regionalism,” the belief that the “region should become a unit
for action: planning would be an antidote against market failure, achieve development, and drag the
country out of the Great Depression” (Molle 2009: 487). Alfred Bettman, the chair of the Cincinnati City
Planning Commission, along with fellow planner Ladislas Segoe, both pioneers in the planning field, lent
their support to the Cincinnati CSP’s work, arguing that the Ohio Valley river basin was an important
planning unit for water pollution control and a range of other issues. According to Segoe, “the people in
the Valley are alive to their interdependence and to the need of regional collaboration in the solution of
some of their most important problems” (Segoe 1937: 31). At the same time, this was largely a new
identity that the Cincinnati CSP, Bettman, and others were trying to craft in the Ohio Valley. As Alley
(2002) describes for the Ganges River Valley, the creation of a “wastescape” in that area was facilitated
(and complicated) by centuries of religious symbolism that had portrayed the river basin as an living entity
connecting anyone bathing in its sacred waters (see also Rademacher 2011 for a similar context in
Nepal). While the Ohio River had been an important economic, legal, and cultural corridor since before its
appropriation by the U.S., there was little recognition that the river represented a common thread linking
residents in the area, particularly after the decline of steamboat transportation in the nineteenth century.
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As the Cincinnati CSP sought to mobilize the public to support their river basin approach, their
most effective tactic was often through demonstrating that pollution traveled great distances while
retaining its potential to have negative impacts. According to the Cincinnati CSP, the movement of
polluted materials made connections stretching across hundreds of miles, among many people who
would have rarely thought their daily lives intersected. Biery was in particular fond of these examples,
describing how “Under [cold] conditions like this when the [Ohio] River is well refrigerated the raw sewage
from Pittsburgh is carried downstream along with the ice and the ice cold water, almost as good as new”
(Biery 1940: 3). Or another of Biery’s favorite campaign phrases drew particular attention to the
movement of pollution, as he facetiously complained that Cincinnatians "don’t want to be reminded every
time asparagus is served for supper in Pittsburgh” (Tucker 1967: 185).
The Cincinnati CSP and their allies also sought to show that that pollutants could be traced back
to their origins, even if it was only in generic terms. When a public health official in Louisville declared that
the city’s typhoid germs might as well have “Made in Cincinnati” written on them (Cleary 1967: 36) or
when Biery made his asparagus quip, they showed how, via increased sanitation monitoring, the source
of organic and chemical pollutants could be deciphered across long distances. Many individuals across
the Ohio Valley found this argument compelling in making sense of their own experiences. A journalist
who also served as a Chamber of Commerce executive in Marietta, Ohio spoke of his conversion to
basin-wide pollution reform in terms of this spatial connectivity. The residents of Marietta, on the banks of
the Ohio River, were disturbed to learn that calcium chloride discharged from one factory in Barberton,
Ohio, close to Akron, was clogging up their wells and making it more difficult to tap into their groundwater:
“It was here that the eye-popping fact began to emerge…it is more than 200 miles from Barberton to
Marietta. Yet, throughout this entire distance the waste material from this one factory has created for
many municipalities and industries a problem...” (Dixon & Thompson 1955: 61).
ORSANCO’s messaging highlighted many such linkages across the Ohio Valley, urging cities and
towns to understand themselves as part of one community, linked by experiences of pollution. Across
these campaigns, the primary focus was an appeal to “a sense of common responsibility” (ORSANCO
1950: 6), a theme which reappears repeatedly in ORSANCO’s early annual reports. ORSANCO’s
approach relied on urging individuals, municipalities, and businesses to understand that their waste
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discharges had effects on downstream communities and recognizing themselves as potential polluters,
defining their work as “the creation of public awareness and the acceptance of a common responsibility in
arresting the degradation of water resources" (ORSANCO 1951: 5). This “responsibility” argument hinged
on both this widespread sense of community and a perceived legibility of pollution itself, with the belief
that, if Ohio Valley residents and industries could be brought to recognize that their waste discharge
would affect their neighbors along the river – and the understanding that these neighbors would know
where this pollution had come from – it would make them more likely to support pollution control efforts.
Thus, the materiality and (downstream) circulation of pollutants enabled Ohio Valley residents
and industries to perceive a shared space of interaction defined by the Ohio River watershed. In this
sense, Biery and later ORSANCO positioned the Ohio Valley river basin as the obvious context for a new
set of relationships based on the movements of organic and inorganic pollution. Shapiro and Kirksey have
referred to these types of relationships, which are intimately connected to biological and chemical
processes, as biosocial and chemosocial, referring to the “social relationships that emerge from biological
[and chemical] conditions and the science and technology through which they are known” (Shapiro and
Kirksey 2017: 484, see also Rabinow 1996). The Cincinnati CSP and ORSANCO worked with the
increasing levels of pollution in the Ohio River, as seen in incidents like the phenolic acid issue in 1924 or
gastroenteritis outbreaks of 1930 and 1934, to cultivate a new polluted public across the Ohio River.
Through their joint efforts, the sanitation engineers, business leaders, recreationists, and politicians that
made up the Cincinnati CSP brought together cutting-edge scientific understanding and advertising
expertise to make this community real for Ohio Valley residents, creating linkages through waste that they
had not considered previously. Even if in practice the limited and unidirectional communicative capacity of
stream pollution fell far short of fostering a public sphere based on discussion (Habermas 1989), through
their messaging, the Cincinnati CSP and ORSANCO were able to effectively harness this image of a
polluted Ohio Valley to cultivate a “realm of embodied and quotidian copresence” (Chalfin 2014: 101).
Much as Chalfin highlights for public toilets in the Ghanaian town of Tema, in its circulation and effects,
waste became the basis for a physically-derived public sphere.

D. Bringing Industry into the Polluted Public
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Much historical analysis has focused on how industrial actors secured a major victory for their
interests by working with state health boards and sanitation experts to develop this river-basin approach
to pollution control (Colten and Skinner 1995, Ross and Amter 2010, Kehoe 1997). In this view,
ORSANCO’s interstate compact exemplified these shortcomings, since for chemical pollution control
efforts, it depended on industrial pollution committees comprised of factory representatives in each sector
to set the standards and policies for their own area. ORSANCO formed numerous special committees on
topics steel production, distilleries, and chemical salts (ORSANCO 1952). At the national level, industry
sought to circumvent stringent pollution control by framing its opposition as “a question of efficient
utilization of water resources. Waste disposal was a legitimate use entitled to share the waters with other
uses such as water supply, power, transportation, and recreation” (Ross and Amter 2010: 102). Industrial
lobbying groups also employed a communications strategy emphasizing that any “drastic” pollution
control changes would have a negative effect on the economy, since they believed sudden cost burdens
placed on industry would drive many factories out of business (Ross and Amter 2010). For industrial
interests, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 and the formation of ORSANCO certainly
represented a net win. The largely toothless Federal Water Pollution Control Act preempted national
regulations that would have been imposed by distant technocratic functionaries less interested in
responding to industrialists’ needs (Colten and Skinner 1995). In the Ohio Valley, by instead working with
local sanitation technicians on ORSANCO’s industrial waste committees, businesses could be active
participants in setting their own water quality standards and determining what chemicals would be
considered toxic.
However, this analysis misses an important component of the Cincinnati CSP’s approach, one
that both helped legitimize the techno-industrial alliance at the heart of ORSANCO and had important
consequences for how businesses and developers viewed the relationship between pollution and
economic potential in the Ohio Valley. Namely, the communications strategy developed by Biery, and
later ORSANCO, stressed that stream pollution affected industrial users as much as the rest of the
polluted public, and that cleaning up stream pollution provided not just a boon to public health, but also an
economic benefit:
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Degradation of water quality by pollution is not simply an offense against social decency. In the
Ohio valley, at least, pollution abatement is a dollars-and-cents investment in survival. If water is
foul, people still must drink it and take the consequences. And industries, most of whom require
vast quantities of water, can turn to no substitute material (ORSANCO 1950: 6)

Whereas the Izaak Walton League almost exclusively focused on the negative effects that
industrial pollution had on nature, the Cincinnati CSP and ORSANCO repeatedly chose to highlight the
ways that industry itself was adversely impacted by pollution. Before a Congressional committee, Biery
was careful to clarify that “water supplies, both domestic and industrial, suffer from the effects of these
polluting substances…” (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1948a), while elsewhere stating that pollution was
“harming public health, handicapping industry, and destroying recreational assets of our nation” (Biery
n.d.). Seen from this perspective, rather than just being a polluter, industry could join the ranks of the
Ohio River basin’s polluted public, because just like everyone else, industry needed clean water, “and
polluted streams cannot furnish the quality of water that industry must have” (ORSANCO 1950: 7).
Casner (1999b) has detailed in depth the social and legal roots of this growing belief that pollution
affected industry in the Ohio Valley, which gained traction in the region from experiences with the
extremely acidic water leaking from active and abandoned Appalachian mines. These waterways polluted
by mines would rapidly corrode any metal equipment that came in regular contact with the river water,
such as pumps or barge hulls. Acid mine drainage particularly affected railroads since they needed
massive amounts of water to run their steam-powered trains, and acidic water generated continuous
damage to engine boilers. By 1927, the Pennsylvania Railroad had invested $30 million in a water
delivery system including 36 reservoirs and 441 miles of pipe to ensure the availability of clean water
along their rail lines (Casner 1999b: 183). When coal mining efforts threatened an important reservoir in
the Pennsylvania Railroad’s water supply system, they successfully sued these nearby mining
companies, forcing them to prevent acid mine water from leaking into the water supply. This decision
overturned decades of Pennsylvania precedent establishing the right of mines to produce acidic waste,
which had been based on the view that – despite any threat posed to public health by acid pollution –
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continued coal mining represented the greatest contribution to the public good because of its
contributions to local employment and the economy. As a result of the Pennsylvania Railroad v.
Sagamore Coal Co. et al case, the Pennsylvania legal system reversed this decision in 1922, overturning
coal mining’s privileged position. According to Casner, this landmark case represented an early
“recognition that industry itself suffered from the consequences of contaminated water” (Casner 1999b:
197). This change can be regarded as an important step in moving from the opinion that pollution was an
inevitable byproduct of industrial productivity to instead actually seeing it as a potential menace to
economic growth. Still, despite these experiences with acid mine drainage, the Pennsylvania Railroad
case failed to generate a widespread belief among industrialists that pollution represented a threat to their
activities or the massive water supplies that they needed to run their operations (Casner 1999b).
Biery knew that changing the perceptions of industrialists would be challenging, but believed that
they just needed to be educated in order to embrace anti-pollution efforts. Building on conservationist
arguments about efficiency and waste (Hays 1959), Biery made convincing industrialists a major focus of
the Cincinnati CSP’s work, arguing that the group had to first “educate them and start a program that over
a period of years can be worked out” (OVIA 1935: 42). In addition to this belief that industry polluted
because they had not been educated about the harmful effects of pollution on their operations, Biery was
a big proponent of industrial firms being taught to find profitable alternate uses for their own polluting
discharges, arguing that reuse of many by-products could be worked out through encouraging new lines
of thinking:

I know what can be done in education. I remember it was only a few years ago that if you walked
behind any of the canning factories in southern Indiana you would find a beautiful crimson stream
of tomato juice flowing into the nearest creek or the nearest river, possibly a foot deep and four or
five feet wide. If you had passed a law forbidding the companies to dump that stuff into the
streams you would have put them out of business. That is not what you did. Some scientist
explained to those fellows that people ought to drink tomato juice. You drank it for breakfast and
liked it. They do not dump that stuff into the streams now. They are producing tomato juice and
working the rest of it up into catsup. I do not know if you can reclaim any of the sulphuric acid that
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comes out of the mines, but through this process of live and let live, and calm analysis, I think this
whole difficulty can be licked. (OVIA 1935: 42)

32

Progress was slow in getting these points across, with Biery explaining in 1939 that “two years of
intensive cultivation” of industry had only led to an uneasy truce regarding possible pollution regulations
(Biery 1939: 28). Even after the launch of ORSANCO, the group’s Second Annual Report stated that,
“Taken as a whole, industry has been tardy in grasping the significance of pollution abatement efforts.
Part of this points up the fact that management has lost sight of the basic importance of water in
production operations” (ORSANCO 1950: 34).
After World War II, a partnership with General Electric (GE) helped provide additional impetus
and clout to Biery’s industrial messaging. In GE, which had faced sustained criticism for its role in
polluting the Housatonic River near Pittsfield, MA (Perry 1945, see also Nash 1989), Biery and later
ORSANCO found a key ally in developing public education materials about the economic impact of
pollution treatment. ORSANCO relied heavily on a documentary produced by GE about the importance of
anti-pollution measures for the country’s waterways, which made special point to focus on how pollution
also affected industrial profitability as well as public health. Titled Clean Waters, ORSANCO’s staff wore
out several reels of Clean Waters from showing the film so frequently (Cleary 1967: 96). In addition, GE
made available H. Vance Crawford, a member of their public relations staff who “spent nearly a year in
Cincinnati, where he worked with the ORSANCO staff in developing exhibits and other promotional aids”
(Cleary 1967: 97). Crawford and H. Peter Converse, a GE community relations specialist, helped
ORSANCO develop their campaign materials and publicity strategy for both the public at large and to
target specific industries (ORSANCO 1951: 20).
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Market-oriented economists have claimed that industrialists have long taken their own initiative to
recycle factory byproducts because of the financial incentives involved, but the historical evidence is far
from clear that this has been the case (Rosen 2012).
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Figure 4.1 – Still from Clean Waters. Concurrent narration with this image: “Industrial plants needing a
plentiful supply of clean water will not locate along polluted streams” (Wolff 1947).
With this expanded support, the Cincinnati CSP and ORSANCO found increased success in
convincing industrialists that pollution affected them as well. The collection of different “industry-action”
committees formed by ORSANCO were critical in this effort, since a key activity for each committee
member involved promoting “within the ranks of their specific industry an appreciation of the need to
minimize pollution wastes" (ORSANCO 1951: 23). The studies produced by these committees were
mass-produced and disseminated to factories throughout the Ohio Valley (ORSANCO 1951). By the time
of the ORSANCO treaty signing in 1948, Pennsylvania Governor James Duff, a conservationist,
described how he was now finding that “one of the first questions new industries put in inquiring about a
site is ‘What is the analysis of the water?’” (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1948c). Given this outreach and the
role of its industrial-waste committees, ORSANCO was recognized as a leader in engaging industry in its
work. According to Paavola (2006), of all the interstate compacts developed for pollution control, only
ORSANCO had any significant “influence on industrial water pollution” (454).
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Given Biery and ORSANCO’s sustained outreach to industry, it is important to hold in tension
how they, on the one hand, helped industry circumvent federal pollution control through an interstate
compact approach that gave business leaders a powerful voice in establishing pollution control measure,
but also, on the other hand, spread new understandings of how stream pollution negatively affected
industrial productivity within the region, moving factory owners to believe that too much pollution would
impact their bottom line. The engagement of technical experts and industrialists at the center of
ORSANCO’s approach was not simply a story of industry manipulating state-level sanitation engineers
and health officials in order to continue discharging waste with limited oversight or consequences. Rather,
ORSANCO explicitly sought to responsibilize industry as an active part of the Ohio Valley’s polluted
public to make sure “that all segments of industry are aware of their responsibilities” (ORSANCO 1950:
34). In the face of industrialists arguing "that pollution-abatement requirements are putting them at
competitive disadvantage,” ORSANCO flipped the equation to claim that these businesses stood “to gain
a competitive advantages from a stream clean-up program" and “there is hardly an industry that would not
be in a stronger profit-making position if it could get better water” (ORSANCO 1950: 34). Ultimately,
through sustained outreach, ORSANCO’s publicity efforts were key in transforming ideas of clean water in
the Ohio Valley, helping to move public opinion from a “nineteenth-century notion that pollution
represented an unfortunate trade-off for progress” (Casner 1999b: 197) to a view that stream pollution
actually impeded development and that clean water represented growth. In this sense, ORSANCO
contributed to the emergence in the post-World War II period of a linkage between infrastructure and
economic development (Rankin 2009). Whereas “public works” – the term used previously in the U.S. for
these kinds of improvements – encompassed projects for the common good inclusive of beautification,
public health, or economic benefit, instead infrastructure required a more narrow forecast of economic
impacts. In ORSANCO’s view, sewage treatment infrastructure made sense because it represented
sound business planning for the communities involved.
ORSANCO’s publicity strategy – focused on this messaging that linked clean water, health, and
economic development together – helped forge a wide-ranging techno-industrial assemblage in the Ohio
Valley. ORSANCO brought together factory owners and sanitation engineers, who working in
coordination were able to tie together public health and employment through the potency of clean water. If
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officials under the sanitary city portrayed fresh water as the “the universal cleaning agent,” under
ORSANCO, clean water became the “universal growth agent,” an elixir for economic development and
health, with the capacity to spur growth throughout the river basin. ORSANCO sought to cultivate
awareness of these special properties of clean water not just with industry, but among the diverse cast of
water users; in 1951, ORSANCO’s community relations team synthesized this multi-stakeholder
messaging through their new motto: “Clean Waters Protect Your Health — Protect Your Job — Protect
Your Happiness” (ORSANCO 1951: 17). In this sense, clean water’s vitality became an asset in terms of
a range of activities, and communities that failed to tackle their pollution risked falling behind significantly.
The newly conjured polluted public of the Ohio River basin, containing many different river users,
embraced the idea that pollution control administered by an assemblage of local sanitation engineers,
public officials, and industrial representatives represented an efficient and advantageous arrangement for
the region’s continued growth. By the 1960s, the Ohio Valley region had significantly more municipal
sewage treatment facilities completed or under construction compared to other regions in the U.S., while
industrial waste committees continued to develop discharge control recommendations for each sector
(Cleary 1967). After his success with ORSANCO, Biery later joined the Ohio Valley Improvement
Association as a Vice-President and helped incorporate pollution as part of their Ohio Valley lobbying
work with the federal government, as the linkage between pollution control and river-basin administration
further took root under ORSANCO.
Finally, the strength of this ORSANCO assemblage is evident in the fact that, despite their
differences, ORSANCO and the Izaak Walton League actually increasingly worked in harmony in the
Ohio Valley after 1948. G.E. Condo, chair of the Izaak Walton League's Ohio Valley Anti-Pollution Subcommittee, "stated that at one time the league had been doubtful of the effectiveness" of ORSANCO, but
that the group's activities had dispelled "such doubts and [given] further evidence of good faith"
(ORSANCO 1957: 12-13). Both groups pushed this economic interpretation of clean water in the 1950s,
reinforcing one another’s messaging. The ORSANCO’s Third Annual Report (1951) features a picture of
a convention exhibition that includes ORSANCO’s “Clean Waters Protect Your Health — Protect Your Job
— Protect Your Happiness” motto, as well as a prominent sign indicating “The Ohio River Valley Water
Sanitation Commission Cooperating with the Izaak Walton League” (17). This collaborative presentation,
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repeating many of the points from GE’s Clean Waters promotional video, focused on the fact that
pollution limited recreation-oriented businesses, depressed property values, and restricted industrial
growth. By the 1950s in the Ohio Valley, there were few alternatives to ORSANCO’s views on “clean
water” and its economic potential.

Figure 4.2 – Joint ORSANCO and Izaak Walton League display. (ORSANCO 1951: 17)

E. Clean Water and Redevelopment on the Cincinnati Riverfront

In this last section, I want to return to the Cincinnati riverfront to discuss how pollution control
objectives reconfigured redevelopment initiatives in the area. Specifically, I focus on how anti-pollution
efforts began to intersect with elite perceptions of the riverfront’s status and their plans for its future, as
well as how activities led by the Cincinnati CSP and ORSANCO intersected with these plans. While the
Cincinnati CSP and ORSANCO had little direct impact on the Cincinnati riverfront, I argue here that the
ways they linked “clean water” with economic growth facilitated later efforts to revitalize the riverfront
through the construction of parks and green spaces. As the environmental movement emerged in
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Cincinnati during the 1970s, local elites used this new environmental framework as well as ORSANCO’s
arguments about the economic benefits of “clean water” to argue that residential and industrial riverfront
areas needed to be “cleaned up” in order to protect the Ohio River and also to make the area desirable
for investment.
A major focus of work under the Cincinnati CSP had been the cultivation of a polluted public
embracing the entire Ohio Valley, but in tandem with these efforts, the Cincinnati CSP had also worked to
make Cincinnati the leading urban example of responsible stream pollution management along the Ohio
River. Biery and others relentlessly promoted the need for Cincinnati to take the lead in tackling pollution,
particularly in building a sewage treatment plant on the Little Miami River, a heavily polluted tributary of
the Ohio River on the east side of the city. After the eventual creation of ORSANCO, the new group
hosted a public hearing in January 1949 to establish water treatment standards for the Cincinnati Pool –
the twenty-two mile stretch of river in front of the city running between Dam 36 to the east (near the
Coney Island amusement park) and Fernbank Dam farther downstream. Following this hearing, using
ORSANCO’s new guidance on treatment standards, construction began on the Little Miami sewage
treatment plant shortly after, finishing in 1953. Northern Kentucky opened a facility later that same year,
while Cincinnati eventually opened additional plants on Mill Creek (1959) and Muddy Creek (1961).
These efforts led to the slow improvement of water quality on the Ohio River in front of Cincinnati and
Northern Kentucky.
Yet, the Cincinnati CSP and ORSANCO had little interest in the Cincinnati riverfront
neighborhoods themselves, which remained a mix of industrial and low-income residential areas, many
deteriorating due to lack of investment and the effects of flooding. As detailed in Chapter Two, the Ohio
River had decreased in importance as a social space over the first half of the twentieth century, with
activities like fishing, bathing in the river, and taking pleasure cruises all declining in popularity. According
to a recreation and anti-pollution advocate at the 1935 OVIA convention: “The steamboat age beckoned
our fathers and mothers to the river. Another move in another age has called them back ashore” (OVIA
1935: 96). Many pointed to the ways that the Ohio River was changing as an important reason for this
shift, with its sluggish conditions and growing water pollution deterring people from enjoying their local
waterways. In Cincinnati, health experts advised against bathing or fishing in the Ohio River. After the
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1934 drought caused a major typhoid outbreak, Cincinnati officials posted warnings against swimming at
popular bathing spots on the Ohio shore of the river and Covington, KY instituted an outright ban on
public bathing (Cleary 1967).
For their part, the Cincinnati CSP and ORSANCO had little interest in restoring any intimate
social connection to the Ohio River. While recreation always factored into the Cincinnati CSP’s
considerations, the group’s overriding focus was on public health and economic growth. Moreover, the
tensions with the Izaak Walton League during the 1930s and 1940s reinforced the lack of interest in the
topic. Throughout negotiations for the ORSANCO compact, delegates prioritized public health and
economic growth over recreation, with one treaty delegate from Pennsylvania requesting to have “health”
listed as the most important issue, followed by “welfare”, and finally “recreational facilities” (Conference of
Delegates Appointed by Governors of Ohio Valley States 1938: 7). Once the Ohio Valley states signed
the agreement establishing ORSANCO, staff and commissioners frequently mentioned recreation in the
organization’s early stages, but typically treated it as a secondary concern, even as they began
cooperating more with the Izaak Walton League. For example, during the 1949 ORSANCO hearing to
establish water quality standards for the Cincinnati Pool – ORSANCO’s first set of regulations regarding
treatment objectives for a particular section of the river – the committee decided to aim for “a reasonably
clean condition” in regards to deoxygenation, where “limited recreation such as boating but not swimming
will be inviting” and allowed for conditions that were “lower than recommended for healthy fish life”
(ORSANCO 1949a: 13-14).
However, Cincinnati recreationalists began returning to the Ohio River in the decades following
ORSANCO’s formation. Following a new round of lobbying from the OVIA, the US Army Corps of
Engineers rebuilt most of the navigational lock and dam system in the 1950s and 1960s, incorporating
taller dams and bigger locks in their efforts to modernize the infrastructure (OVIA 1958). These new
features deepened and slowed the river even further, making it even more like a series of connected
pools. An increasing number of pleasure boaters and fishers demanded access to this lake-like Ohio
River, with "more than 15,000 Greater Cincinnatians who own and operate the great pleasure fleet" in the
city (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1964: 9). The upsurge in river recreation led to “more than $20 million”
being spent in the first five years of the 1960s, and plans for "more boat docks, more boat harbors, more
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river-based restaurants, bars and floating hotels" (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1964: 9). In parallel, reformers
in Cincinnati had long desired to construct riverfront parks. Although the 1907 Kessler park plan made no
mention of a riverfront park, the 1925 and 1948 city plans both called for parks along the Ohio River.
These plans would have replaced many lower-income mixed race and industrial riverfront areas like the
Central Bottoms with beautified promenades and public spaces more welcoming to the leisure activities of
upper-class whites. Though popular, these plans produced little real progress in transforming the
Cincinnati riverfront.
With the economic boom and rapid suburbanization of the post-war years offering increased
leisure time, many groups began looking for ways to utilize the Cincinnati riverfront as a new space
recreational opportunities. The Cincinnatus Association, which had led investigation in Ohio River flooding
and stream pollution in the 1930s, became the lead organization seeking to transform the riverfront into a
system of parks during the post-war period. The Cincinnatus Association remained a group of elite white
men drawn from business interests across the city, who conducted their own investigations through
special committees, presented recommendations, and then organized campaigns to achieve their goals.
Led by members Ewart Simpkinson and Robert Acomb, the group held a long-term vision of creating park
spaces along the water. For his part, Simpkinson had been advocating for riverfront parks going back all
the way to 1929 (Morgan 1993). Simpkinson, a life insurance agent, and Acomb, and advertising
executive, were architects of the Cincinnatus Association’s 1962 Symbolon competition to construct a
riverfront monument, which was meant to stimulate interest and redevelopment in the riverfront area. As
described in the previous chapter, the Symbolon competition fizzled after judges declared that no
submission was of sufficient quality to be selected as a winner. Despite this failure, the Cincinnatus
Association argued the competition had been a success, claiming that the press it generated and
Simpkinson and Acomb’s campaign slogan “The park is the spark!” had led to the passage of a $6.6
million bond issue for urban renewal efforts to demolish buildings on the riverfront and to build a
downtown convention center (Tucker 1967). Shortly after the passage of this bond issue, the Cincinnati
Park Board created a temporary park in the central riverfront area while city officials developed final urban
renewal plans for the area. The city razed this park when construction began on the Riverfront Stadium in
1967 (Payne 1983).

170

But, it was only by the time that Cincinnati’s Riverfront Stadium opened in June 1970 that
expectations for the riverfront began to change significantly. On April 22, 1970, the first Earth Day had
helped crystallize a growing concern about mistreatment of the environment. The newly empowered
environmentalist movement, inspired by works like Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962), tied the health
of the region’s waterways not only to the discharge of pollutants from industries and residences, but also
to more general issues like litter and pesticides, called “nonpoint source” pollution. ORSANCO had largely
restricted its focus to “point source” pollution coming from municipal or industrial facilities, but
environmental advocates argued that preserving the Ohio River would take a more generalized change in
behavior from the city’s inhabitants. Simpkinson and Acomb led efforts to link this emerging
environmental attitude with efforts to redevelop the riverfront. Several public and private groups had been
active in creating new plans for the riverfront in the 1960s and early 1970s, including the Cincinnatus
Association, but Acomb and Simpkinson began to push in 1974 to form one consolidated body to guide
the better utilization of this important asset. The new committee would guide development of the city’s
entire riverfront, rather than the mish-mash of groups that had been responsible for varying projects up
until then. In February 1975, Cincinnati’s City Council recognized this new group, the Riverfront Advisory
Council (RAC), as the official agency to guide redevelopment of the riverfront, with Acomb and
Simpkinson on the Executive Committee.
Unlike past riverfront development plans, such as the 1967 Riverfront Plan created by the Stanley
Consultants, the RAC foregrounded pollution as a key issue, highlighting the environment and water
quality as important considerations (RAC 1975a, RAC 1975b). RAC members were concerned that
“...despite its historic, continuing and projected importance, the city on the whole has tended to treat [the
river] as an alley, a place for refuse, rather than as an asset” (RAC 1976b: 4). Simpkinson made the
removal of the American Compressed Steel junkyard, located near the central riverfront, a celebrated
symbol of the growing commitment to clean up the riverfront and make it accessible to the city. According
to city’s grant application for federal funding to purchase the junkyard:

The project seeks to reclaim and preserve the city's unique and invaluable natural resource —
the Ohio riverfront. The area is presently an unsightly scrapyard and a serious environmental
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blight. The project would remove this eyesore and replace it with open space to be used for park
and recreation purposes. (quoted in Ahlering 1983: 45)

As detailed at the beginning of this chapter, the discovery of the city’s first Front Street water works
pumping station, buried under this scrapyard after being abandoned in 1907 due to pollution concerns,
only served to reinforce this message.
Concurrently, Cincinnati entering the 1970s had begun to change dramatically. The largely
industrial economy that Hudson Biery and ORSANCO had known no longer dominated the urban
landscape. Rather, rapidly accelerating deindustrialization and suburbanization were moving jobs and
residents outside the city, while also shifting the city’s economy towards service businesses, including
banking and retail. As Stradling and Stradling (2008) describe for Cleveland, these shifts brought
increased intolerance for the pollution attributed to factories and sites like the American Compressed
steel junkyard. Instead, local elites believed that they needed to create healthy and attractive landscapes,
so that the city could draw capital back to the riverfront, as well as new residents and tourists, using the
nexus of environmentalism and redevelopment to provide an enticing incentive. Drawing on Acomb’s
advertising background and Simpkinson’s long booster experience, the Cincinnatus Association and RAC
made cleaning up the riverfront as a key element in their work:

Until a few years ago, this Central Riverfront was our run-down ‘back yard’ flooded area and no
one much walking down there. The City has, since then, spent millions making this Central
Riverfront our ‘front yard’ so that private capital would spend millions more, which would re-coop
this potentially very valuable land so near the heart of downtown” (Simpkinson 1976: 1, underline
in original).

By repackaging the riverfront as source of “environmental blight” rather than an important industrial or
residential location, Simpkinson and Acomb were able to secure new supporters and funding to transform
the area.
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The RAC tailored their efforts, based on input from technicians and business interests, to fit with
the emerging environmentalist, which called for cultivating a proactive care for the natural world (Luke
1995, Agrawal 2005). Environmentalists saw recreation – along with other techniques like hedonic
property pricing that specifically factored in pollution levels (Pearce 2002) or statistical models calculating
pollution health risks (Beck 1992) – as ways to help foster this environmental mentality. Visual or physical
engagement with nature through recreation was seen to tie care of the self to care of the environment.
The RAC members shared this view, arguing that the riverfront was unique since visiting “this active
natural force which refreshes the spirit as well as the mind,” making it a “‘re-creational’ asset of the first
importance” (RAC 1976b: 10). In this view, contact with the river remade visitors, teaching them to
appreciate the revitalizing effects of the environment and encouraged them in nature’s care. The RAC
also warned of the dangers posed by river pollution and the need to combat it. Stream pollution
represented the dark underside of clean water. Much as Gidwani and Reddy (2011) have documented in
India, waste (here in the form of stream pollution) became the unsavory other to an idea of capitalist value
(embodied in clean water). In this view, better water separated the desirable from the marginal.
Acomb and Simpkinson, through their involvement in different groups like the RAC and the
Cincinnatus Association were thus able to reposition the riverfront as a fundamentally dirty and polluted
space, and riverfront residents and industries as both endangered by pollution and suspect because of
their association with these areas. Much as others have discussed when using the work of Mary Douglas
(1966) on purity and dirt to understand urban redevelopment (Thompson 1979, Bauman 2003, Jackson
Jr. 2010), when Cincinnati’s city representatives identified riverfront neighborhoods and industries as
“polluted” and “dirty,” it also rendered them “out of place.” According to this view, these areas would
require extensive demolition and reimagining to restore them to a desirable state. In an ethnography of
Cincinnati’s East End neighborhood, the eight-mile stretch of riverfront just east of the central riverfront
area, Halperin (1998) provides numerous examples of how city officials used arguments about
environmental blight and health to justify disinvestment and displacement in the area. These techniques
ranged from an EPA investigation that shut down a gas station that doubled as the community’s main
meeting space to when “developers attempted to use the [environmental quality control] guidelines to
eliminate affordable housing by increasing its cost, again under the guise of ‘concern’ for the community”
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(121). In this way cleaning up pollution and improved environmental standards provided a framework to
displace riverfront residents and industries that had long existed in the area.
Linked in this way with the environmental movement, redevelopment became one of the means
of sanitizing polluted urban environments, returning them to an appealing and healthy state, while
legitimizing the need to move out polluted residents and industries (Checker 2011). The opening of
riverfront parks in Cincinnati, overseen by the RAC and Cincinnatus Association, largely followed this
approach, targeting objectionable low-income mixed-race neighborhoods like the remnants of the Central
Bottoms and East End neighborhoods, to be replaced by a wholesome and refreshing natural
environment reserved primarily for high-income white communities (Pulido 2000). This link between
“cleaning up” urban spaces and redevelopment is complex though, and often ambivalent, creating
conflicting desires, even on the part of the people being displaced (Campkin 2013) The RAC’s approach,
reinforced by the surging environmental movement, succeeded in garnering support from riverfront
communities themselves. Studies presented by University of Cincinnati urban planning students at a 1976
RAC meeting showed that cleaning up the river was the primary concern for a majority of residents in
riverfront neighborhoods (RAC 1976a: 3).
The RAC’s process of depicting the riverfront as a polluted space, even if given new energy by
the environmental movement, drew considerable inspiration from the assemblage of clean water shaped
by ORSANCO. This call to stop treating the river and riverfront as the “community dump” (RAC 1976b:
13) overtly harkened back to Biery and the Cincinnati CSP’s campaign to provide clean water to the Ohio
Valley, which would stimulate growth in the region. Simpkinson and Acomb, in their Cincinnatus
Association leadership capacity, had been in touch with Biery during the 1960s, learning about the
approaches the Cincinnati CSP had utilized to achieve its objectives (Tucker 1967). The RAC also
pointed to ORSANCO in order to buttress its own activities, describing how the “Ohio River Sanitation
Commission [sic] has spent the last two decades enforcing pollution standards,” so that “the river is no
longer an open sewer” and it was even “clean enough for swimming” in some places (RAC 1976b: 8)
At the same time, the RAC extended ORSANCO’s focus on cleaning up the Ohio River in new
ways, arguing that the riverfront had to be redesigned in order to protect the clean water supply contained
by the river. They strategically engaged sanitation experts to reinforce their own environmental-friendly
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emphasis on recreation and urban redevelopment, including working with the city’s Metropolitan Sewer
District (MSD), which was formed by Cincinnati and suburban municipalities in 1968 to provide
comprehensive sewage collection and treatment for the region. The RAC Executive Committee invited
MSD to attend all RAC meetings as a guest, arguing the district’s anti-pollution efforts were directly tied to
the RAC’s work (RAC 1975c). The RAC collaborated with MSD in promoting plans to build storm runoff
retention ponds along the riverfront; these twenty retention ponds would collect combined sewer
overflows (CSO), the mix of storm water and raw sewage discharged without treatment from
overwhelmed sewer systems in times of heavy rain, in order to keep the system from being overwhelmed
and backing up. Federal budget cutbacks in the late 1970s ruled out the construction of the retention
ponds, but the proposal still burnished the waterfront’s credentials as an important environmental site, the
last line of defense to keep nonpoint source pollution out of the Ohio River (RAC 1976b). This
engagement with MSD helped RAC seamlessly integrate conceptions of “clean water” with their goals for
the economic development of the riverfront, making them largely interchangeable when considering plans
for the area.
In utilizing Mary Douglas’ observation that dirt is “matter out of place” (1966: 35) to understand
the connection between redevelopment and “cleaning up” urban areas, it is also important to examine
what effects individuals and communities believe purification processes will have (i.e. what does “pure”
look like) and where these beliefs come from. Looking at redevelopment as self-evidently a purification
process – where developers and urban elites go to great lengths to portray low-income mixed-race
communities as living in “dirty” or polluted areas that require massive public investment to clean up –
assumes that “purification” is naturally connected to certain outcomes of economic growth. In fact, there is
no standard outcome for what “purification” will look like or the effects it will have. I argue here that we
need to examine how the process of “cleaning up” is constructed in given contexts like the Cincinnati
riverfront. In Cincinnati, the belief that purifying the “dirty” riverfront communities would lead to economic
growth clearly had its roots in ORSANCO’s arguments about the properties of “clean water.” Tackling
water pollution was not just about public health, but creating the conditions for continued capitalist
expansion. In this regard it is important to look back at how ORSANCO’s work to link clean water and
economic growth framed the transformation of Cincinnati’s riverfront as a showcase space of parks and
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recreation, rather than assume that the process of “cleaning up” urban areas involves self-evident
components like access to clean water or green spaces. In the case of Cincinnati, while the
environmental movement was crucial in identifying the riverfront as “polluted,” we need to go back to
ORSANCO’s mid-century anti-pollution efforts to understand the ways elites viewed the potential
outcomes of “cleaning up” of the area.
In the second half of the 1970s, Simpkinson and Acomb, as part of RAC, finally oversaw the
opening of a series of parks along the Central Riverfront, featuring promenades and direct access to the
water. These new parks – Yeatman’s Cove, the Serpentine Wall, and Sawyer Point – became central
public spaces in the city. Appeals to the techno-industrial knowledge of ORSANCO about the powers of
clean water helped justify these park projects and provided backing to the RAC’s desire to purify the
spaces of the riverfront and encourage new development. The RAC was also able to position itself firmly
within an environmentalist approach, which encouraged personal responsibility for maintaining a healthy
environment through attention to non-point source pollution and outdoors recreation.

F. Conclusion

My focus in this chapter has been on how, transitioning away from the sanitary city framework,
sanitation engineers, public officials, and industrialists collaborated as part of the Cincinnati CSP to
reshape understandings of pollution as having impacts across the Ohio Valley. While the sanitary city
mostly focused on public health issues, under ORSANCO, the polluted public also expanded these
considerations to factor in economic growth as well. Experts from local and state agencies contributed
knowledge of pollution threats, as well as familiarity with the sanitation infrastructure and treatment
standards that could be deployed to combat pollution. For their part, business interests participated by
providing advertising and lobbying knowledge to gain traction for the proposal both among government
officials and other industrialists. The interweaving of sanitation expertise with business techniques proved
very effective in convincing the public and elected officials about the necessity of the Cincinnati CSP’s
approach. Through this collaboration, the Cincinnati CSP succeeded in pushing forward their own vision
of pollution control emphasizing a river-basin approach in the form of the ORSANCO interstate compact,
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alongside federal legislation that supported research and the construction of treatment facilities without
establishing new federal regulations or monitoring agencies.
In its first decades of operation, ORSANCO failed to establish effective regulations for industrial
discharges. At the same time, the group did play an important role in changing perceptions among
industrialists and the public at large about the economic benefits of clean water. Working with the flow of
the Ohio River, they created a polluted public in the Ohio Valley, a biosocial and chemosocial
assemblage linked by the circulation of waste but also by a shared view of the importance of clean water
in underpinning development. These changes under ORSANCO did not neatly match up with actual
improvements in terms of controlling toxicity and public health threats posed by industry, but rather shifted
the understandings of the purpose of pollution control. By linking “clean water” and economic
development, the Cincinnati CSP and ORSANCO were actually able to redefine urban growth in the
region, providing new explanatory rationales for what made cities successful. For its part, the Ohio River
largely cooperated with ORSANCO’s objectives, linking the members of the polluted public across the
Ohio Valley while also serving the economic and public health interests of local elites. The Ohio River
became clean enough that it posed little direct threat to elite interests, while also still diluting industrial
pollution authorized under ORSANCO waste discharge permits, enabling businesses to continue
externalizing their waste costs.
Despite their successes, the activities of the Cincinnati CSP and ORSANCO had limited impact
on the Cincinnati riverfront. City elites had tried to redevelop the area for decades, but had to wait until
the 1970s, with the emergence of the environmental movement, to secure local and federal financing to
construct a riverfront park system. Groups like the Cincinnatus Association and the RAC utilized
environmental language around “environmental blight” and the benefits of recreation to attract support,
but they also built on the approach laid out by ORSANCO to show that “cleaning up” the river and
riverfront would enable redevelopment to take place, bringing investment to an area of marginal industrial
and mixed-race neighborhoods. Because of the decades of publicity work undertaken by the Cincinnati
CSP and ORSANCO in the Ohio Valley prior to the environmental movement, Cincinnatians were
disposed to believe the Cincinnatus Association and RAC arguments that displacing the “dirty” mixedincome residents and industries of the central riverfront would lead to economic renewal.
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The publicity efforts managed by groups like the Cincinnati CSP, ORSANCO, and the RAC
positioned the Ohio River and the Cincinnati riverfront as critical polluted spaces that urgently required
“cleaning up” to protect the urban and regional community. Rather than a purely technical problem best
handled by scientists, these groups sought to resolve the problems of pollution control by combining
economic and technical insights. These efforts were not just about the need to create infrastructure to
provide pollution treatment, but also about educating the public on the pressing need to “clean up” these
polluted spaces in the first place. Throughout their campaigns, these groups portrayed the Ohio River and
Cincinnati riverfront as critical pollution control sites because they were also areas that would be
economically productive if they could only be “cleaned up.” The justifications for pollution control were
thus closely tied to economic arguments around promoting growth. Pollution in this sense represented
waste in both of its senses, that is, in terms of contamination and underdevelopment (Gidwani and Reddy
2011). This view also recognizes the contradictory role of pollution in urban development, since the city
must utilize waste, exploiting “organic and inorganic, human and non-human urban trash in order to
sustain itself” (Kaika and Swyngedouw 2000: 136). Even as the city casts aside people and places that
are labeled “dirty” or undesirable, it needs these marginalized populations to move forward.
Finally, when Douglas (1966) describes “dirt” as “matter out of place,” pointing to the powerful
impulse to purify “dirty” things, it is important to remember the incomplete and sometimes ambivalent
nature of this relationship to urban development (Campkin 2013). Ultimately, the RAC members sought to
spur private residential and commercial construction by pushing for riverfront parks as a means of
“cleaning up” the area for investment, but they fell short of making the area desirable to developers in the
way they had intended. According to Mitchell’s geographic history of downtown Cincinnati, city officials
and their allies were “successful to the point of cleaning up [this] downward transitional area,” but were
frustrated by the slow pace of investment as they “awaited external market forces to generate the
required momentum to facilitate the remaining development objectives” (1998: 391). Simpkinson got his
parks, a massive investment that displaced a number of riverfront residents and industries, but he never
got his “millions more” in private investment. When he passed away in 1993, the central riverfront was still
largely a disconnected maze of concrete structures and isolated parks, cut off from downtown by Fort
Washington Way. On the central riverfront, the RAC only had one riverfront luxury apartment tower, the
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massive unadorned One Lytle Place, to show for the city’s investments )though developers took more
initiative to build luxury townhomes and condos farther east of downtown, Halperin 1998). Extending
these successes to the central riverfront would be a major focus of the 1990s. Meanwhile, even as it met
most elite development needs for the region, the Ohio River remained one of the most polluted rivers in
the U.S., receiving large quantities of chemical waste annually. The working river once favored by
ORSANCO increasingly butted up against this vision of “cleaning up” the riverfront for residential
development. Perceiving themselves under threat, Cincinnati’s maritime industries felt the need to fight
for their place in the city, and began to organize to secure more recognition for their contributions. As
Cincinnati invested further resources in a bid to finally redevelop the riverfront, these visions of the
“working river” and “luxury river” increasingly came into contact.
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Chapter 5.
Reassembling Infrastructure on the Cincinnati Riverfront, 1988-Present

Jack Moreland drove me down to the Taylor Creek Overlook Park. Moreland, President of
Southbank Partners, a community development organization serving the six Northern Kentucky cities
across the river from Cincinnati, wanted to quickly show me the area’s newest park, located on the Ohio
River. Moreland turned the car onto the nostalgically-named Riverboat Row before pulling up to the onethird acre park wedged between two seafood restaurant chains, a hotel looming across the street. As we
walked around the edge of the park on a clear September afternoon, Moreland offered “This park’s got
about as good a view of the city as you can find,” letting me take in the prospect for a moment. Walking
down towards the riverbank, Moreland explained that the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet had built the
park area on top of the discharge point for the Taylor Creek culvert, a tunnel carrying the creek’s water
underneath the communities of Bellevue and Newport before emptying into the Ohio River. For years, the
culvert’s discharge had steadily eroded the nearby riverbank, threatening to undermine the restaurants
and adjacent street. To prevent further deterioration, the Southbank Partners, along with local officials
from Newport and Bellevue, county officials, and state representatives had all lobbied together to include
the project in the state budget, in order to reengineer the culvert’s discharge point and cap the small
recess in the riverbanks that the erosion had formed. They succeeded in getting a project included in the
Kentucky Transportation Cabinet’s budget to rebuild and extend the culvert. Afterwards, Southbank
Partners secured a grant from the utility provider Duke Energy for basic landscaping on the new land. The
city and Southbank Partners hoped to identify further support to include additional park features, including
walking paths and seating. Moreland was particularly proud of the project, citing it as an ideal example of
“using infrastructure to turn a liability into an asset.” Southbank Partners had seen that the need to fix an
infrastructural problem could also double as an opportunity to develop and beautify the riverfront.
Moreland was also deeply satisfied that Taylor Creek Overlook Park would feature as part of the
Southbank Partners’ larger vision for the Riverfront Commons, a network of riverfront paths and public
spaces intended to integrate the Northern Kentucky communities along the Ohio River.
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Across the river and several months later, I met with Jack Rennekamp at the main offices of the
Metropolitan Sewer District of Greater Cincinnati (MSD), located on the Mill Creek just west of downtown
Cincinnati. Rennekamp, an Assistant Superintendent at MSD, was explaining to me the goals behind
Project Groundwork. MSD is in the middle of an long-term multi-billion dollar effort to revamp many of
Cincinnati’s sewers, known as Project Groundwork. In 2002 and 2004, a federal judge mandated the
upgrades, under what is know as a “consent decree,” in order to reduce pollution caused by rainwater
runoff and combined sewer overflows (CSOs) in the Cincinnati area, which discharge raw sewage into
local waterways during storms so that the sewer system will not be overwhelmed by excess water. As a
result, MSD introduced Project Groundwork to combat the effects of rainwater runoff, including initiatives
to replacing old sewer lines, treatment facility upgrades, and public education around green alternatives
like water gardens and rain barrels. Rennekamp was particularly pleased with one part of Project
Groundwork: the plans for the Lick Creek Greenway in South Fairmount. MSD’s plan called for moving
the Lick Creek out of its culvert tunnel and restoring it to its more natural state – a process called
daylighting. The restored creek would be the center of landscaped park features intended to help spur
redevelopment in the surrounding neighborhood. He described it as a unique proposal, “designed as a
consent decree solution, but at same time...it’s also hoped to have other consequences, to provide
economic development, jobs, growth, community redevelopment to a severely depressed area.” While
careful to clarify that rate payer funds were only being used to support sewage improvements,
Rennekamp was proud that this “more comprehensive approach to an engineering problem” went beyond
the minimum requirements to embrace a collaborative process. “We could have simply, as an alternative,
created a detunnel that would have collected sewage and pumped that out at a later point in time and
we’re done, we’re out of there…” but MSD instead chose to seize the opportunity presented by an
infrastructural problem to benefit the community.
I begin this chapter by describing these two projects because of the ways that they bring together
technical and economic rationales. In many regards the MSD plan is eerily similar to the Taylor Creek
Overlook Park area that Moreland had taken me to see. With the Lick Creek Greenway in Cincinnati, it is
MSD, a utility agency, driving forward the project, while the Southbank Partners, a redevelopment
corporation, put the plans in motion for the Taylor Creek Overlook Park across the river in Northern

181

Kentucky. How should we interpret these very analogous projects? Across the previous chapters, I have
argued against accepting an explanation for infrastructural proposals that is either purely economic or
purely technocratic, in that, when elites argue that infrastructure is needed to “prime the pump” for
redevelopment, it is usually also about reshaping the ways people use and understand the city, and vice
versa, when scientists talk about the need to tackle pollution or flooding, it also typically relates to efforts
to control and benefit from the redevelopment of urban spaces. This interplay of the technocratic and the
economic played out in the collaborative efforts of groups like the Ohio Valley Improvement Association
or the Cincinnati Committee on Stream Pollution (CSP) – groups bringing together local boosters and
industry representatives with scientific experts and government technocrats. In this chapter, I want to
focus on how this interdependence between technopolitics and redevelopment has intensified in recent
years, to the point that it is not uncommon for a redevelopment organization like Southbank Partners to
identify and drive forward a sewer repair project, nor for utilities like MSD to propose a community
redevelopment project integrated with its environmental remediation program. If up until this point I have
argued for the need to consider both economic and technocratic arguments together, in this chapter I
want to examine how these rationales have become further entangled, making it even harder to
distinguish between technopolitics and redevelopment or between expertise and the urban growth
machine.
I investigate this transition based on interviews and ethnographic observations focusing primarily
on two riverfront projects. Whereas in previous chapters, I focused primarily on infrastructural programs,
here I am looking at what are foremost two redevelopment efforts that also prominently feature
infrastructural elements in their justifications. The first is The Banks, a by-now quite common mixed-use
project on the central riverfront with prime residential units, destination shopping, cultural attractions,
commercial real estate, and green space. The second is the recently rebranded Ports of Cincinnati &
Northern Kentucky, a collection of commercial sites scattered along the riverfront in fifteen Ohio and
Kentucky counties, but concentrated in the area stretching westward from Cincinnati’s central riverfront.
These private businesses have been leading “port development strategies” (Jermier et al 2016) in an
effort to attract additional interest and investment to the region’s maritime industries. During my fieldwork
at these two sites, I spoke with developers, engineers, barge and river terminal operators, public officials,

182

environmentalists, and other stakeholders about their involvement in each, as well as about their
perception of Cincinnati’s riverfront in general. Many of the people I spoke to represent groups that I have
discussed in previous chapters, such as with the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission
(ORSANCO), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the River Advisory Council (RAC, previously known
as the Riverfront Advisory Council), while others came from newer groups like the the Ohio River
Foundation or the Central Ohio River Business Association (CORBA).
Advocates for The Banks and the Ports of Cincinnati & Northern Kentucky sometimes co-exist
uneasily, with their visions for the riverfront standing in marked contrast – developers for The Banks want
to portray the Ohio River as a space of leisure and relaxation, while maritime industries involved in the
Ports of Cincinnati & Northern Kentucky stress the economic role of the river, a rugged and utilitarian
space of blue-collar work. Most of these river users publicly promote cooperation and sharing the river,
yet in practice there are numerous examples of tension, with condo owners claiming terminal facilities are
dusty, noisy, and ugly, or maritime businesses viewing with skepticism plans to extend bike paths or
parks along their sections of the “working river.” Despite these divisions, each of these projects are
deeply rooted in the same infrastructural systems that have developed along the riverfront over the past
century. I became involved with the communities behind each of these projects in order to understand the
range of changes taking place on the riverfront, tracing the differences and similarities in how they pursue
redevelopment, and particularly how infrastructure figures in their thinking, since advocates for both The
Banks and the Ports of Cincinnati & Northern Kentucky justify their arguments based on the legacies of
the systems created to improve navigation, flood control, and pollution control. Thus, I explore through my
interviews how the role of infrastructure anchors these actors in a common framework for how they relate
to and seek to benefit from being on the riverfront.
In this chapter’s last section, I examine how interrelated technopolitics and redevelopment logics
have become increasingly easy to co-opt on the Cincinnati riverfront. With both projects relying on hybrid
arguments that foreground infrastructure and present technical expertise and redevelopment as
interdependent, I argue that a new more flexible understanding of the symbolic role of infrastructure is
necessary. Increasingly in Cincinnati, infrastructure is a key component efforts to conjoin an ideology of
urban growth with an ideology of expert governance, and while a significant literature has discussed this
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approach in relation to private-public partnerships, I argue it is important to see how other actors are
deploying these arguments in creative ways. Based on these new approaches, Cincinnati is seeing
reinvigorated calls for infrastructural investments from many different sectors, as well as particular support
for redevelopment efforts that integrate infrastructure prominently. While this new configuration of
infrastructure is portrayed as even more accessible and beneficial to the public than prior infrastructural
projects, in Cincinnati these new deployments of infrastructure still preserve the many forms of exclusion,
particularly around race and gender, that have long characterized the intertwined histories of
infrastructure and urban development. Finally, as a resource and an actor in Cincinnati, the Ohio River is
increasingly mediated through technical-development assemblages like The Banks and the Ports of
Cincinnati & Northern Kentucky. Ultimately, this means that the mostly white and male actors who
oversee these projects benefit from the potential represented by working with and taking advantage of the
Ohio River.

A. The Banks and The Ports

When I first arrived back in Cincinnati in 2015, after having left more than a decade ago,
everyone wanted to tell me how much the city had changed since I last lived there. They marveled at
Over-the-Rhine, a historic neighborhood located just north of downtown, and how it had rapidly gentrified
in recent years, with trendy new restaurants and specialty boutique stores. Despite Over-the-Rhine’s
hipster cachet, many preferred The Banks, with its in-demand, newly-built apartments and popular
nightlife destinations. In addition, after years of political drama, the city was also building a streetcar line
to connect The Banks with Over-the-Rhine. Of all these developments, The Banks, a totally new
neighborhood, perhaps surprised people the most, since the central riverfront area had remained
obstinately underdeveloped for decades in spite of seemingly never-ending redevelopment plans.
Developers and the city government had repeatedly failed to advance long-cherished plans for a new
neighborhood there with civic buildings, luxury apartments, and destination retail, first laid out in the 1948
Cincinnati Metropolitan Master Plan. The city opened a multi-use stadium on the site in 1970, later joined
by an indoor arena in 1975 and a system of riverfront parks, but these investments had failed to spur
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private development in the area. Instead, Cincinnati’s central riverfront landscape in the early 1990s was
a labyrinth-like collection of concrete tunnels, parking garages, staircases, and pedestrian bridges,
making it hard to imagine any walkable, urban neighborhood existing on the site. To city officials and
business leaders in the early 1990s, it was clear that the central riverfront needed a change. Even with
the completion of Sawyer Point Park in 1988, the flagship riverfront park, it looked unlikely that the current
riverfront arrangement would generate transformative private redevelopment.
The first step towards resolving these concerns came in March 1995, when the non-profit booster
organization Downtown Cincinnati Inc. (DCI) suggested reducing Fort Washington Way’s footprint as a
first step in redeveloping the riverfront. When I spoke with John Schneider, who headed the DCI
transportation committee which developed the proposal, it had been more than two decades since his
involvement in the process, yet the experience was still fresh for him. According to Schneider, a
confluence of events in the mid-1990s had finally begun to shift the landscape. First, Fort Washington
Way, originally opened in 1962, was crumbling and, at a minimum, needed to be completely repaved. The
local professional football and baseball teams, which shared Riverfront Stadium, both wanted their own
new facilities. At the same time, in 1994, the National Conference for Community and Justice proposed
the construction of a major museum dedicated to the underground railroad, which had had significant
routes through the city. A desire to locate the museum on the riverfront proved popular, attracting public
and corporate backing for the project. Finally, the Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD) began developing
plans to tackle combined sewer overflows (CSO) in the central riverfront area, reducing the number of
sewer outfalls and annual overflow incidents from downtown, estimated at close to 150 per year (Ben
2010).
Schneider’s group at DCI, working with the Ohio-Kentucky-Indiana Regional Council of
Governments (OKI, which controlled disbursement of federal funds for local highway projects),
recommended a complete overhaul of Fort Washington Way, narrowing the highway and sinking it below
ground level. Not only would this DCI-OKI proposal diminish the break between downtown and the
riverfront, it would create fourteen new acres of property to be developed on the riverfront, an attractive
prospect. Their proposal ran into opposition from city agencies, which had favored simply repaving the
Fort Washington Way as it was. In addition, following proposals laid out in the Cincinnati Plan 2000
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(published in 1982), the city’s urban planning department had begun drafting plans to build a massive
concrete platform extending over Fort Washington Way in order to facilitate development of air rights over
the riverfront.
In his downtown apartment two decades later, Schneider still conveyed the excitement of the
struggle to see which plan would win out, as both groups sought to gain backing from public opinion and
from city elites. According to Schneider, “at first there was, you know, outrage. I proposed Fort
Washington Way, and the county engineer, Bill Brayshaw, who had actually built it as a young man
working for ODOT [the Ohio Department of Transportation], I mean he tried to get me thrown off the
board of Downtown Cincinnati, Inc.” Schneider let me peruse through a scrapbook he had put together
with newspaper clippings charting the back and forth. Ultimately, in Schneider’s view, the DCI-OKI plan
eventually emerged victorious because it represented the possibility to create additional riverfront
acreage, whereas previously the “conversation had been so limited because there was so little land down
there [on the riverfront].” City Hall and the powerful Cincinnati Business Committee threw their support
behind the DCI-OKI plan to reconfigure Fort Washington Way.
After formally adopting the DCI-OKI plan, City Hall appointed John Deatrick as the supervising
engineer to move the project forward. On the back of the Fort Washington Way proposal, in 1996,
Hamilton County residents voted to provide public funding for two new sports stadia. The city-appointed
Riverfront Steering Commission, another group convened to kick-start river redevelopment, contracted
Urban Design Associates (UDA) to recommend potential stadium sites, as well as create a master plan
for the riverfront redevelopment. After more debate (in which Schneider again played a prominent role),
both stadia were located on the central riverfront, with the first, a football stadium, intended to be opened
in 2000. Meanwhile, the Fort Washington Way project advanced rapidly, breaking ground in 1998.
Deatrick described how the project managers felt “we needed to tie – to make sure the highway did get
done and to add a sense of urgency – that we tie it to the opening of the [football] stadium” in 2000,
meaning the project had to be fast-tracked, both in terms of securing funding and letting contracts for
constructions. I met with Deatrick in his City Hall office, where he was in the midst of supervising the city’s
newest major infrastructure project, the streetcar. To show me how the project had developed, he pulled
out the original funding matrix from among the project files he still kept on hand, outlining the complex
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operations required to rebuild the Fort Washington Way by-pass, which had grown from an estimated
original budget of $20-30 million for a simple repaving, to a massive $313.4 million effort encompassing
the by-pass, a public transit station, floodwall, and other related efforts. During the Fort Washington Way
reconstruction, the project engineers were even able to tackle the CSO problem, installing a large
interceptor sewer on the northern edge of Fort Washington Way, which acted as ad hoc storage for storm
runoff and reduced the number of overflow incidents to only a handful each year.
With Fort Washington Way completed, the focus moved to completing the second stadium (2003)
and opening the National Underground Railroad Freedom Center (2004). In a decade, the city and county
officials had been able to realize most of their goals to reconfigure the riverfront. And yet, private
development still lagged behind. City Council rejected a development plan put forward by City Manager
John Shirey and Economic Development Director Andi Udris in 1997 for a “mega-entertainment” district,
with the Mayor decrying it as a “malling” of the riverfront (Donovan & May 1998: A1). As an alternative,
the UDA consultants developed a plan calling for redevelopment to be built on massive parking garages
in order to raise the site out of the floodplain. In 1999, a joint Riverfront Advisors Commission, with
representatives from government and the private sector embraced the plan and suggested calling the
area The Banks. They outlined plans to move the project forward and got buy-in from the local
governments for Hamilton County and the City of Cincinnati, the two main entities required to advance the
work. Still, bickering between the county and city slowed the construction of the garage infrastructure to a
crawl (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 2007). In the absence of progress, across the river in Kentucky, a mixeduse development, Newport on the Levee, had opened in 2001, with an aquarium, movie theater, bars,
and retail outlets. Much to the chagrin of Cincinnati officials, Newport on the Levee was extremely
popular, drawing large crowds down to the Northern Kentucky waterfront.
In 2006, due to continued delays with building out the garaging infrastructure, the city and county
formed a Banks Working Group, chaired by the CEO of the Cincinnati baseball team, Bob Castellini, who
also owned a produce wholesaler firm that had previously been located on the riverfront for decades. In
November 2007, at the urging of the Banks Working Group, the city and county finally signed a
development agreement with Carter and Dawson, two Atlanta-based firms. In addition, the city and
county formed a Banks Public Partnership to facilitate work on their joint public infrastructure projects,
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primarily the parking garages (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 2007). After groundbreaking in 2008, The Banks’
first commercial and residential moved in during 2011, while the first sections of a new green space along
the river, Smale Riverfront Park, opened in 2012. Construction has continued on the parking garages and
further phases of development, expected to last until at least 2025.
While The Banks attracted significant public attention, another riverfront redevelopment project
involving the city’s maritime industries had been gaining traction outside of the limelight. For a number of
years, there had been no central organization to represent river industries in Cincinnati. After the
modernization of Ohio River lock and dam system in the 1950s and 60s, leadership of the Ohio Valley
Improvement Association (OVIA), which had long been drawn from Cincinnati’s navigation concerns,
shifted to Ashland Oil, Inc. (in Ashland, KY) and the coal operators in Huntington, WV. By 1983, a muchreduced OVIA merged with DINAMO, a group in Pittsburgh focused on launching a new effort to once
again modernize the locks and dams (Murray 2018). Cincinnatians were largely left on the sidelines in
this process. Yet, around 2000, the city’s maritime industries began to organize again to gain additional
support and investment for their activities. These efforts were connected to the Riverfront Advisory
Council (RAC) – described in the previous chapter when the city government formed the group in 1975 to
review land use planning and zoning for the entire riverfront, playing a key role in promoting increased
recreation and green space along the river. After producing A Study of the Cincinnati Riverfront in 1981,
the RAC continued to review waterfront zoning decisions and provide advice for the City Planning
Commission on waterfront issues. These activities included leading planning for new residential
developments in Cincinnati’s East End neighborhood (Halperin 1998) and providing input on The Banks
plan, though they increasingly felt excluded from the process (Cincinnati Enquirer Staff 1998). The RAC
limped towards the millennium with limited funding and an unclear mission. Maritime interests began to
coalesce around the RAC as a vehicle that could represent them.
In 2002, Eric Doepke, a local landscape architect who had been involved Sawyer Point Park
among many other area projects, led efforts to reconstitute the faltering Riverfront Advisory Council as the
River Advisory Council. In relaunching the RAC, Doepke wanted to focus on improving river trade
efficiency as well as watershed management, issues that he felt were slipping off the radar with all the
attention on developing The Banks. While primarily drawing participants from the Cincinnati side, Doepke
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pushed for the new RAC to have a regional focus, encompassing Ohio, Kentucky, and Indiana. Through
reports on river industries, site mapping, and prototypes for new river terminals, the RAC sought to bring
attention to the “working river,” raising awareness among the public about the city’s maritime economy.
RAC efforts increasingly focused on expanding the boundaries of the federal government’s definition of
the Cincinnati port area, which only included 26 miles in the vicinity of the city. New RAC participants
agreed that an expanded port area would help official statistics better capture local economic activity on
the river. Doepke and others also believed this redesignation would improve local cooperation and help
promote the area, since an expanded port zone would bump the entire region up the national trade
rankings. In 2000, Huntington, WV had expanded their port to almost 200 miles of riverfront located in
West Virginia, Kentucky, and Ohio, including stretches on the Ohio River, Big Sandy River, and Kanawha
River. The redesignated Port of Huntington Tri-State became the country’s largest inland river port and
the envy of its neighbors. The process required significant resources and coordination, working with
officials from all the implicated counties as well as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in order to submit an
application for redesignation.
Despite continued discussions, the RAC made little progress towards redesignating the port. To
Doepke, when I spoke with him at his office in the posh suburb of Hyde Park, cluttered with mementos
from past projects, the main issue was a lack of trust among riverfront industries:

At the meetings of the RAC, you would have industrial people who owned their machines,
terminals, all of it, but they were all looking like frogs, their eyeballs were just this far over the
table…never saying anything, just trying to suck up everything they could, and they couldn’t get
their eyes of that jackass over there who’s that guy who screwed us out of a nickel per ton. In
other words, they were in their competitive mode.”

Doepke urged these business to embrace collaboration. In 2011, a group of maritime industries formed
the Central Ohio River Business Association (CORBA). According to CORBA’s Executive Director, Eric
Thomas, the RAC had been a fundamental first step, but he and many of his colleagues from the private
sector had actually had to take the initiative to get things done: “we just got frustrated, because we come
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here to this [RAC] meeting every month, we talk about issues but we’re not doing anything, we don’t have
any money to get anything done. We need an organization that can take these issues and do something
with it.” CORBA took the lead on the redesignation process in conjunction with the Port of Greater
Cincinnati Development Authority and the Northern Kentucky Port Authority, building on the RAC’s
previous efforts and always acknowledging Doepke’s early contributions. They were finally successful in
early 2015, winning recognition of the expanded Ports of Cincinnati & Northern Kentucky. The new port
stretches 226.5 miles across fifteen counties (including along the Licking River), compared to 26 miles for
the previously designated Port of Cincinnati. Four Indiana counties were invited, but declined as they
already operated as part of statewide port system. In 2016, government statistics declared the new Ports
of Cincinnati & Northern Kentucky as the busiest inland river port and thirteenth largest nationally. They
redesignation has subsequently garnered significant attention, with the Mid-America Freight Coalition
declaring others could "learn from these efforts in Ohio and Kentucky" (Jermier et al 2016).
With the redesignation completed, CORBA has shifted its focus to new projects, including a port
asset inventory and debating potential investments in container-on-barge infrastructure. The decline of
coal shipping, long the most important commodity moved on the river, had led to successive years of
decreasing Ohio River freight tonnage. This change, and the unlikely possibility that coal would return to
its previous highs, pushed CORBA to explore alternatives like container-on-barge technology, which
could carry consumer goods and would enable the region to develop freight alternatives to the bulk and
break bulk commodities that make up the vast majority of river trade presently. In addition, the local
CORBA leadership began contacting other ports and trade associations along the river to discuss the
formation of an M-70 Coalition. In 2007, the federal Maritime Administration (MARAD), part of the
Department of Transportation, established a Marine Highway Program to encourage freight carriers to
move from the overburdened highway system to rivers and coastal waters. MARAD renamed the Ohio
River the “M-70 Highway,” linking it symbolically with the I-70 highway running parallel to the north. The
M-70 Coalition would similarly lead a push for new cargos to come to the river and coordinate shared
promotional efforts.
The Banks and the Ports of Cincinnati & Northern Kentucky represent starkly different visions of
the riverfront, the “working river” versus the “luxury river.” The “working river” is represented as a matter-
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of-fact space of industry, where aesthetic concerns are subordinate to economic interests. Meeting with
terminal owners, they were proud of their ugly enterprises, with “tank farms” for chemical shipments and
temporary-looking hoop buildings for storing bulk commodities. They constantly reminded me that it was
the maritime industries who had built Cincinnati and stressed their long roots on the riverfront, with one
pointing out to me a loading crane that had been in operation since the 1930s. If the “working river” is a
gritty pragmatic vision of the river, the “luxury river” is its inverse, where spaces like The Banks, and the
cluster of high-end riverfront condos extending to the east of downtown, celebrate the natural beauty and
pleasure-driven side of the Ohio River, with parks, exciting shops, and desirable residences. The
developers and engineers I spoke with from The Banks were eager to show how the project represented
a new era, solving issues that had long made it difficult to live near the river. Despite these differences,
both projects are deeply rooted in the same infrastructural histories of the Ohio River and the riverfront.
The systems developed for navigation, flood control, and pollution mitigation are an ever-present
reference for both projects, at times celebrated and in other instances as a haunting, something obviously
there but only obliquely discussed. These linkages shape the ways that advocates for each project
understand and justify their projects, at times in complementary ways and in other instances with
divergent viewpoints despite this shared framework. In the following section I explore how these
infrastructural legacies shape the ways each project relates to river and justify their position on the urban
riverfront.

B. Claiming the Riverfront

The Hall of Mirrors is located on the third floor of the Netherlands Plaza Hotel, an extravagant Art
Deco building in downtown Cincinnati. According to the hotel’s website, the Hall of Mirrors is “often
referred to as the most beautiful ballroom in the Midwest,” a masterpiece of gilded accents and diffuse
lighting. It stands out even in a hotel filled with bizarre and alluring imagery – a staircase leading up to the
Hall of Mirrors features an 1980s mural of Cincinnati, painted in bright neons against a black backdrop,
and an adjacent ballroom is intended to resemble the interior of a cruise ship. Unsurprisingly, the Hall of
Mirrors has been the preferred site for gatherings of powerful people in Cincinnati since it opened in 1931,
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and thus has featured prominently in the history of the Ohio River and the Cincinnati riverfront. For
decades, the Ohio Valley Improvement Association (OVIA) regularly held their meetings there, and in
1948 the eight Ohio Valley governors met there to sign the ORSANCO compact.
In November 2016, the Waterways Council, the national advocacy organization for navigation
infrastructure, came to Cincinnati to host its national convention in the Hall of Mirrors. Having the
convention in Cincinnati was a homecoming of sorts for the group since it traces its roots back to the
OVIA.
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And just like at the OVIA’s first meeting in Cincinnati in 1895, the convention audience featured a

mix of “river men,” U.S. Army Corps of Engineers officers, and industry groups like grain wholesalers and
cement corporations. They had assembled to discuss the future of the country’s inland navigation system,
both in terms of infrastructural needs and to forecast the future freight possibilities. At the meeting, I ran
into Errin Howard, Director of the RiverWorks Discovery educational program, who ushered me over to
meet Charlie Jones, nonagenarian chairman of Amherst Madison, a towing and river terminal company
based in West Virginia. Charlie had been a member of the OVIA from a young age and was happy to
regale me with some of his early memories of the organization, including attending the massive
celebrations in 1929 accompanying the opening of the lock and dam system on the Ohio River.
Moreover, the tone of this most recent Waterways Council convention echoed those early OVIA
meetings: an undercurrent of tension fed by multiple years of declining tonnage on the river. The era of
King Coal, which had largely been responsible for driving Ohio River trade over the past century,
appeared to be ending due to a combination of increased regulations and inroads by natural gas
production. Throughout the event, participants were once again pondering how to revive river trade,
including discussions of container-on-barge technologies and increasing shipments of grain and other
products through the expanded Panama Canal. Proceedings at the current Waterways Council
convention were dominated by grizzled veterans of the maritime trades, many from long-time river
families, such as with Charlie Jones, as well as others who started as deckhands and worked their way
up to management roles. Drawn from across the country, they greeted each other as old friends, sharing
stories and joking with one another. Rev. David Rider, head of the Seamen’s Church Institute, mingled
with the crowd in the Hall of Mirrors – his organization has been dedicated to the care of these maritime
33

After the OVIA merged with DINAMO in 1983, Barry Palmer, the first Executive Director of DINAMO
helped launched Waterways Council, Inc. in 2003, becoming its President and CEO.
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workers since 1834, providing counseling and spiritual support, as well as more recently offering
professional training and safety certifications. The “river men” were joined by engineers and
administrators from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and from the MARAD command, many in
full uniform. Governmental representatives provided updates about their latest plans for the rivers and
were eager to reconnect with maritime business owners. At lunch, a program honored a USACE Ohio
River district officer who was being assigned to a new role. The business owners and USACE officials
traded compliments throughout the lunch event, the engineers citing how much they relied on maritime
industries to manage the river and make it productive while the Waterways Council leadership profusely
thanked the USACE officer for his fine service and dedication.
Throughout the event, this partnership reinscribed the “working river” as a space of white
masculinity, based on the combination of parochial industrial knowledge and governmental technical
expertise. As the two groups reaffirmed their bonds, they also demonstrated their commitment to
preserving the preeminence of freight navigation on the Ohio River, even in the face of competing claims
34

made by residential developers and environmentalists.

Despite the central role played by the “river men”

and male USACE officers, close to twenty percent of the audience were women. A handful came from
maritime companies and others from governmental offices, but many had backgrounds in
communications and the non-profit sector. In their roles, many of these women were leading public
education efforts to connect more people with the “working river”: what it contributes to the economy, how
the lock and dam system functions, and the possibilities for careers in the sector. For example, Errin
Howard’s organization, RiverWorks Discovery, has a mission to educate children and adults about the
river commerce in conjunction with the cultural and ecological histories of the river. Based in Cincinnati,
Howard has built up RiverWorks Discovery to reach thousands of individuals each year, including a
million-dollar exhibit that tours the region, storyteller programs, and river career days for high school
students. The organization is part of National Mississippi River Museum & Aquarium, but draws most of
its support from more than 150 private sponsors, including almost all of the most prominent maritime
businesses in the Mississippi and Ohio Valleys. According to Howard, the origin of RiverWorks Discovery,
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According to one critical local environmentalist I spoke to, the USACE, because of its interests in
navigation, has long focused primarily on the main stem Ohio River rather than any of the tributaries or
overall watershed.
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launched in 2004, came from the realization that there is “a disconnect between the public and what they
knew and understood about river transportation.” Many individuals, even from river communities like
Cincinnati, had little idea that there was a lock and dam system that made the river navigable year-round,
or the multiple other infrastructures needed to make the river economically profitable. “The idea behind
[RiverWorks Discovery] is if you can educate the public, then they can make informed decisions when
they go to vote, you know, to support infrastructure on the river.” Many women have stepped into similar
public relations roles on the “working river,” acting as intermediaries between maritime businesses and
communities that have largely forgotten about them or see them as antiquated.
Despite representing a “luxury river” that is defined in many ways as the opposite of the “working
river,” The Banks features a similar gendered division of labor. City officials have relied on a balance of
technical expertise and development knowledge to move the project forward over more than two
decades, with the vast majority of these positions occupied by older white men such as John Schneider,
John Deatrick, and others with backgrounds in engineering, urban planning, and private sector
development. While I was in the field, the two primary organizations responsible for continuing to advance
The Banks were the master developer Carter
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and The Banks Public Partnership, which coordinated the

city and county’s infrastructural efforts, primarily for the construction of the garages that served as
platforms for The Banks’ apartments, hotels, and commercial spaces. Carter, based in Atlanta, had hired
Dan McCarthy, a local with development experience in the downtown core, to represent its interests in the
city, and provide a local presence for their involvement in the project. The Joint Banks Steering
Committee, the group of local officials and corporate executives advising on the project, convinced
Deatrick to return to the city in 2008 to manage The Banks Public Partnership (he had moved to
Washington, D.C. after completing the Fort Washington Way project). By the time I arrived, Deatrick had
already moved into directing the city’s new streetcar project, and his role on The Banks had been taken
over by Phil Beck, who had a background in architectural design and construction management. The
Banks Public Partnership and Carter collaborated closely, coordinating on construction schedules,

35

Carter was in the role of master developer, while Dawson oversaw financing for the project. In 2017,
the City of Cincinnati, Hamilton County, and Carter announced they were mutually concluding their
relationship for The Banks. Progress on the project had begun to slow down, with difficulty maintaining
tenants or finding investors for later stages of the build out
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producing public progress reports, and determining design elements, down to the shape of the curbs and
the style of street lamps.
I joined Phil Beck and Marie Gemelli-Carol in The Banks Public Partnership offices, a doublewide trailer tucked into a corner of The Banks footprint that is still awaiting the construction of its parking
garage platform, meaning it sits two stories below street-level compared to the other parts of The Banks
that have already been developed. Gemelli-Carol, President of Starboard Strategy Corp, described how
she became involved in the project, responding to a request for proposals in 2008 to design and
implement a public relations plan for The Banks Public Partnership. According to Gemelli-Carol, it was a
challenging environment in 2008, first because of the economic downturn, but also because of the
inherent difficulties in having to make “concrete sexy” as well as deeply ingrained doubt among the public
that The Banks was ever actually going to happen. “So we came in, and we did some baseline research.
We decided that, yeah, people still believed that nothing would ever be built,” and in response they:

…took every dollar we could in our budget to show people that it was happening. You don’t argue
with someone in words, to say ‘Oh that’s not true,’ you know. What you do is you continue to
show them. So we tried to tell the story [of The Banks progress].

Where the Waterways Council prefers to show a depersonalized space of river transportation,
administered by experienced technocrats and “river men,” the strategy for The Banks has been to show a
lively space of fun, relaxation, and coming together, a “magnet for anybody who wants to come downtown
and reconnect with the riverfront” in Gemelli-Carol’s words. From planning to implementation, the focus
has been on highlighting diversity, from the inclusion of minority or women-owned businesses in
construction to promoting the multicultural crowd attracted to The Banks. According to Gemelli-Carol, no
one would ever have to “stage” a photo at The Banks to highlight diversity, because it is always on
display whenever anyone came downtown. The combination of technical expertise and development
knowledge at The Banks, which Gemelli-Carol and Starboard Strategies interpreted for the public, told a
very different story of what the “luxury river” represented to Cincinnati in contrast to the Ports of Cincinnati
& Northern Kentucky.
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This is not to say this framework departed radically from the legacies of the “working river.”
Throughout The Banks physical layout, it prominently features references to the city’s navigational
history, continuing themes first established in the adjacent riverfront parks to its east. While the old sports
stadium had been an enclosed bowl, providing an isolating experience for fans, the new baseball stadium
opened a wide panorama towards the river so attendees can watch boats pass on the Ohio River, and
incorporated steamboat smokestacks in the outfield wall, which belch smoke whenever a player hits a
homerun. An walkway adjacent to the stadium is home to the National Steamboat Monument, opened in
2002, which includes a massive paddlewheel replica, lofted in the air, and surrounded by twenty-four
motion-activated pylons, which play historic river noises, such as boat whistles, songs, and the shouts of
boat hands, recreating the soundscapes of the river (when it is actually working). In the new Smale
Riverfront Park, an interactive feature shows how water moves through a scale model of The Banks,
including a functional miniature lock and dam built in front of the miniature riverfront. All of these
references allude to the area’s steamboating history as well as its ongoing navigational usage. In
addition, a current focus for the Cincinnati Parks Department is constructing a public marina in front of
The Banks.
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The proposed marina will provide year-round service at an accessible location, attracting

pleasure boaters from all across the region to The Banks. Any visitors could dock for ten days in the
central riverfront area and walk into the city to enjoy The Banks or the Central Business District.
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Long-time efforts to create a docking facility for pleasure craft on the Central Riverfront had twice led to
the usage of wharf boats (converted from a tugboat and a barge) that could be moved during the winter,
but both proved largely unpopular and ultimately sank (Blackmore Smith 2016).
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Figure 5.1 – A lock and dam model placed in front of a map of The Banks, which is also supposed to pay
homage to the history of flooding in the area (Beall 2015). Photograph by author.
The incorporation of the historic river reflects the sustained interest in a steamboat “golden age”
and its links to modern day navigation. Proposals dating back to the 1960s recommended including
reconstructed steamboats on the shore, even placing one such boat in a pool of water, because it “would
lend authenticity” (Stanley Consultants 1967: 37) to the site. The excitement around bringing a marina to
the riverfront has similarly been tied to reopening “the south door to the city” according to one present-day
advocate, a return to the origins of the city. Yet, at the same time, on the part of riverfront industries, there
is a feeling of a double standard. According to one maritime business operator:

You look at the Chamber of Commerce’s website, you look at REDI’s website,
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you walk down to

the offices of City Hall or whatever, and people like to have pictures of the boats and the barges.
You know and everybody likes to say, “Gee we’re part of this great riverfront, look at our beautiful
37

The Regional Economic Development Initiative (REDI) is responsible for promoting Cincinnati’s
industrial potential.
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riverfront and look at these boats that go by,” and so on and so forth. But then when you start
saying, “Oh but by the way that boat needs land at that terminal down there to unload sand and
gravel and it’s a 12, it’s a 24-hour operation, and they’re banging and things, making noise all
night, and having some dust issues or whatever.” Now all of a sudden it’s “Oh, wait wait wait, we
like to see the boats, we just don’t need to see them here.”

This ambivalence leads to friction between marine industries and residential developments along
the riverfront, while the city government is often seen to be disinterested or actively against the interests
of navigation. One isolated terminal facility, located to the east of The Banks, has had several years of
disputes with residents who have occupied new condo buildings and townhouses in the area since the
early 2000s. The city has rezoned the area to restrict the terminal’s activities and ability to expand in the
future, leading to an unsuccessful lawsuit on the part of the port enterprise to overturn the regulations.
While this represents a extreme case, it is well known among the marine industry community as a clear
instance of the lack of appreciation for the “working river.”
Navigation is not the only issue that crosscuts The Banks and the Ports of Cincinnati & Northern
Kentucky. Flooding is another major concern to both developments. For its part, The Banks is presented
as an elegant solution to the flooding issues that have confounded riverfront developers for more than a
hundred years. The garage platforms, already one of the largest contiguous parking facilities in the
country and still growing, are the primary response to the issues of flooding. These garages allow high
water to pass under The Banks without affecting street life. By emphasizing a flood-resilient approach
rather than resisting flood waters, The Banks is able to work in concert with both the natural and
regulatory environments to create a sustainable development, seen as especially important in the context
of climate change that will likely bring more extreme flooding events (Deatrick 2015). The parking garages
let the Ohio River, when in flood stage, to flow them through without disrupting the area’s floodplain
storage capacity or causing backflow, accommodating the river rather than relying on costly alternatives
like energy-hungry pumps to push it back. Phil Beck, the Banks Public Partnership Project Executive,
described it as a kind of infrastructural “martial arts, where you just sort of, you don’t resist [the
river]...we’re just sort of moving with it.” At the same time, the parking garages then create development
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podiums raised above the 500-year flood zone, which can be sold to the master developer as air lots
outside of the flood zone, meaning tenants are not required to hold federal flood insurance and reducing
rental costs significantly.
This flood-resilient approach used at The Banks is a point of pride for the engineers and
developers. Most presentations of the project start with the area’s flood history, describing how the
innovative use of garage platforms finally enabled development to take place on the riverfront. Reminders
of flooding are built in the infrastructure as well, including a staircase from the bottom of the parking
garage up to street level that marks the crests of nine historic floods, as well as the heights of 10, 25, 50,
100, and 500-year floods. Yet, flood-resilience is not a core message The Banks development team or
The Banks Public Partnership pushes out when marketing the project. In their view, the association with
flooding would generate unnecessary doubts, especially since the modern river monitoring system will
give at least a two-day warning if the parking garage needs to be evacuated. According to a lead
developer for the project, since tenants are not required to sign up for flood insurance, the topic does not
organically arise as part the of the leasing (though commercial renters tend to be savvier about flooding),
and they are unlikely to bring it up. And for Beck:

...I guarantee you, if you got out there, you’re up anywhere on [street level of] our project, maybe,
I don’t know what percent, but probably over half of the people you talk to, if you say, ‘Do you
realize there’s a two-story parking garage below you right now?’ They’re be like ‘Huh?’ Most
people don’t make that connection.

While The Banks Public Partnership team is interested in increasing awareness of the parking garage to
generate more revenue, there is less need to inform the public that it serves a fundamental flood-related
function.
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Figure 5.2 – Staircase in The Banks showing past flood levels. Photograph by author.

For their part, maritime businesses have long argued that their port facilities were one of the few
riverfront uses that could adapt to regular flooding. Many of the businesses are located directly in the
floodplain and the bulk commodities the ports deal in, such as pig iron or coal, can be immersed in flood
waters without significant issues (though newer bulk commodities like fertilizers pose their own
challenges). And flood management plans ensure that most companies can continue operating even
during high water. The owner of one facility drove me around his site, pointing out why the operation,
which specialized in coal, was able to continue with deliveries even during major high water events,
ensuring that customers received their shipments on time. Like The Banks though, CORBA and their port
members make little overt use of their flood resilience to market the Ports of Cincinnati & Northern
Kentucky. It is an important feature of their worksites, but does little to attract business. The few maritime
businesses located outside of the 500-year flood zone are much more likely to market this fact rather than
the other way around.
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Perhaps surprisingly though, maritime businesses are eager to market their environmental
credentials when talking about the Ports of Cincinnati & Northern Kentucky. While manufacturing and
logistics companies are often portrayed as polluters, CORBA promotes the environmental benefits that
come with shipping by barge, since the energy costs per ton mile of freight are significantly lower
compared to rail or tractor trailers. According to CORBA’s Executive Director Eric Thomas, the use of
barge transportation “alleviates congestion off the highway, which also serves to take the highest polluting
mode of transport [trucking]...out of the picture, and move it over to the least polluting, which is water. The
same with rail to water” Part of this strategy to promote the river as a more environmentally friendly option
is represented by the MARAD’s M-70 designation. Renaming the Ohio River as the M-70 repositions it as
a “green highway,” an alternative to the “crumbling” interstate highway and rail systems. According to one
maritime business owner, MARAD’s M-70 designation was a way to communicate that the river was an
efficient and greener space of transport, as well as to support new approaches like container-on-barge
technologies. RiverWorks Discovery is a major vehicle to spread this message, comparing the
environmental impacts of river barges compared to rail or trucking, while Errin Howard also highlights
other environmentally-sensitive work the industry does, such as on-board recycling programs, organizing
riverbank clean-ups, and using biodegradable chemicals onboard their vessels.
In terms of The Banks, water pollution plays a less clear cut role in how the project is promoted.
Certainly, most individuals on the development and engineering side recognize that improvements in
water quality has been a key factor in enabling the reinvention of the riverfront as a residential and
recreational space, even though the vast majority of The Banks’ visitors have little direct interaction with
the water. Still, this is in line with representations of The Banks as a “healthy” destination according to
John Schneider, with wide sunny streets and a gentle slope that draws pedestrians to the river view. The
Smale Riverfront Park is fundamental to this image, helping The Banks cultivate an image as an attractive
green space where people can go to refresh themselves and connect with the river. In recognition of this
importance to the success of The Banks, all tenants pay into a fund that helps maintain the park and
preserve its green space. At the same time, local groups put on events like Paddlefest (a kayaking and
canoeing festival) and the Great Ohio River Swim (a short swimming race across the Ohio River,
departing from The Banks to a point near the Kentucky shore and then heading back to The Banks).
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C. New Approaches to Infrastructure on the Riverfront

These individuals behind The Banks and the Ports of Cincinnati & Northern Kentucky have in
many ways continued the legacies of earlier groups, building their claims to the riverfront through their
relationships to flooding, pollution, and navigation. Yet, the past two decades have seen an important
transition in terms of the assemblage of infrastructure, technical expertise, redevelopment, and the Ohio
River on the Cincinnati riverfront. Although previously I argued that infrastructure has been a mediated
between developers and experts – bringing them together, whether in conflict or collaboration –
increasingly, as described at the beginning of this chapter, technical experts are comfortable adopting
developer arguments and developers are eager to tackle technical problems like erosion or community
health. This goes beyond just, for instance, a realtor imitating what an engineer might say, to instead
using infrastructure as a means to simultaneously present market-oriented and technocratic logics as
interdependent.
I want to be careful to clarify that I am not arguing that redevelopment knowledge and technical
expertise are merging in practice to become a new hybrid formation. In fact, many of the individuals I
spoke to continued to point to the differences between their fields, particularly between engineers and
developers, as well as the difficulties in bringing them together to collaborate. According to John
Schneider:

I think there’s always a struggle in infrastructure between the economists, which I support, and
the engineers. The economists ask the kind of critical question, “Why are we doing it this way?”
while engineers will just say, “How can we build it the cheapest? How can we make it the safest?”
You know all that stuff.

Another individual described the issue as, “Engineers don’t see in grey. They see in black or white. Either
it’s on or it’s off. It’s the solution, and this is...the best solution based upon their experience and their
professional development and their knowledge.” One development official I spoke to, when I mentioned
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my conversations with engineers, simply said, “My condolences”. For their part, engineers and other
technical experts largely viewed developers as impractical but necessary partners, with whom they were
often engaged in, what one engineer termed, a “dance” to secure the information and resources
necessary to proceed with work, or in the case of regulatory functions, to ensure that legal requirements
were being followed.
Throughout my fieldwork, these informants were eager to interpret my interests as conforming to
one or the other of their professional viewpoint. Many individuals working in development typically seized
on my Cincinnati background and admitted passion for the city to assume I was a booster. They assumed
I most interested in understanding the economic impact of the projects we were discussing and that I
wanted to ultimately contribute in my own way to local growth. When not viewed primarily as a local
booster, many people I interviewed, particularly if coming from a more technical background, saw me as a
fellow expert. They shared research with me and sought to engage me as an interlocutor similarly
concerned with the abstract problems they faced. One waterways lobbyist even told me, “We need more
eggheads like you.” My experience with the ways individuals sorted my background pointed to the
continued importance of these categories in everyday interactions around waterfront infrastructure, as
well as the stark divides in the ways people perceived them. Phil Beck, as lead at The Banks Public
Partnership, was very grateful for his professional development in both the technical field of architectural
design and more development-oriented field of construction management. “With my background, I can
kind of step in the middle of certain discussions and...play referee and figure out exactly what the
situation is and how we address it.” To many involved in infrastructural projects on the river, these
continued acts of translation and mediation are necessary between developers, engineers, and other
technical experts due to their significant professional differences.
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Yet, despite these perceived

differences, government officials are increasingly presenting arguments to the public that the
interdependence of technical and development logics is fundamental to the success of new projects.
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See also Reuss (2008), who has described an increasing expectation for engineers to be involved in
public debates directly, so that negotiating ability now sometimes seems more important than technical
proficiency. This was certainly the case for Deatrick, the lead city engineer on both Fort Washington Way
and The Banks, but he argued it was specifically his urban planning background that had given him more
appreciation for the “person-to-person” aspect of his work.
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For its part, The Banks is often portrayed as only being made possible because of a special
collaboration between technical and development actors. Cincinnati’s urban elites had long seen the
central riverfront as an intractable problem, since it contained what was obviously prime real estate, but,
according to the common view, was limited from reaching its full potential by regular flooding. Deatrick,
the previous director at The Banks Public Partnership, wrote an article for the journal Water Management
about the benefits of flood-resilient redevelopment and The Banks’ parking garage infrastructure. He
argues that: “Since the founding of Cincinnati on the banks of the Ohio River in 1788, the city’s floodprone central riverside area has been exploited in multiple waves of development, none of which were
viewed a success – until now” (2015: 85). In this perspective, the move to build flood-resilient parking
garage infrastructure finally unlocked the development potential of the area by also dealing with the more
technical issue of preserving floodplain capacity and maintaining a harmonious relationship with the river.
The parking garages resolved both issues in one simple solution, managing the flood threat while also
creating new air property rights above the parking garage that can be efficiently developed. Furthermore,
by generating revenue, the parking garages help ensure the infrastructure itself is financially sustainable.
The combination of technical expertise and development knowledge deployed at The Banks is seen as a
major breakthrough. According to Beck, “Why did it take us two-hundred years to figure this out? It just
did.” It is not just one or the other – since many previous proposals could have resolved some of these
issues – but the integrated approach that is seen to make The Banks a success. In his article, Deatrick
describes the importance to the project of “integrating [flood-resilience] into a master plan and, in turn,
how it made a dramatic difference to the development of the [Central Riverfront] and turned it from a
regional liability to a point of regional pride” (2015: 87). For Deatrick and The Banks team, without floodresilience there would be no redevelopment, and without redevelopment there could be no flood
resilience. Even though Deatrick, Beck, and other experts involved in the project did not approach it
primarily from a development viewpoint, they have been able to powerfully articulate why these two
approaches go hand-in-hand, and how careful infrastructural design was the key the unlocking all of the
problems posed by the Central Riverfront.
The effect has been imbue infrastructure with the capacity to serve as a cure-all, ready to fix any
ill. In this usage, “infrastructure” is an extremely potent and open-ended symbol, represented as both a
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public good and a private good, resolving technical as well as development issues According to Flyvbjerg,
buoyed by both public and private sources of support, "current spending on infrastructure constitutes the
biggest investment boom in history, measured as share of world GDP" (2009: 362). The literature on
public-private partnerships has already charted in-depth the allure of approaches bringing together
governmental and private sector actors (Boardman et al 2015, Brash 2011), which is an important
component of this process, but the infrastructural changes I want to describe in many ways exceed these
parameters. Whereas infrastructure has very frequently been represented as the “public” component of
public-private partnerships, this is not necessarily the case in terms of this new more flexible approach to
infrastructure. To this point, so far I have discussed this new expert-development assemblage in terms of
infrastructure for The Banks, a classic example of a public-private partnership, but I will now turn to the
Ports of Cincinnati & Northern Kentucky, an apparently very different approach to infrastructure.
Unlike The Banks, there is no discrete location that one can visit and find the Ports of Cincinnati &
Northern Kentucky. Rather, the redesignated area brings together a collection of disparate maritime
businesses stretched out over 226.5 miles of shoreline on the Ohio River and Licking River. Many of
these business, organized through the CORBA, work closely with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and
the Waterways Council to advocate for and maintain the lock and dam on the river. At the same time,
they are deeply suspicious of government intervention, with maritime business owners hotly debating
efforts to seek federal support to develop port facilities integrating container-on-barge technologies.
According to one terminal director,

We’d be more than happy to put the capital in to go ahead and start unloading [containers], we’ll
do it, if there’s a deal, we’ll do it. What frustrates us a little bit, is sometimes that you know there’s
government money, and...private industry does pretty good. Between us and our competitors in
town, all of us want more business, so there’s not enough to go around now. There’s no need to
put public money into another dock that just going to compete with private industry.

For this terminal director, instead of focusing on attracting government funds, CORBA should focus on
marketing to bring more business to the Ports of Cincinnati & Northern Kentucky. “Get the business to
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Cincinnati, then we can all compete for it...as opposed to sponsoring an outfit to go bring something in.”
Eric Thomas, CORBA’s Executive Director, agreed about the importance of marketing the region in a way
that brought attention to the river. “From a marketing perspective...everybody likes to brag about the fact
that Cincinnati is within a day’s drive of 60% the population of the United States and 55% of the
manufacturing. So what? It’s a spot on the map and you can draw a circle. My question is what does that
really mean? And what is the impact of the river?”
For Thomas, an important first step in this process has been the development of CORBA’s Port
Asset Inventory, an effort to collect and make accessible data on the region’s river industries. Thomas
and CORBA envisioned the project in order to provide logistics information that can be used to attract
more commerce to the region, promoting the area’s unique local capacities. In the past decade,
Cincinnati has emerged as an important delivery and logistics hub. CORBA is eager to integrate itself as
part of this booming field. Called the Central Ohio River Information System (CORIS), and developed in
conjunction with the Ohio-Kentucky-Indiana Regional Council of Governments, the database provides
granular information about all the maritime businesses found throughout the Ports of Cincinnati &
Northern Kentucky (whether they are CORBA members or not). A pivotal part of this strategy has been
the message that maritime businesses are a key part of the region’s infrastructure. Available on the
CORBA website, CORIS’ byline invites users to “Explore Infrastructure Along the Central Ohio River” and
then shows an extensive list of all the privately-owned and operated ports along the Ohio River, sortable
by dock type, storage facilities, and their links to other transportation systems like trucking and rail. The
port inventory asset has helped reposition maritime businesses as vital infrastructure in and of
themselves, with CORBA using CORIS to make visible and legitimize the presence of private
infrastructure on the river. Thomas has pushed the CORIS project and this infrastructure message
through media hits and public forums, arguing that for the region to really effectively market its maritime
infrastructure, local officials and the public at large need to understand what already exists. CORBA’s
infrastructuralization of the maritime businesses making up the Ports of Cincinnati & Northern Kentucky
has driven home repeatedly the public function these port facilities serve, to the point that a reporter for
the industry outlet Marine Link, in a feature article on CORBA, felt it was necessary to clarify that the
group could not actually “officially sponsor projects needing public funds, e.g., serving as the “public” half
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of a public-private partnership” (Ewing 2017), since even though it appeared to be acting like a public
body, CORBA remains a private entity.
In this sense, this infrastructuralization of maritime industries can be thought of as countermovement to the privatization of infrastructure – which seeks to transfer publicly-owned infrastructure to
private ownership. Instead, here CORBA asks for recognition of the public importance of private
businesses (though stopping far short of pushing to nationalize these businesses). One of the ways they
have reinforced this argument is through enlisting supply chain and logistics experts from the University of
Cincinnati and Northern Kentucky University to help them understand river traffic and legitimize their
efforts to improve and market the region’s assets. According to Thomas, “from a maritime perspective,
technology, and particularly ‘big data,’ will continue to shape global and domestic supply chains”
(Cincinnati Business Journal Staff 2015). In my conversations with Thomas he referenced several times
the need to “get somebody analytically answering the question” of the river’s impact. Even the muchcelebrated redesignation of the Ports of Cincinnati & Northern Kentucky is fundamentally about expert
analysis and legibility, involving U.S. Army Corps of Engineers statisticians compiling data about the
activities of private maritime businesses. Like with The Banks, the Ports of Cincinnati & Northern
Kentucky is built on the relationship between local maritime developers and technocratic experts from
government and academia. Without one or the other, the Ports of Cincinnati & Northern Kentucky would
not exist, literally in this case, and sustaining their interdependence through the symbolic work of
“infrastructure” is at the core of CORBA’s efforts.
For locals, given this emerging emphasis on infrastructure that fuses together the public and
private, it was thus not completely surprising when U.S. President Donald Trump came to the Cincinnati
riverfront on June 7, 2017 to formally launch his infrastructure push. Since his campaign, President
Trump has adopted infrastructure as a core part of his economic message, but in a way that can appear
baffling to many observers. On the one hand, he consistently frames infrastructure as a public good,
necessary to ensure the US’s national strength. His calls for increased federal investment and leadership
to rebuild the country’s infrastructure often explicitly criticize past strategies to devolve infrastructural
oversight responsibilities to the state or local level. Similar to how Brash (2011) has described
Bloomberg’s administration in New York, these arguments are based on a form of managerial (though not
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necessarily scientific) expertise intended to preclude political debate, pointing out how President Trump’s
past experience as a builder make him uniquely suited to these tasks. At the same time, President Trump
seeks to expand private investment in and control over U.S. infrastructure, common in many other
countries, while also cutting or streamlining regulations involved in the process. In infrastructure,
President Trump has thus found an ideal symbol to promote his mixture of a nationalist managerial state
and supply-side economics, increasingly referred to as Trumponomics (Locke 2017).
Appearing at Rivertowne Marina on Cincinnati’s East Side, President Trump delivered his
infrastructure speech with the Ohio River as a backdrop, the podium positioned so audience members
could see a tugboat behind him, draped in a massive U.S. flag and towing barges loaded with West
Virginia coal. His speech led with populist themes about “rivers, like the beautiful Ohio River, [that] carry
the lifeblood of our heartland,” and he made a pointed effort to celebrate the workers and businesses
crucial “to help us build the roads, the bridges, the tunnels and the waterways of tomorrow,” while also
criticizing neoliberal policies that had left infrastructures “crumbling” across the country. President Trump
particularly highlighted the role of developers, inviting “a couple of the greatest builders in America, Steve
Roth of Vornado [and] Richard Lefrak of Lefrak” to join him on the stage. This was a marked departure
from President Obama’s infrastructural message, which stressed new technologies, innovative
engineering, and the importance of education (Obama 2010, 2014). Notably absent from the speech were
mentions of scientists or engineers, and particular any recognition of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
given the location and focus on waterways infrastructure. But, as President Trump delved into praising
maritime transportation, he also repeated many of the expert supply chain and logistics arguments that
CORBA and others deploy to justify the role of their maritime businesses, stating that: “The contents of
just one nine-barge towboat, like the one behind me, carries the equivalent of 1,000 semi-tractor trailers.
People don't realize it. People don't realize it, but they do now,” and “More than half of all the American
steel is produced within 250 miles of where we're standing right now and its production depends on the
inland waterway system...”
President Trump, much like CORBA and The Banks, is pushing forward a new vision of
infrastructure built on the interdependence of development knowledge and expertise. Even though each
has their distinct arrangements, this emergent infrastructural assemblage has proven to be widely
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popular. As Gusterson (2017) points out, for President Trump, despite a blue-collar populist narrative, this
approach has also appealed to many members of the “petty bourgeoisie...small-business owners,
accountants, and pharmacists” (212), who are invigorated by the patriotic overtones and appeals to free
markets, while also feeling reassured by the reliance on business acumen and “analytical” arguments.
For its part, CORBA has been invigorated by President Trump’s visit and a subsequent study of the
region by the U.S. Department of Transportation, with Thomas stating “It was a big deal for us to get that
kind of prominent mention” (Paeth 2018). At The Banks, despite recent delays phases that saw Carter
exit as master developer in 2017, the project has continued to receive massive support for its
infrastructural work, resulting in $1,343,600,000 of public investment for the project through 2013
(Deatrick 2015).
The current popularity of infrastructure on the Ohio River stands out when contrasted with other
contexts, such as that described by Bear (2015) on the Hooghly River around Kolkata. In the latter case,
even though many of the spaces of the urban riverfront are nationalized, because of crippling state debt,
the infrastructure of docks, buoys, and pilot ships needed to make the river economically productive have
all been left to decay in order to maximize revenue. Rather than a potent symbol capable of creating new
value as it is increasingly seen in Cincinnati, on the Hoogly River, infrastructure is an undesirable
expense, a budget line to be reduced or eliminated to meet the needs of austerity. Interestingly, Bear
(2015) also notes that the decay of infrastructure has been accompanied by a belief among port workers
that their masculine courage is weakening. If anything in Cincinnati, based on the interviews I conducted,
most of the men associated with planning these projects would associate the changing concepts of
infrastructure as sustaining white masculinity, but also requiring it to evolve by being responsive to new
actors like bicyclists or environmental groups that are also making claims to the riverfront.

D. Infrastructural Remedies

Through these efforts, infrastructure has gained a new kind of visibility. While Star (1999) argued
that infrastructure is meant to be invisible or taken for granted, more recent studies have pointed to the
need to examine closely how infrastructure is made either invisible or visible in specific contexts (Carse
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2012, Larkin 2013). While Star’s blanket claim has obvious limitations, at the time it was written, it had
clear relevance for many in a neoliberal moment when the private sector far outshone the public sector,
and when developers and technocrats relegated discussions about infrastructure and government
redistribution to the background (Logan and Molotch 1987). Clearly, in the current context, infrastructure
has returned to the forefront once again, attracting significant new support and attention. Yet, it is not the
sort of modernist awe-inspiring visibility that Kaika (2005) describes in her study of early twentieth century
Greek water infrastructure, where massive dams adorned with classical architectural elements became
the site of popular day-trips for urban residents to marvel over, representing the victory of the technocratic
state over nature and society. Rather, as infrastructure has become an increasingly flexible tool to bind
together development and technocratic expertise, it is not the physical site of infrastructure that is so
visible, but the act of creating and performing infrastructural functions that attracts attention and value.
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For President Trump, the importance of the symbolic role of infrastructure is clear given that he continues
to promote his infrastructure plan despite the fact that the “blue-collar” appeal of massive construction
projects is often its role as a response to unemployment and the U.S. is currently experiencing historically
high employment levels (White 2018). Infrastructure in this sense appears as the solution that actually
goes in search of problems to resolve; “green infrastructure” enables “soft development” and “smart”
infrastructure undergirds tech-driven urbanism. According to Bear, infrastructure has recently emerged as
“an abductive sign of a productive force” and a “promise of prosperity to come in spite of the ruins around
us” (Venkatesan et al 2017: 5), giving infrastructure a life of its own. This new symbolic role of
infrastructure, rather than being associated exclusively with government investment, makes it accessible
to a wide range of private and public actors, and moves beyond any one rationale for why infrastructure is
necessary.
In this respect, the current configuration of infrastructure resembles mid-century discussions
40

around housing in the U.S.

After intense debate about the role of government in guaranteeing a right to
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Although many I spoke to at The Banks and about Fort Washington Way also mentioned the
importance of considering design and appearance in building infrastructure, an approach the Deatrick first
introduced to the project by having a urban design firm take a prominent role in creating Fort Washington
Way. Deatrick’s goal was to increase the impact of the visual appearance of the infrastructure, with
decorative retaining walls, unique pavers, special cable stays, and many other elements to make the area
more attractive.
40
Much appreciation to Dana-Ain Davis for suggesting this line of thought.
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housing during the Great Depression (Baxandall and Ewen 2000), the idea of housing that ultimately
emerged relied on the private sector leading massive suburban expansion through heavy federal subsidy.
This approach combined arguments about private and public benefits that made houses appear as the
solution to a range of issues affecting the country, including uncertain economic growth, urban crowding,
and the need to cultivate consumer demand. Much as the “house” became increasingly visible as a
flexible way to resolve numerous problems in the post-World War II period, the new image of
“infrastructure” has seen it portrayed as uniquely situated to resolve current predicaments of climate
change, weak growth, and insecurity. This in turn has led to the embrace of infrastructure by an diverse
and apparently conflicting range of actors, from the Trump administration to the Obama administration,
and from The Banks mixed-use development to the Ports of Cincinnati & Northern Kentucky.
But, as Lipsitz (2006) points out for housing, despite claims that the new integrated governmental
and private sector approach to housing would benefit everyone, in fact structural conditions of racism
meant that while housing appeared as a universal panacea, it overwhelming accrued benefits to white
communities. Ownership of construction companies on the production side, and, on the consumption
side, preferential access to mortgages for whites, redlining, and urban renewal programs that failed to
provide relocation services for displaced communities of color, among many other factors, shaped the
way housing’s benefits were unevenly distributed. Similarly, in terms of how “infrastructure” is presented
today, even as it argued that everyone will benefit from these projects, the reality is that the vast majority
of infrastructural decision-making power remains with the same groups that have always made
determinations about the role, placement, and scope of these projects. As described earlier in this
chapter, the present-day arrangement for creating infrastructure in many ways closely resemble the
conditions that produced the Ohio Valley Improvement Association (OVIA) or the Ohio River Valley Water
Sanitation Commission (ORSANCO). Many of the older, white men in leadership positions, from both the
technical and development fields even have family connections to the river that stretch back multiple
generations.
My own background as a white male from Cincinnati, and in particular my interest in the history of
the river, helped me connect with my elite informants in ways that I do not think would have been possible
otherwise, providing an entry point to conversations around governmental redistribution, private financing,
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and local power that are frequently hard to access for social scientists. Rather than as an external
observer, many of my informants perceived me as someone equally interested in preserving the
infrastructural heritage they were invested in.
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There have certainly been changes, as with the increased

(if circumscribed) participation of women in these discussions, and the increasingly common usage of
inclusion clauses for publicly-funded project, which stipulate the employment of a certain percentage of
minority or women-owned businesses on projects receiving tax dollars. Largely though, these new
arrangements have done little to adjust how infrastructural transformations are conceived, negotiated,
and maintained; elites continue to use these projects to shape the urban environment to their ends and to
meet their goals. When talking about the Fort Washington Way project with Schneider, he emphasized
how, after his proposal gained support from the powerful Cincinnati Business Committee, made up of the
CEOs of the largest local corporations, the Governor’s office conveniently “found” $75 million that it had
overlooked in the capital budget to advance the project. New support for infrastructure has not meant new
power arrangements in deciding what does and does not represent a public benefit.
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As a result, these infrastructural improvements predominantly benefit wealthier and whiter
communities, so that infrastructure becomes a key means of continuing to buttress whiteness in
Cincinnati. This is clearly the case for The Banks where the level of investment has created a pressure for
returns that are only available via luxury housing and hotels, high-end commercial tenants, and highprofile office tenants. Where the Central Bottoms once stood, a neighborhood with affordable and
centrally-located spaces for residences, small-scale industry, and warehousing,
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the area has been

transformed into an upscale space of consumption. The presence of the new riverfront park is meant to
mitigate this exclusivity, yet it can only have limited impacts in terms of making the area accessible to the
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Although there were also limits in this regard; despite several efforts I failed to talk with Bob Castellini,
owner of the baseball team located on the riverfront and a major force in pushing forward The Banks
project. The Castellini family has deep roots on the riverfront through operating their wholesale grocery
business as well as through leadership roles in the OVIA.
42
Still today, when local organizations or governments from Hamilton County want to apply for support for
infrastructure projects from the State of Ohio capital budget every two years, the requests have to be
routed through the Cincinnati Business Committee, a private body, which determines whose requests will
be forwarded to the state legislature for consideration.
43
Even after the construction of Riverfront Stadium in 1970, the area remained a viable option for lowincome individuals seeking employment, due to the continued presence of the wholesale grocers. In the
1981 made-for-TV movie The Pride of Jesse Hallam, Johnny Cash – playing an illiterate coal miner who
moves from Kentucky to Cincinnati – finds his first urban job down on the riverfront working for an Italian
grocer.
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full community. It is clear here that more intense infrastructural investment has been critical prerequisite to
shaping The Banks as a “luxury brand” according to one developer I spoke to. A number of similar
developments enabled by new flood-resilient infrastructure now extend along Cincinnati’s eastern
riverfront, slowly pushing out low-income African-American and white communities in the city (Halperin
1998). Similar developments are occurring in Northern Kentucky as well. Across the city, numerous other
communities have seen increased infrastructure – such as the downtown streetcar, new highway exits, or
improved high-speed internet networks – help lead to gentrification and the displacement of mostly lowincome communities of color.
Meanwhile, the maritime businesses that make up the Ports of Cincinnati & Northern Kentucky
portray themselves as the opposite face of this infrastructural gentrification. While The Banks is the
“luxury river,” the Ports of Cincinnati & Northern Kentucky represent the “working river.” Their version of
the riverfront, built around private infrastructure, is meant to be more accessible, providing career
opportunities for low-income individuals and the possibility to grow the local economy through improved
transportation efficiency. However, ultimately, the terminal facility owners are primarily concerned with
increasing the value of their business and property. Through its research on maritime infrastructure and
its promotional activities, CORBA’s port development strategy is focused on enabling these local
businesses to grow, and as they are more successful this will make riverfront property more costly and
inaccessible, mirroring in many ways the processes taking place at The Banks and other riverfront
residential redevelopments that make up the “luxury river.”
The parallels between these groups were driven home for me when talking to a terminal operator,
well-known in the city because of his dispute with with condo owners and the city who he argued was
trying to zone him out of existence. This case is often taken up as an example of the lack of recognition
and respect for what the “working river” contributes to the city. But, in our conversations, this terminal
owner also mentioned that his own family had considered redeveloping their property with condos, but
building height restrictions had led them to abandon the plan as unprofitable compared to their current
terminal facility. To this maritime operator, it obviously made good business sense to explore all the
options. At the same time, this flexible approach undermines a claim that the infrastructures operated by
maritime industries serve a public good beyond just the profit imperatives of individual business owners.
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In this sense, no one on the river would ever suggest recategorizing the maritime industries as a public
utility, such as Bear (2015) describes for the decrepit port facilities of Kolkota.
Under this emerging assemblage of infrastructure, these projects bring developers and experts
ever closer together and increasingly, makes them interdependent, so that it is unlikely what could be
considered either a “development” or “expert” justification for an infrastructural project would be put
forward by itself. Instead, it is more and more common to see an extended and heterogeneous list of
outcomes that an infrastructural project will enable its backers to accomplish. This claiming to integrate
multiple objectives through a single infrastructural project, which several off my informants referred to as
the “comprehensive approach,” has proven very alluring, and more difficult for critics to dispute. As
Ottinger (2013) has shown through her study of a Louisiana oil refinery that saw significant local
resistance due to health concerns, the company deployed a combination of both economic and expert
rationales to stress that they would be taking a responsible and comprehensive approach, a tactic that
was extremely successful in muting community push back. Similarly in Cincinnati, the combination of
technical and development expertise has increased public buy-in for these projects. Yet, despite its
presentation as a public good that will benefit everyone, these infrastructural projects have only served to
further reinforce white elite control over Cincinnati’s built environment. The intermixing of development
and expertise knowledge have reinforced white elite control over infrastructure to determine the contours
of urban development, thus creating and sustaining further forms of social exclusion in Cincinnati.
Paradoxically, more infrastructure in places like the riverfront has corresponded with less tangible public
control over this area, particularly in terms of the spaces of the river itself, as physical, economic, and
bureaucratic entanglements surrounding each new infrastructure turn the landscape into a briar patch of
crosscutting regulations and vested interests.

E. Conclusion

Since the 1990s, infrastructure in Cincinnati has moved from being an afterthought to now being
presented as the perfect solution to a host of problems. The interlacing of development goals and
technical capacities has been critical to this shift, as each new infrastructural project comes accompanied
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by a magical laundry list of problems it will resolve. Fort Washington Way and The Banks would fix
sewage problems, simplify traffic, promote public transportation, make flood problems a thing of the past,
and on and on. The Ports of Cincinnati & Northern Kentucky would reduce pollution, increase
transportation efficiency and employment, promote the city, and bring new trade opportunities. Through a
planning process, developers and engineers make it seem as if they have considered every angle. This
tactic is beyond being apolitical, rather it welcomes public input and debate that can generate additional
concerns to be resolved by infrastructure. The construction of Fort Washington Way provided a perfect
example of this rationale. When some critiques suggested that the project should consider whether light
rail could use these routes in the future, or when others argued that ideally Fort Washington Way would
be capped one day and enable further development of the potential air lots, the project engineers simply
spent ten of millions of extra dollars on reinforcing foundations and expanding throughways. They justified
these expenses as “foresight” so that these goals could potentially be realized one day and would save
millions in the future (Ben 2010).
While this new vision of infrastructure has presented itself as a cure-all, it has done little to
change relationships between the Cincinnati riverfront and Ohio River. Throughout this chapter, I have
largely avoided a discussion of the Ohio River as an engaged actor in the processes described here. This
is because I want to draw attention to the ways that these local projects that are integrating development
and technical logics, such as The Banks and the Ports of Cincinnati & Northern Kentucky, have
increasingly mediated direct relationships with the Ohio River. As numerous studies have shown,
infrastructure has brought water into almost aspect of urban life, intricately connecting the spaces of the
city through pipes, reservoirs, water towers, and numerous other water production technologies (Kaika
2005, Swyngedouw 2004, Gandy 2014). The result has been to interpret the city as a “space of flows”
where the impact of water’s materiality (alongside the effects of many other non-human urban actors)
makes it impossible to separate the urban from the natural (Kaika 2005).
Yet, in Cincinnati, while the materiality of water and associated infrastructure has increasingly
shaped the city, the Ohio River itself has become more marginal. A recent article in the Cincinnati
Enquirer about Paddlefest, the annual Ohio River kayaking and canoeing event, described the river’s role
in these terms:
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Two scientists conducted a study where people watched a video of a group of people passing
three basketballs in a circle. Half are dressed in white; half in black. Viewers are instructed to
count the number of times a player in white passes the ball. While this is going on, a person in a
gorilla suit walks into the middle of the game, beats its chest and walks off screen. Only about
half of the people who watch the video notice the gorilla. And for 364 days a year, the Ohio River
is sort of like that invisible gorilla of Cincinnati, [Paddlefest volunteer Jerry] Schulte said. It's there,
a background of our daily lives. But do we actually notice it? Do we actually see it? (Blackmore
Smith 2018)

Across this dissertation, I have tried to show how elites have sought to move the physical space
of the Ohio River farther and farther away from everyday life, even as it has become increasingly
important as a setting for urban redevelopment projects in Cincinnati. The Banks and the Ports of
Cincinnati & Northern Kentucky represent in many ways a culmination of this process. In vastly different
ways, they have positioned the Ohio River as an external object removed from everyday life, while
simultaneously seeking to increase its visibility in the city.
The Banks represents the “luxury river” as an object of visual consumption, to be enjoyed from a
distance but not up close. One developer termed this view the city’s “southern draw,” the fact that in
recent decades the urban gaze had been pulled back to the river as a beautiful natural space (after the
processes of “cleaning up” the Ohio River described in the previous chapter). Urban developers cultivated
this perspective, building thousands of condos and townhomes designed around stunning views of the
river. The Banks is in many ways the culmination of this movement, bringing the natural river as near as
possible without encouraging direct contact. Smale Riverfront Park almost disappears as it descends
towards the river, with patchy clumps of grass and litter predominating along the shore. Meanwhile, the
Ports of Cincinnati & Northern Kentucky and CORBA continue to push the message introduced by the
OVIA more than a century ago: that maritime navigation represents a fundamental contribution to the
city’s economy. The practical and technical skills of the “river men” and the USACE can best make the
river productive The Ohio River lock and dam system is core to sustaining the “working river,” even as it
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alters the hydrology of the river and making the river less useful for waterfront residents, bending the river
to the needs of barges and tugs above all else.
In distinct ways, both projects reinforce elite control over the Ohio River while making it less
hospitable to everyday use. As a result, the people most directly interacting with the river on a regular
basis are a limited few: boathands, water works and sanitation engineers, pleasure craft owners, USACE
engineers, and dock workers. If we think of the Ohio River as an assemblage constituted through its
relationships, all of Cincinnati’s residents are intimately connected to the river through the pipes, sewers,
and purification plants that circulate the river’s water, but only a limited amount of persons actually deal
with the Ohio River itself as a material force, a non-human actor shaping the world around it. In his study
of lawn culture in the United States, Paul Robbins (2007) describes the ways that turfgrass lawns have
“controlled and disciplined” (xvi) suburban subjects to respond to their needs, in ways that shape what it
means to be a good neighbor or respectable property owner. While the Ohio River once exerted this kind
of influence on everyday life in Cincinnati – forcing urban residents to respond to its changes in course,
the diseases it brought, and the destruction of its floods – the efforts of white male developers and
experts have increasingly buffered most people from river life.
This is not to claim that the Ohio River has been “tamed” in any sense. As I have tried to show
throughout, rather the Ohio River has largely gone along with these changes, acting in favor of elite
interests on the river, whether through floods that eat away at low-income neighborhoods or increased
levels of pollution that make the river unpleasant for recreation or cohabitation. Over the last century,
local elites have rather learned how to work collaboratively with the Ohio River to support the goals of
white supremacy and capitalist development in Cincinnati. It has been a productive partnership that has
enabled them to remake the local riverfront over decades.
But is this what the Ohio River wants? In the recent shift to understand non-human actors and the
way they shape the world, there has been a particular emphasis on trying to understand the needs and
desires of these entities that are so different from human actors. Much of this focus has been in
recognizing the ways that human and non-humans mutually constitute one another, a viewpoint that
provides the basis for an alternative future oriented towards sustainability and mutual thriving, rather than
the destructive forces at the center of capitalism (Haraway 2008, Kohn 2013, Tsing 2015). Understanding
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the viewpoints of non-human actors is critical in developing this expanded awareness. As Kohn describes
it, “there is something about our everyday engagements with other kinds of creatures that can open new
kinds of possibilities for relating and understanding” (Kohn 2013: 7). But, at the same time, as Povinelli
points out, the desires of many non-human actors can differ wildly from what we define as mutual
flourishing – in fact many non-human actors can actually prefer the context of capitalist development
(2016: 12). While I do not think it is possible to determine whether the Ohio River “prefers” capitalism, its
actions have certainly worked in tandem with elites interests in Cincinnati over the past century. And as
local development and technical expert elites have sought to cut off most Cincinnati residents from the
Ohio River, they have been the ones who have benefited and learned the most from closely engaging
with the river.
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Chapter 6.
Conclusion

Cincinnati’s bicentennial took place in 1988. Numerous events, books, and souvenirs marked the
anniversary. Unsurprisingly, given the emphasis on the city’s origins, the river was a central theme
throughout. The “Tall Stacks Music, Arts, and Heritage Festival” brought fourteen historic riverboats and
more than 700,000 people to the waterfront, an event that reminded Cincinnatians of the “river water in
our veins” (Goetz 1999). Also, in the newly inaugurated Sawyer Point Park, the Greater Cincinnati
Foundation and local Contemporary Art Center jointly unveiled Cincinnati Gateway, a massive landscape
sculpture, 400 feet long by 145 feet wide, designed to celebrate the waterfront. The sculpture, or
“storyscape” as the artist Andrew Leicester has called it (Smithsonian American Art Museum n.d.: 3) is
comprised of a long narrow earthwork, running parallel to the river and topped by a walkway. A tunnel,
capped by an ornate bridge, bisects the earthwork, providing an entrance to the park. Various elements
from the Cincinnati area are incorporated into the sculpture, including local indigenous iconography and
references to the city’s geology, although the work is perhaps best known for introducing a new icon to
the city, the flying pig.
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However, the project’s central imagery is drawn from riverfront infrastructure (Smithsonian
American Art Museum n.d.). The main entryway imitates one of the Miami-Erie Canal locks, which had its
Ohio River terminus nearby. The central span represents the city’s many bridges, making the Cincinnati
area one of the most difficult stretches along the river for river pilots to navigate, and the walkway on top
of the earthwork includes a scaled replica of the entire Ohio River, on which Leicester chose to mark all
twenty-eight of the modern locks and dams operating on the river, from Pittsburgh down to Cairo. The
earthwork itself is also meant to pay tribute to the series of levees that protect Cincinnati and Northern
Kentucky from flooding. Once a visitor passes through the entry tunnel, they reach a small plaza
dominated by a towering Flood Column: the pillar marks the height of the city’s three highest floods, in
1884, 1937, and 1964. At the top of the column, there is – half-ominously, half-mischievously – a notch at
44

Leicester placed four winged pigs atop steamboat smokestacks, playfully harkening back to the city’s
early pork processing industry on the waterfront, which had earned it the name “Porkopolis.” Despite an
initial outcry from some quarters, including a protest at City Hall, the city soon adopted flying pig as its
own (Doss 1992). The symbol has appeared everywhere from t-shirts to the name of the city’s marathon.
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one hundred feet (twenty feet above the flood crest of 1937) next to a question mark, leaving open the
possibility of greater disasters in the future. Finally, the sculpture’s greenery, particularly the inclusion of
riparian plant species, draws attention to the river’s ongoing improvements in water quality.

Figure 6.1 – On top of Cincinnati Gateway, with a scale representation of the Ohio River and the lock and
dam system. Photograph by author.
Leicester stated that he intended to create Cincinnati Gateway as an intentionally apolitical
sculpture, and to do so he leaned extensively on the riverfront’s infrastructure to provide the raw material
for his storyscape (Doss 1992). The enormous investments in technologies to manage the city’s
relationship with the river have positioned infrastructure as the omnipresent, neutral, and familiar
background to the riverfront. Originally called internal improvements, and then public works, and most
recently infrastructure, elites in Cincinnati have promoted these Ohio River projects as necessary to
facilitate economic growth and also to improve individual well-being in the city.
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The literature on technopolitics (Mitchell 2002, Joyce 2003, Von Schnitzler 2016) have shown in
great depth the ways scientific and bureaucratic expertise have been used to position these construction
projects, small and large, as intentionally apolitical. In looking back at the past century of Cincinnati’s
relationship with the Ohio River and its riverfront, I have sought to trace this deployment of technopolitical
expertise in ways that also recognizes the important role and contributions of development knowledge.
From the ways I have described how infrastructural projects have been implemented on the Cincinnati
riverfront in past chapters, it is clear that bureaucratic experts were joined by development actors with
backgrounds in real estate, commerce, and industry, among other areas, who collectively helped shape
the form and objectives of each project in appreciable ways. There is significant epistemological overlap
between the formations of scientific expertise and development knowledge, as they are fundamentally
both elite claims to authority based on privileged experiences – professional formation in the case of
expertise (Isin 2001) and capital accumulation in the case of development (Cowen and Shenton 1996).
As such they shared many features in common, and at times can even appear to blur into one another,
with interchangeable rationales for why each represents privileged knowledge about how the world works.
Yet, in Cincinnati over much of the past century, they have been treated as two distinct groups of elite
actors who came together numerous times to resolve infrastructural issues that neither could sort out by
themselves.
Thus, the infrastructural assemblage of development knowledge and scientific expertise has
actually provided a productive tension that helps drive forward these riverfront projects, sourcing the
legitimacy and purpose of infrastructural improvements in multiple arguments distributed among divergent
actors acting collaboratively. Simply put, this tension brings elites from existing or emerging class
formations into conversation around infrastructural proposals, while also increasing the number of
available justifications at hand for the work they want to undertake. The compositions of these
heterogeneous groups in Cincinnati have varied widely, but are also defined by great continuity in terms
of race, gender, and elite status. The Ohio Valley Improvement Association (OVIA) brought together
federal Congressman, army engineers, “river men,” civic boosters, and professional lobbyists to discuss
navigation. Many of these same actors, joined by new individuals, showed up in later discussions around
flood control and pollution abatement. In Cincinnati, ruling families like the Tafts and Castellinis, as well
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as the activities of groups like the OVIA or the Riverfront Advisory Council, have also helped tie together
these extended infrastructural conversations, with members appearing and reappearing as new proposals
emerge. This approach to infrastructure has actually reinforced its apolitical hue in Cincinnati, making it
an increasingly more flexible and disarming tool for elites to exert their influence in the city.
This is not to say this approach is infallible. Gregory (1998) describes a similar combination of
development and technical arguments that the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ)
utilized unsuccessfully in New York City to justify the construction of a twenty-two mile public
transportation system to link Manhattan, LaGuardia Airport, and J.F.K. Airport (but no points in-between).
PANYNJ argued that the new monorail would cut traffic, improve the city’s global competitiveness, aid the
local environment, and generate jobs. Gregory observes closely the resistance to this proposal by middleincome African-American communities in Queens, who were fiercely opposed to monorail but largely
sidelined in the citywide debate (and even falsely represented as onboard with the PANYNJ plan in
national or regional media). The project eventually faltered because of escalating costs, a bidding
scandal, and other priorities for key actors. While Gregory admits that the PANYNJ elites were very
successful at “governing the public articulation of meaning and symbols” (1998: 246) around the project –
using divide-and-conquer to mute opposition and their preponderant resources to control framing – he
also points to how these elites were “less successful at imposing (or concealing) dominant worldviews”
(246). In Cincinnati, Halperin (1998) has similarly shown how groups affected by displacement on the
riverfront were able to describe the operations of power that they were confronting and call out sophistry
and discrimination. Even if marginalized communities are not always successful in turning back elite
infrastructural proposals, it is important to recognize the capacity of these groups to often accurately
diagnose the challenges they encounter. Just because developers and technical experts argue that
infrastructure will solve every problem does not mean everyone is appeased. As Gregory (1998) notes,
the important next step in these instances is to build linkages with other opposition groups and resist the
capacity of elite agencies to compartmentalize dissent.
Not only have I wanted to show how an ideology of growth has influenced the creation of
infrastructural systems as much as an ideology of science, but also that the relationship between the two
in Cincinnati is markedly different than for the creation of infrastructure under, for instance, socialist
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societies where central authorities often drive construction priorities (Collier 2011) or monarchical and
dictatorial contexts where autocratic rationales intermix with the logics of international development aid
(Rademacher 2011, Barnes 2014). Throughout Cincinnati’s history, infrastructure, particularly in its
inception and creation, has been an important grounds for divergent elite interests under a system of
liberal governance – which must constantly balance the desire to govern directly with the need to promote
personal freedom (Joyce 2003). Infrastructure has provided an opportunity for elites to come together and
resolve or negotiate regarding their objectives. While an urban planner and a real estate agent, or an
industrialist and a sanitary engineer, may have widely differing views about how the city should be
governed, through infrastructure they can create concrete compromises that enable them to interrelate
their discordant visions. This is another way of thinking about Star’s claim that infrastructure is “a
fundamentally relational concept” (1999: 380), since even in its conception and construction it is
dependent on the interactions of a wide range of actors. In this study, I develop the view that these
relationship are best characterized as an assemblage where the “members of an open whole never melt
into a collective body but instead maintain an energy potentially at odds” (Bennett 2005: 462). My interest
has been to show that this assemblage has transformed both proponents of scientific expertise and local
growth in particularized ways. This is not just about developers “using” scientists in order to advance their
own agendas, or vice versa, even though most histories have tended to interpret these interactions in this
way. Rather, it is important to show how these engagements alter both forms of understanding in their
shared practice.
Yet, at the same time, as my ethnographic research in Cincinnati showed, there are still stark
divides between developers and engineers, between industry and technical experts. Part of effectively
turning back these elite infrastructural proposals also requires paying attention to the specific
relationships that underpin each project. Returning to Gregory’s example (1998), there was no monolithic
PANYNJ seamlessly pursuing diverse technical and development objectives, but rather a collection of
often discordant interests brought together around the monorail. A critical response to elite-driven
infrastructural projects needs to find and exploit these differences, targeting the often tentative consensus
upon which these projects are established.
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Where does the river itself fit in this? An extensive literature has documented how infrastructural
projects like those found on the Cincinnati riverfront are intended to control and benefit from nature, even
though it constantly upsets and transforms the ends designed for it (Kaika 2005). More recently,
infrastructure has been more frequently designed to cooperate with or aid nature, since, as one
environmentalist I spoke to said, “sometimes [nature] needs help.” Yet, across these instances, it is still
assumed that nature represents an externalized non-social force, variable in its particulars but essentially
comparable across the globe (Tsing 2005). This view reinforces the assertion by Mitchell (2002) that the
separation of nature from society is a key means of legitimizing expertise, where experts claim that their
capacity for rational thought it what sets them outside of nature and thus makes them capable of
manipulating it. For Mitchell, inert non-social nature is a central link in a chain of analytical divisions that
undergird expertise: “In each case, the place and the claims of expertise are constituted in the separation
that seems to open up, opposing nature to technology, reality to its representation, objects to their value,
and the economy to the science of economics” (2002: 15, see also Latour 1993).
However, for the Ohio River – while these arguments have had significant relevance – at the
same time, I have argued across this study that looking at infrastructural proposals put together by both
representatives of scientific expertise and of local growth shows a more complicated vision of nature and
non-human actors. In many instances, the history in Cincinnati’s riverfront has shown that a more social
and cooperative vision of nature was used to configure the infrastructural proposals related to navigation,
flood control, and pollution abatement on the Ohio River. From the first OVIA convention, where a
speaker urged that “man must be a co-worker with nature to accomplish its purposes” (OVIA 1895: 20) to
the continued emphasis on learning from “Old Man River,” the case for this tendency to separate and
control nature has been balanced by multiple counterexamples. In particular, the contributions of
development actors have actually been crucial in this sense, representing a more local and
contextualized knowledge in these discussions about the Ohio River, one that is based on experience
45

rather than scientific training.

Despite the evidence for this, at times surprising, relationship to nature in

the creation of infrastructure for Cincinnati’s riverfront, I do not want to reproduce a romanticized view that
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I think Mitchell’s division between the “the economy” and the “science of economics” is very relevant in
this regard, since it points to the distinct kinds of knowledge claims one would expect from local growth
actors as opposed to professional experts (2002).

224

the actions of Cincinnati elites to recognize the social aspects of nature therefore translated to living in
respectful harmony with the Ohio River. Rather, this alternative form of knowing the river has been used
to make these infrastructures even more effective in meeting the goals of the elite parties that conceived
and pushed forward these projects, whether for capitalist gain, control over urban space, white
supremacy, improved public health, or other ends.
There are two caveats here. First, the river is not inherently the dutiful partner of white elite men
in Cincinnati. The Ohio River as an actor has no attachment to specific populations within the city or
elsewhere, and its behavior can help as much as hurt anyone who seeks to engage it. Yes, currently, the
river’s configuration largely favors the interests of local elites, but this should not be taken for granted.
This can and will change. Charting an alternative way forward needs to start by proactively thinking about
how to redefine this relationship with the Ohio River as a non-human actor, considering the priorities that
should structure our mutual engagement. As Smith (2008) consistently reminds us, this is not about
helping the river or other spaces of the environment return to a “natural state.” Instead the focus is on the
intrinsic relationship between producing nature and our efforts to reproduce human society (while also
recognizing that this does not imply the capacity to “control” nature). How much water does the city want
to consume? How do urban residents want to enjoy the river as a space of pleasure? Is navigation
important? If current arrangements are preferable how can more human and non-human actors benefit
from this relationship? The Ohio River is one of the few commons left in Cincinnati and residents could
much more strongly stake a claim in its future.
The second caveat is that this work is hard. As I described in the previous chapter, there are
relatively few individuals who engage directly with the river and many of them are elite actors (or operate
at the behest of elites). While they benefit from this exchange, these elites equally must be attendant to
Ohio River’s needs and desires. They spend countless hours studying pollution levels, observing flood
stages, and navigating its waters. I am not claiming that this engagement with the Ohio River improves
these actors, but it does place demands on them. While hundreds of thousands of people in Cincinnati
drink the river’s water or flush their sewage onto its banks (after treatment), they give little thought to what
they are asking the Ohio River to do. To understand and benefit from the river will require time and (often
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unpaid) work, both to establish new relationships and to unravel the existing behaviors concretized in the
thick networks of infrastructure along the riverfront.
The Cincinnati riverfront has been changed drastically by this past century of infrastructural
improvements. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the riverfront was both central and marginal,
located near employment, entertainment, and civic structures, but still accessible for low-income residents
and small-scale businesses, sustaining numerous mixed-race communities and opportunities for many
individuals along the shore. The Ohio River at this time, because it was both unstable but closely
integrated into Cincinnati’s social life, enabled this odd marginal/central position for the riverfront within
the city. Since then, perhaps more than any other place in Cincinnati, the riverfront has been the focus of
intensive infrastructuralization, particularly the Central Riverfront area where The Banks, the park system,
and remnants of industry coexist. As a long-time manager at a port facility pointed out, all the city’s
transportation infrastructure (navigation, rail, highways) point towards the Central Riverfront area, but
newer sanitation and flood-resilient infrastructures to promote “beautification” and “gentrification” have
also focused on the same area, creating a complex infrastructural entanglement that ties together multiple
elite interests. The result is a dense terrain of layered infrastructural systems, each with networks of
actors, many overlapping, invested in their system’s maintenance and improvements. With this increasing
density of infrastructural systems, the riverfront has become more costly to occupy and utilize. A local
development agency representative told me that due to these past infrastructural legacies, the cost of
developing property in Queensgate, a riverfront neighborhood just west of downtown, is roughly twenty
times more than the local average.
Following Vertesi (2014), within such densely layered infrastructural contexts, the capacity to
move across and align these different systems becomes increasingly important, crafting approaches that
reduce the “seams” between each new overlay. In Cincinnati, this has meant looking at the ways that
local elites have continued to promote infrastructural investments and seek to integrate their proposals
with existing systems, while also using their position to mediate access to the Ohio River itself. Most
recently, these efforts can be seen with the introduction of “comprehensive” approaches to infrastructure
that seek to resolve many riverfront problems (like transportation access, water quality, flooding, lack of
development, etc.) in tandem. While there is great promise in many of these efforts, the proposals have
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also largely continued to increase elite control over the riverfront, displacing remaining low-income
residents, and making access to the Ohio River more difficult. In summary, as the Cincinnati riverfront has
become the site of more and more infrastructural investment over the last century, I argue it has also –
counterintuitively given the stated objectives of many of these projects – become more and more
exclusionary and tightly-controlled.
Yet, the very concreteness of this infrastructure also provides the grounds for an alternative
politics to push back on this process. According to Bear, “Infrastructure makes durable in its forms
specific materialist ethics allowing people to claim a right to res publica or public things” (Venkatesan et al
2017: 5). The oft-stated “public benefit” objectives of these projects are built into the materiality of
infrastructure, which can be seized upon or repurposed to meet the needs of the local community. For
just one example, numerous archaeological examples point to the reuse of government walls to create
housing, taking the work invested in the former infrastructure and bending it to the needs of individuals. In
the case of the Cincinnati riverfront, this is about reframing the intentions of infrastructure. How can the
water pumping stations, flood-resilient parking garages, sewage treatment plants, navigation dams,
docks, and other infrastructure be recaptured for the public? Adapting Vertesi (2014), the potential need
here is to reconnect these systems that are already physically operating in the same space. A public
politics of the Cincinnati riverfront could then start by stitching together these disparate system, opening
“analytical opportunities for examining power structures in heterogeneous infrastructural environments”
(277). Public reevaluation of the Ohio River and the Cincinnati riverfront – one that begins by recognizing
the incredibly complex investments over the past century that have made the space what it is today –
would better prepare us to make a difference in shifting priorities in the future.
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